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RÉSUMÉ 
Cette thèse a pour objectif de fournir une analyse compréhensive des composantes de jure et 
de facto de la sécurité foncière des communautés locales en regard du cadre législatif, ainsi 
qu’une évaluation approfondie de l’interaction entre REDD+ et les accords fonciers actuels. 
La Thaïlande, pays dans lequel semblent coexister les droits fonciers de facto et les propriétés 
d’état de jure, fut sélectionnée comme cas d’étude. 
 Deux résultats principaux ressortent de cette étude. Tout d'abord, le cadre juridique ne 
reconnaissant pas le droit à la propriété ancestrale a conduit à différentes situations foncières 
de facto pour les communautés. Certaines communautés jouissent d’une occupation de leurs 
propriétés foncières de facto comparativement plus sécurisée que d'autres. Deuxièmement, il 
apparaît que le mécanisme REDD+ n’a pas représenté une incitation suffisante pour le 
gouvernement Thaïlandais à résoudre rapidement ces litiges fonciers. En outre, les risques 
inhérents à l'insécurité foncière décourage les investissements REDD+, pouvant aller jusqu’au 
retrait des financements. Ainsi, cette thèse complète la littérature existante sur le mécanisme 
REDD+ et le foncier sur trois aspects majeurs: (1) cadre légal et foncier, (2) foncier et 
déforestation et (3) concurrence entre la titularisation du foncier et la mise en place de 
REDD+. 
 Les implications politiques tirées de l'étude comprennent des mesures à long terme 
pour une réforme du régime foncier et à court/moyen terme pour une réévaluation des 
priorités du gouvernement afin d’assurer la cohérence des politiques vers la mise en œuvre de 
pilote REDD+ sous forme de paiement pour les services environnementaux (PES) et 
l'amélioration des structures institutionnelles. 
 
Mots clés: déboisement, réforme du régime foncier, forêt communautaire, paiement pour les 
services environnementaux, Asie du sud-est 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of de jure and de facto tenure security of 
local communities in relation to domestic legal framework and a thorough assessment of how 
REDD+ and current tenure arrangement interacts. Thailand, a country where there is an 
apparent coexistence of de jure state property and de facto tenure rights, was selected as a 
case study.  
 There are two primary findings emerging from the study. Firstly, the legal framework 
with non-recognized customary tenure led to different de facto tenure impacts in different 
communities. Some communities were found to have their de facto tenure comparatively 
more secure than others. Secondly, REDD+ could not provide sufficient incentive for the 
government to expedite tenure clarification. Moreover, the embedded risks of tenure 
insecurity discouraged REDD+ investment and led to withdrawal of the fund. The thesis 
contributes to the existing literature on REDD+ and tenure in three main aspects: (1) legal 
framework and tenure, (2) tenure and deforestation and (3) tenure clarification and REDD+ 
competing agendas. 
 Policy implications drawn from the study comprise of long-term measures namely 
comprehensive tenure reform and short to medium-term measures, including re-assessment of 
government priorities for policy consistency and pilot implementation in form of payment for 
environmental services (PES) and improvement of REDD+ institutional structure. 
 
Key words: deforestation, tenure reform, community forest, payment for environmental 
services, Southeast Asia 
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RÉSUMÉ SUBSTANTIEL 
Comme prévu par la décision adoptée par la Conférence des Parties (COP) 1/CP. 16 (III C 
paragraphe 73), le programme REDD+ sera mis en œuvre en plusieurs phases pour permettre 
aux pays participants de prendre en compte leurs spécificités et capacités respectives. La 
plupart de ces pays sont actuellement dans la phase de préparation, qui se concentre 
principalement sur l’élaboration de stratégies et de politiques nationales, l’acquisition et/ou le 
renforcement des compétences ainsi que les études de faisabilité. Au cours de cette phase de 
développement, une évaluation approfondie de la situation foncière locale et des activités 
pilotes REDD+ à l’échelle subnationale, c’est à dire sur différentes régions recouvrant une 
partie de l'ensemble du territoire national, pourrait fournir des indications utiles pour aider les 
pays à évaluer et définir les options les plus appropriées pour leurs futures stratégies REDD+ 
nationales. Ainsi, comme reconnu par la décision 1/CP. 16 (III C paragraphe 73), une telle 
approche subnationale, représente une étape clé vers une transition au niveau national. Il est 
intéressant de noter qu’à l’heure actuelle, la majorité de la bibliographie existante qui traite de 
l'influence du foncier sur le mécanisme REDD+ identifie la sécurité foncière comme l'un des 
facteurs centraux déterminant les impacts sociétaux et environnementaux du REDD+. 
 La notion prépondérante émergeant des études publiées est que, lorsque la sécurité 
foncière sur les zones de forêt est précaire, le mécanisme REDD+ peut, soit, offrir des 
opportunités, ou bien, constituer une menace pour les communautés vivant dans ces zones. En 
effet, dans le premier cas, le mécanisme REDD+ pourrait permettre l’accélération de la mise 
en place de réformes foncières et ainsi par ce biais, améliorer la sécurité foncière des 
communautés locales, entre autres avantages. À l’inverse, dans le second cas, en vue de la 
mise en application du programme REDD+, les communautés pourraient se voir dépossédées 
de leur terre, exclues et marginalisées, principalement de deux façons. Tout d'abord, la mise 
en œuvre du programme REDD+ pourrait imposer communautés locales de justifier leur 
sécurité foncière par des titres de propriété comme condition préalable à leur participation au 
programme, ce qui serait susceptible d’avoir pour conséquence d’exclure les communautés les 
plus pauvres. Deuxièmement, une des modalités possibles du mécanisme REDD+ est un 
accord contractuel pour l'amélioration de la gestion des forêts aux travers de paiements pour 
des services environnementaux (PSE). Ce type d’accord PSE se réfère à une transaction 
volontaire d'un service environnemental ou à l'utilisation de terres bien identifiées entre un 
fournisseur et un acheteur, soumise à la condition que le fournisseur garantisse la réalisation 
de services environnementaux. Ainsi, l'accord exige que les fournisseurs de services 
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environnementaux détiennent les droits de propriété, ou au moins les droits d'exclusivité de 
facto sur les terres et les ressources qu'ils s'engagent à protéger ou à gérer de manière durable. 
Or, certains utilisateurs des terres dans les régions tropicales souffrent de l'insécurité foncière 
et des droits insuffisants. Il est donc peu probable que ces utilisateurs faisant face à 
l'insécurité foncière de facto soient admissibles à des financements de projets 
environnementaux tels que pour la séquestration de carbone. 
 Dans de nombreux cas, les régimes fonciers dans les forêts reste incertains et contestés 
par des revendications conflictuelles exprimées par le gouvernement et les communautés 
locales. Aujourd'hui, les gens qui vivent dans les forêts continuent de réclamer un régime 
foncier coutumier, c’est à dire transmis de manière ancestrale, même si l’état ne reconnait 
souvent pas ces revendications pour les zones de forêt. Il est donc crucial de comprendre la 
situation foncière actuelle et comment le mécanisme REDD+ pourrait affecter le régime de la 
propriété foncière ainsi que la façon dont les lacunes du droit foncier peuvent limiter la mise 
en œuvre efficace du REDD+. Par conséquent, il apparaît que la question de l'insécurité 
foncière est susceptible de présenter des risques importants pour la réussite à long terme du 
programme REDD+ et nécessite donc une attention toute particulière alors que les pays sont 
en train de développer leur stratégies REDD+ nationales. 
 Malgré une préoccupation nationale et internationale croissante sur les implications du 
programme REDD+ sur le foncier des communautés tributaires des forêts, peu d'études 
scientifiques ont tenté d'évaluer les liens entre les deux, et seulement quelques-unes ont 
analysé les études pilotes REDD+ en Thaïlande. Cette étude vise à combler ces lacunes en 
matière de connaissances et est basée sur une étude de cas en Asie du sud-est en mettant 
l'accent sur la Thaïlande, où coexistent de jure propriétés de l'Etat et le régime foncier de 
facto. 
 Cette étude repose sur deux principales questions de recherche. La première pose la 
question: « Est-ce qu’à l'heure actuelle, le cadre juridique en l’état, avec les droits coutumiers 
non reconnus, produit des effets similaires de facto pour toutes les communautés? », question 
basée sur l'hypothèse que les communautés révèlent différents impacts de facto en raison de 
contextes locaux distincts. La deuxième question de recherche demande: « Comment la mise 
en œuvre du programme REDD+ affecte le foncier de jure et de facto des communautés 
locales? » L'hypothèse correspondante est que la mise en œuvre de REDD+ permettrait de 
renforcer à la fois le droit et le foncier de jure et de facto des communautés locales. Par 
conséquent, la présente étude offre une analyse empirique de la situation foncière actuelle en 
Thaïlande ainsi que des résultats des premières interventions du projet REDD+. Cette étude 
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tire et discute également un ensemble de données afin d'enrichir le débat en cours sur la 
relation entre REDD+ et foncier, plus précisément en référence à l’impact du REDD+ sur les 
régimes fonciers, la réforme foncière et les programmes concurrents au REDD+. 
 Les données nécessaires pour répondre à ces questions, ont été collectées grâce à des 
méthodes primaires comprenant des enquêtes de terrain, des discussions de groupe, des 
entretiens en profondeur et une revue de la bibliographie existante. Neuf à dix participants du 
même sexe et de la même tranche d'âge étaient rassemblés par groupe de discussion en vue 
d'améliorer la représentativité des échantillons, avec un total de quatre groupes (39-40 
participants) par communauté: hommes de 20-49 ans, femmes de 20-49 ans, hommes de 50-
79 et femmes de 50-79. Des enquêtes ont été aussi menées sur les participants aux groupes de 
discussion. Les entretiens en profondeur ont été conduite auprès d'informateurs clés impliqués 
dans la mise en œuvre d'un cadre juridique foncier pour soutenir le projet pilote REDD+ dans 
la zone d'étude. Les personnes interrogées comprenaient des membres du comité des 
communautés, des responsables gouvernementaux, des organisations non-gouvernementales 
et les bailleurs de fonds, ce qui a permis de recouper, trianguler et enrichir les données 
obtenues à partir des communautés. 
 Un total de quatre communautés a été choisi pour l'étude. D’une part, deux sont 
réparties dans les régions du nord de la Thaïlande, incluant les communautés Mae Sa Mai et 
Mae Sa Noi qui ont été sélectionnes en raison de leur occupation de terrains forestiers 
appartenant juridiquement à l'état, et de leur implication dans un certain nombre de conflits 
fonciers locaux pour tenter d’améliorer leur sécurité foncière et la probabilité de 
développement PSE/REDD+ dans la région. D’autre part, deux communautés des régions de 
l'ouest de la Thaïlande, les communautés Ton Mamuang et Bongti Noi, qui ont été choisies en 
raison du statut juridique de leur foncier appartenant à l'état et de leur implication dans le 
projet BCI, considéré comme une des activités pilotes REDD+ de la Thaïlande selon R-PIN 
2009. 
 En ce qui concerne la première question de recherche, les résultats obtenus confirment 
l'hypothèse de départ, en faisant ressortir deux principaux résultats qui contribuent de deux 
façons différentes à la connaissance existante sur la sécurité foncière de facto, dans un 
contexte où coexistent les systèmes fonciers statutaires et coutumiers sans liens formels. 
D’une part, ces résultats indiquent que, chez certaines communautés, le cadre juridique a 
donné lieu à l'insécurité foncière de facto des communautés locales, et, d’autre part, ils 
montrent aussi qu’un cadre juridique similaire a, au contraire, abouti à la sécurité du foncier 
de facto pour d'autres collectivités. En outre, ces résultats offrent un éclairage sur les raisons 
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potentielles de ces différents niveaux de sécurité foncière de facto observés chez les 
communautés locales. 
 Le premier résultat principal attrayant a la première question indique que, dans le 
passé, les quatre communautés étudiées ont indiqué que leur sécurité foncière de facto a été 
affectée par le cadre juridique, notamment la loi sur les parcs nationaux et la loi sur les 
réserves forestières nationales. En effet, la désignation des parcs nationaux et des réserves 
forestières nationales a été déclarée à l'échelle nationale sans aucune consultation publique 
préalable, dans le cadre de l'effort du gouvernement pour conserver les forêts. Ainsi établis, la 
plupart des parcs nationaux et des réserves forestières nationales se chevauchent néanmoins 
largement avec les installations préexistantes de nombreuses communautés locales. Ces deux 
lois ayant interdit l'occupation et l'utilisation des terres à l'intérieur des aires désignées, ont, 
par conséquent, rendu illégale l’occupation des terres par les communautés locales. Ainsi, 
suite à cette superposition des nouvelles institutions officielles sur les arrangements informels 
préexistants, la sécurité foncière des quatre communautés résidant à l'intérieur des terres 
forestières appartenant, de fait à l'état, a été contestée et les menaces d'expulsion forcée ont 
été adressées comme une conséquence du cadre juridique. Ces revendications conflictuelles, 
faites à la fois par l'état et les collectivités locales, ont conduit à de fréquents affrontements 
avec un sentiment d’amertume entre les deux parties, allant même dans le passé jusqu’à de 
violentes représailles par les communautés. Bien que la situation de facto du foncier a évolué 
au fil du temps et que certaines mesures de résolution des conflits ont été mises en œuvre, 
actuellement, les deux communautés de la région de l'Ouest sont restées généralement sans 
exclusivité vis-à-vis des autorités et redoutent encore des expulsions forcées. Par ailleurs, les 
autorités gouvernementales ont commencé à réguler la capacité des communautés à retirer des 
produits forestiers de la forêt communautaire. Ces résultats apparaissent en accord avec la 
littérature existante, suggérant les effets négatifs du cadre juridique sur la sécurité foncière de 
facto des communautés locales en Thaïlande à l'heure actuelle. 
 La seconde conclusion principale découlant de la première question de recherche est 
qu’actuellement, le foncier de facto de certaines communautés locales s'est amélioré, même 
sans progrès significatif du cadre juridique. Malgré le manque de reconnaissance juridique de 
leur propriété ou de titre d’ayant droit, les résultats de cette analyse montrent que les deux 
communautés étudiées dans les régions du nord de la Thaïlande, avaient le sentiment général 
que leurs propriétés foncières étaient garanties. Ces communautés semblent avoir compris et 
intégrer le fait qu'elles peuvent avoir des droits d'exclusivité contre tout utilisateur 
incompatible, y compris les autorités de l'état. En outre, la plupart des membres n'ont pas peur 
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de l'expulsion forcée de leurs installations. De plus, l’implémentation des règles régissant 
l'accès, l'utilisation et la gestion des forêts communautaires a été initiée et mise en œuvre par 
les communautés elles-mêmes, plutôt que d'être imposée par les autorités. Ces nouveaux 
résultats introduisent donc des nuances dans le débat en cours sur la sécurité du foncier des 
communautés dépendantes des forêts en Thaïlande. En même temps, ces résultats enrichissent 
le débat international sur la sécurité d'occupation des arrangements fonciers locaux en 
fournissant des preuves empiriques qui démontrent la présence de sécurité foncière de facto 
des communautés locales, même sans reconnaissance foncière légale. De plus, l'étude propose 
qu’un contexte local d’action collective forte, de réponse stratégique à l'insécurité foncière et 
d’assistance de médiateurs locaux, sont autant de facteurs qui façonnent le lien entre les 
arrangements fonciers locaux et la sécurité foncière de facto, dans les cas où le régime foncier 
coutumier n'est pas reconnu légalement. 
 Bien que les résultats concernant la deuxième question de recherche ne s’associent pas 
pour confirmer l'hypothèse correspondante, deux observations majeures en ressortent. Ces 
observations contribuent à la discussion sur les impacts du mécanisme REDD+ sur le foncier 
des communautés locales, en fournissant des preuves empiriques qui montrent la capacité 
limitée du REDD+ à faire progresser l'amélioration foncière, contrairement aux attentes 
exprimées par certains auteurs dans la littérature. En outre, sur la base de la mise en œuvre de 
l'expansion du parc national, qui a été répertoriée comme l'une des mesures REDD+ dans le 
R-PIN 2009, il est souligné que le programme REDD+ pourrait engendrer certains impacts 
négatifs sur le régime foncier des communautés locales, par le biais d'appropriation de la terre 
et le retrait des droits fonciers des communautés locales. En outre, l'étude met en évidence un 
obstacle tout autant ou plus préoccupant à la mise en application REDD+, que sont les 
programmes gouvernementaux concurrents. 
 En ce qui concerne la deuxième question de recherche, une première partie des 
principaux résultats obtenus indiquent que, contrairement à l'hypothèse initialement formulée 
et à un nombre croissant d'études selon lesquelles la mise en œuvre du mécanisme REDD+ 
inciterait à une accélération des réformes foncières, les avancées actuelles du projet pilote 
REDD+ en Thaïlande suggèrent que le mécanisme REDD+ pourrait, en réalité, ne pas être en 
mesure de fournir des incitations suffisantes, ni pour accélérer les réformes foncières ni pour 
améliorer la sécurité foncière des communautés locales. Dans les faits, les résultats obtenus 
révèlent que le foncier de jure et la sécurité foncière des deux communautés des régions à 
l'ouest de la Thaïlande, qui ont toutes deux participé au projet pilote REDD+ ou BCI, 
n’étaient pas vraiment affectés par le programme REDD+, malgré la demande de ces 
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communautés d'amélioration de leur sécurité foncière à travers ce projet. Par ailleurs, ces 
résultats montrent que le gouvernement Thaïlandais ne s'est pas engagé à clarifier sa position 
sur le régime foncier en vue de la mise en œuvre du mécanisme REDD+. Les conflits fonciers 
forestiers non résolus et l'exclusion potentielle des communautés locales impliquent un certain 
nombre de risques tels que le risque de réputation (être perçu comme soutenant des projets 
aux impacts sociétaux négatifs) et le risque de non permanence (émissions de gaz plus élevées 
à l'avenir en raison d’activités incompatibles avec les utilisateurs actuels des terres). Par 
conséquent, les risques d'investissement liés à l'insécurité foncière ont entraîné le retrait des 
investissements REDD+ et donc empêché la mise en œuvre complète du programme REDD+. 
Dans ce contexte, l'insécurité foncière qui prévaut dans les terres forestières représente donc 
un problème qui pourrait mettre en péril le succès à long terme du programme REDD+. Ainsi, 
ces résultats ne confirment pas l'hypothèse formulée initialement qui affirmait une 
amélioration de la sécurité foncière grâce au mécanisme REDD+. 
 La seconde partie des principaux résultats issus de la deuxième question de recherche 
indique que l'existence même de programmes concurrents aux mécanisme REDD+ pourrait 
être l'une des causes de l'absence de volonté politique forte de se lancer dans des réformes 
foncières, afin d’assurer et de pérenniser le succès à long terme du mécanisme REDD+. Ce 
manque de volonté et d'engagement pour faire progresser la clarification du positionnement 
politique sur le foncier a été observé au cours des dernières décennies durant lesquelles, le 
gouvernement Thaïlandais a été réticent à abandonner le contrôle des zones de forêt contenant 
de nombreuses ressources en bois précieux au profit des communautés locales, et a peu 
répondu aux demandes populaires initiées depuis les années 1990 appelant à la 
reconnaissance juridique des droits des communautés à la terre de la forêt. Cela a eu tendance 
à se poursuivre au cours des années récentes, même avec le développement du programme 
REDD+. De même, les efforts de lutte contre la déforestation, soutenus dans le cadre du 
REDD+, sont restés limités comme exemplifié par la justification du choix du site pilote. 
Cette situation pourrait probablement être expliquée par l'existence de programmes 
gouvernementaux concurrents. En effet, dans le même temps, un certain nombre de politiques 
et de priorités fondamentales, voulues par le gouvernement et se rapportant au secteur 
agricole, sont rentrées directement en concurrence avec la conservation des forêts en 
Thaïlande. En outre, un certain nombre d'études ont révélé un lien étroit entre la promotion de 
la culture de rente et la déforestation en Thaïlande au cours des dernières décennies. Par 
conséquent, en vertu de l'absence de volontés politiques fortes et de l'existence d’ordres du 
jour gouvernementaux concurrents, la convergence éventuelle de l'ordre du jour et des 
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politiques gouvernementales pour prévaloir le programme REDD+ semblent peu plausibles 
en Thaïlande en l’état. Dans ce cas, il est prévisible que les politiques contradictoires 
existantes ou à venir pourraient aller à l'encontre de l'effort de réduction des émissions des gaz 
à effet de serre provenant du secteur de la forêt, ou dans le pire des cas, engendrer la 
conversion des forêts dans des proportions qui pourraient causer l’augmentation des 
émissions nationales. 
 Sur la base des résultats et des discussions présentées, un certain nombre 
d’implications politiques, et de suggestions clés pour la création de conditions propices à 
l’établissement du programme REDD+ ont été tirées de cette étude. L’analyse du cas de la 
Thaïlande met en évidence qu’un régime foncier clair et sécurisé est une condition nécessaire 
à la réussite à long terme du projet REDD+ pour une gestion durable des forêts et 
l'amélioration des moyens d’existence des communautés. Cependant, des réformes foncières 
sans application effective de la part de l’exécutif pourraient engendrer des risques pour la 
réussite future de la mise en œuvre du programme REDD+, tout en exacerbant les inégalités 
actuelles pour l’appropriation des terres et des futurs bénéfices REDD+. Essentiellement, 
l'absence en vigueur d'une forte volonté politique implique que la réforme légale du régime 
foncier serait susceptible d'être lente, coûteuse et pourrait ne pas offrir les résultats attendus 
sur la sécurité foncière des communautés locales. Il advient ainsi, qu’offrir des mandats 
fonciers exécutoires pour les communautés locales pourrait être une mesure à long terme. 
Dans le court et moyen terme, le programme REDD+ nécessite des mesures immédiates pour 
permettre sa mise en œuvre rapide tout en faisant face aux pressions économiques en 
compétition, qui souhaitent la conversion des terres forestières pour d'autres productions 
agricoles et qui menacent de supplanter les incitations financières offertes par REDD+. Les 
mesures potentielles à court et à moyen terme comprennent: 
 Tout d'abord, les politiques nationales et le cadre juridique existants ainsi que les 
priorités du gouvernement pourraient être évalués par rapport à leur cohérence avec les 
objectifs du programme REDD+. Cela englobe les politiques dans tous les secteurs pertinents 
de la déforestation, tels que l'agriculture, l'exploitation minière, la foresterie et le 
développement des infrastructures. Par conséquent, les politiques avec des incitations contre 
productives, des lacunes juridiques ou des priorités conflictuelles, qui auraient des 
répercussions sur la déforestation et l’accès à la propriété des communautés locales 
dépendantes des forêts, doivent être identifiés. En réponse, des mesures provisoires 
correspondantes pourraient être établies pour stopper le développement non durable ou les 
arrangements fonciers instables, le temps que les priorités du gouvernement soient réévaluées. 
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Même si des changements juridiques de fond et des réformes foncières abouties sont 
nécessaires à long terme, l'identification, à court terme, de l'incohérence et de la mise en 
œuvre de mesures politiques provisoires pourraient également réduire la déforestation 
galopante et faciliter le développement du mécanisme REDD+ dans le cadre juridique 
existant. 
 Deuxièmement, en raison de la double absence de clarté sur le statut foncier de jure de 
l'occupation des zones de forêt par les communautés locales et sur la propriété des quotas de 
carbone, les programmes pilotes REDD+ pourraient être menés en tant que projets PSE dans 
un premier temps, ceci dans le but de se développer à long terme en un régime national PSE. 
L’utilisation des attributs PSE et des activités de compensation plutôt que des mandats 
carbones, non seulement, permettrait d’éviter la bureaucratie fastidieuse du carbone liée à la 
mesure, la vérification, la validation et la vente du carbone, mais aussi, les communautés 
locales bénéficiant déjà d’une gestion de facto suffisante et de droits exclusifs sur leurs 
propriétés, pourraient être inclues et bénéficier du PSE, sans attendre une clarification sur la 
propriété de carbone qui risquerait de les exclure en tant que bénéficiaires. Nos résultats 
suggèrent que les deux communautés du nord étudiées semblent avoir une gestion de facto et 
des droits exclusifs, et donc, être en mesure de s’engager dans un projet de protection des 
forêts à long terme, même sans la reconnaissance formelle de leur foncier par les autorités. 
D’après nos observations, ces communautés possèdent les attributs suivants: 
• Une capacité de conservation de la forêt éprouvée. Par exemple, la création et la 
gestion par les communautés locales d’activités de reboisement et de conservation des 
forêts avec l’apport de preuves régulières de résultats positifs pour les forêts. 
• Une action collective forte. Par exemple, l'application rigoureuse des règles 
communautaires régissant la gestion de la forêt. 
• Des droits de gestion et des droits exclusifs de facto. Par exemple, la jouissance de 
l’autonomie et de la responsabilité principale dans le maintien et la gestion de la forêt 
communautaire, avec exclusivité vis-à-vis de tous les autres utilisateurs des terres 
incompatibles, y compris les autorités de l'État. 
• Bonnes relations avec les autorités. Par exemple, l’établissement d’une relation de 
collaboration et de confiance mutuelle entre la communauté et les autorités locales 
pour la gestion forestière et l'application des lois. 
 
 Les communautés possédant les attributs requis ne devraient pas être négligées comme 
participants potentiels à la mise en place du projet REDD+, malgré le contexte actuel de non 
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clarification du régime foncier. Leurs efforts de conservation et de bonnes pratiques de 
gestion durable des forêts devraient être encouragés et être éligibles en tant qu’activités 
REDD+. En revanche, les communautés sans les attributs prescrits, obtiendraient 
certainement moins de succès dans un engagement au programme REDD+ ou à un accord 
contractuel pour la conservation des forêts à long terme, tant que l’officialisation de leur 
régime coutumier n’est pas réalisé. Une action collective faible et le manque de capacité 
éprouvée pour la conservation des forêts de la part de telles communautés, jettent ainsi des 
doutes quant à savoir si elles sont véritablement capables d’engager des activités de 
conservation des forêts. Il en résulte que, sans le droit de facto minimum d'exclure ou de 
gérer, la pérennité des activités de protection de la forêt à long terme pourrait ne pas être 
assurée. L’existence même de conflits en cours avec les autorités, exacerbés par le manque de 
confiance mutuelle, empêche les communautés de conclure un accord contractuel avec le 
gouvernement, en particulier le type d’accord prévoyant des récompenses après l'achèvement 
d’un projet plutôt qu’avant le démarrage d’un projet. 
 Idéalement, l’acquisition du titre de propriété communautaire, englobant à la fois la 
zone de forêt communautaire et les parcelles agricoles individuelles de chacun des membres 
de la communauté, conformément au règlement du Cabinet du Premier ministre régissant les 
titres de propriété communautaires, pourrait être accorde en tant que récompenses à 
l'achèvement d’une activité REDD+. Ce genre de récompense en nature devrait être 
développée parce que les paiements PSE seuls peuvent ne pas être suffisants pour inciter à 
l'utilisation des sols. Le document officiel, fournissant à la communauté les droits d'utilisation 
et de gestion sur la forêt communautaire et les terres agricoles, pourrait être révoqué si la forêt 
communautaire n'était pas bien entretenue ou si un membre de la communauté vendait les 
terres agricoles à des partis externes. En parallèle, ceci implique la modification de plusieurs 
lois contradictoires afin de rendre ce concept réalisable. Les activités liées au REDD+ 
pourraient alors être considérées comme des activités de reboisement ou d'entretien de la forêt 
et être menées en collaboration avec les autorités locales, qui seraient alors en charge de 
transférer le paiement et les responsabilités de mise en œuvre aux communautés locales, en 
conformité avec les législation portant sur les parcs nationaux et sur les réserves naturelles. 
 Troisièmement, en ce qui concerne le groupe de travail REDD+, tel que décrit par la 
R-PP soumis au FCPF en 2013, il semble déjà avoir un positionnement multi-ministériel et 
multisectoriel. Toutefois, plusieurs améliorations pourraient être apportées. L’ajout de 
membres ministériels supplémentaires, ayant une pertinence avec la déforestation et donc 
avec les enjeux du programme REDD+, comme le département de l’irrigation Royale 
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(construction de barrages), le département des industries primaires et des Mines (mines) et de 
l'Autorité du Tourisme de Thaïlande (tourisme), pourraient être inclus. De même, le secteur 
privé, incluant les principaux acteurs des industries agro-alimentaires, de l'énergie et de 
l'industrie du papier, devrait également être parties prenantes, à condition, étant donné que 
leurs rôles dans le groupe de travail REDD+ pourraient être bien définis. Plutôt que d'être un 
organisme distinct, le groupe de travail REDD+ devrait faire partie du Comité national sur le 
changement climatique afin de participer à l'élaboration du plan de politique national de lutte 
contre le changement climatique, et veiller à ce que ce plan soit cohérent au programme 
REDD+. En outre, le Comité, est présidé par le Premier ministre pourrait faire bénéficier le 
Groupe de travail REDD+ d’une autorité solide face aux politiques ou cadres juridiques 
contradictoires. De même, une coordination étroite entre le Groupe de travail REDD+ et 
l'unité gérant l'inventaire des gaz à effet de serre, devrait être mise en place afin de s'assurer 
que l'inventaire de ces gaz soit bien achevé dans les délais impartis. Pour cela, les instruments 
juridiques avec des marges de flexibilité comme les protocoles d'accord, les contrats ou 
accords officiels, pourraient être envisagés. Idéalement, l'équipe de l'inventaire des gaz à effet 
de serre, de l'agriculture, de la foresterie et autres secteurs utilisant des terres, devrait avoir 
des postes permanents pour s’assurer que les compétences techniques et la mémoire 
institutionnelle ne soient pas perdues, et, d’autres parts qu’il existe une continuité dans les 
cycles d’inventaire des gaz à effet de serre. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This introductory chapter gives a brief outline of the research subject and problem. It also 
defines the key terms frequently used in the thesis. After reviewing the current body of 
literature related to tenure and REDD+ issue, the prevailing knowledge gaps are identified. 
Correspondingly, the chapter presents research objective, research questions to be addressed, 
hypotheses to be examined and scope of the thesis. The chapter ends with the structure of this 
thesis.  
1.1. Brief introduction 
Deforestation and other land use changes accounted for about 8% of global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in 2012 (Le Quéré, Peters et al. 2013). The effective mitigation of climate 
change by stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentration is therefore unlikely if the problem of 
forest loss is not addressed. As envisaged by the Cancun Agreements in 2010 as a result of the 
16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16), REDD+ is a mechanism that could reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation, while delivering benefits such as conservation and 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks by creating a 
financial value for carbon stored in forests as an incentive for developing countries (UNFCCC 
2010).  
 As indicated in the COP decision 1/CP. 16 (III C Paragraph 73), REDD+ will be 
implemented in phases to allow the participating countries to take into account their national 
circumstances (UNFCCC 2010). Most countries are currently in readiness phase, which 
focuses on the development of national strategies, policies, capacity building and 
demonstration activities. During this stage of REDD+ development, thorough assessment of 
REDD+ pilots could provide lessons learned to support countries in assessing options for 
future national REDD+ strategies. Much of the existing literature that addresses the influence 
of tenure on REDD+ identifies tenure security as one of the crucial issues shaping social and 
environmental impacts of REDD+ (Unruh 2008; Sunderlin, Larson et al. 2009; Sikor, Stahl et 
al. 2010).  
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 The competing notion emerging from the existing literature is that, where tenure 
security over forest is weak, REDD+ can pose threats or opportunities to local communities. 
On the one hand, REDD+ could help expediting tenure reform and thereby enhancing tenure 
security of forest-dependent communities, among other benefits (Larson, Corbera et al. 2010; 
Evans, Arpels et al. 2012; Larson, Brockhaus et al. 2013). On the other hand, in view of 
REDD+ implementation, the communities could be dispossessed, excluded and marginalized 
primarily in two ways. Firstly, REDD+ could insist on imposing tenure security through land 
titling as a prerequisite for participating local communities, the poor communities are likely to 
be excluded (Eraker 2000; Brown, Adger et al. 2004; Jindal, Swallow et al. 2008). Secondly, 
one of the potential modalities of REDD+ is a contractual agreement for improved forest 
management namely payment for environmental services (PES). It requires the providers of 
environmental services to hold property rights, at least de facto exclusion rights on land and 
resources they commit to protect or to manage sustainably (Wunder 2005; Wunder 2007). 
However, many land users in the tropics remain with perceived tenure insecurity and 
insufficient rights. (Wunder 2005; Wunder 2007). Therefore, it is doubtful whether the users 
with insecure de facto tenure would be eligible for benefits from carbon sequestration 
projects. 
 In many cases, tenure arrangements in forests remains unclear and contested with 
overlapping claims made by the government and local communities (Robinson 2008; Knox, 
Caron et al. 2011; Naughton-Treves and Day 2012). Today, people living in forests continue 
to claim customary tenure, even though states often do not recognize such claims to forest 
area. See, for example Galudra, van Noordwijk et al. (2011) and Colchester (2007). Therefore 
it is crucial to comprehend how REDD+ may affect existing land tenure regime as well as 
how weaknesses in tenure system may limit effective its implementation. The issue of tenure 
insecurity is likely to pose significant risks to the long-term success of REDD+ and 
henceforth requires additional attention as countries develop national strategies.  
Despite the growing concerns over REDD+ implication on tenure as the subject of 
international and national debates, there are nevertheless very few scientific reports have 
attempted to assess the links between REDD+ and de jure and de facto tenure of forest-
dependent communities and a limited number of studies based on the REDD pilot project of 
Thailand. This study therefore aims to fill in these knowledge gaps by using Thailand, where 
there is an apparent coexistence of de facto tenure rights and de jure state property, as a case 
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study. The study offers empirical evidences of REDD+ intervention outcome. It also provides 
lessons learned in order to enrich the on-going debate of REDD+ and tenure relationship. 
Despite being an early evaluation of the pilot project activities, the assessment could 
nonetheless generate valuable insights into the potential challenges and risks of REDD+, 
which could serve as a useful starting point in the process to improve its implementation 
across Thailand and other developing nations. 
1.2. Definition 
This section describes working definition of key terms intensively used in this thesis, they are: 
land tenure, tenure security and REDD+. 
1.2.1.$Land$tenure$$
The nature of land tenure is defined in many diverse ways in each jurisdiction. One of the 
basic differences lies in the extent of ownership, exclusivity and alienability. Definition of 
land tenure in this thesis is based on the concept of land tenure as bundle of rights developed 
by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). The bundle according to Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
comprises of access, withdrawal or use, management, exclusion and alienation rights. Access 
rights refer to the rights to enter a defined physical property (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). For 
example, if a group of travellers hold rights of access, they have the authority to enter a 
resource. Withdrawal rights are the rights to obtain products of the resources (Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992), such as timber and non-timber forest products from the forests. In other words, 
withdrawal rights authorize harvesting from a particular resource. Management rights allow 
the holder to regulate internal use pattern and transform the resource by making 
improvements (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). For example, the rights holder of forest resources 
may determine how, when and where timber harvesting and forest product gathering may 
occur. Furthermore the rights holder may also decide to adjust the land and make decisions on 
whether and where to plant or cut down trees in the area. The rights of exclusion authorize its 
holders to define requirements or qualifications of that individuals must meet in order to 
access the resource (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). This implies that the rights holder can not 
only determine who will have access and withdrawal rights but also exclude certain 
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individuals with incompatible use of the resource (Ostrom 2000). In application to forest 
resource, the rights holder can allow certain individuals to enter and use the forest area or 
collect forest products and can prevent other individuals with competitive use of the forest 
from entering and using the resource as well. Alienation rights represents the rights to 
transfer, sell or lease the resource (Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ostrom 2000). Alienating the 
resources means that an individual transfers the rights of management, exclusion or both. 
Upon alienating such rights, the former rights holder can no longer exercise any authority 
related to the resource. However, in many developing countries, sales or transfer of rights to 
resources to descendants does not necessarily imply the complete transfer of rights as the 
previous owner may hold certain rights even after the transfer (Chauveau, Colin et al. 2006). 
Such situation generally generates conflicts and is referred to as incomplete contracts (Hart 
and Moore 1990) or imperfect commodification of land (Le Roy 1995). It should be noted 
however that only be able to transfer the rights of use and withdrawal is not equivalent to 
alienation rights that include both transfer of management and exclusion rights (Schlager and 
Ostrom 1992). This is because these rights are defined by others, who hold the rights of 
management and exclusion. Such rights holder is called an authorized user, who lacks the 
authority to devise his or her own harvesting rules. 
 Evidently, diverse tenure arrangements allocate different combination of rights to 
various actors; it is possible to have withdrawal rights described as usufructs, which give 
people the right to use lands or forests but not the alienation rights to transfer them (Schlager 
and Ostrom 1992). In other words, right holders may hold different rights that do not 
encompass the entire set of rights defined above. Unlike other resources where the five rights 
are generally independent of one another, in relation to forest resources, these rights are 
frequently held in an associated manner. For this thesis, land tenure composes of the 
following rights, as displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1 Bundle of rights 
Rights Description 
Access and withdrawal To enter and make use of products of the resource 
Management To regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource 
Exclusion To determine who will have an access rights  
Alienation To sell, lease or transfer management rights or exclusion rights or both 
Source: Adapted from Schlager and Ostrom (1992) and Ostrom (2000) 
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1.2.2.$Tenure$security$
Tenure security is defined as the degree to which an individual or a group believes that its 
relationship to land or other resources is safe (Larson, Barry et al. 2010). Security does not 
refer to duration, marketability or breadth of rights over a piece of land; these are all 
components of a particular from of tenure (Sjaastad and Bromley 2000; Van den Brink, 
Thomas et al. 2006). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (2006), unless 
people’s rights to land are legitimated formally or informally by the social context, tenure 
security is not guaranteed. Tenure security can therefore be derived from formal and 
customary legal institutions and officials that give landholders recognition of their rights to 
land and confidence that these rights will be upheld. The erosion of tenure security can occur 
in the situations where authorities are not able to or do not wish to enforce land rights or 
where customary tenure regimes break down and lose legitimacy (FAO, 2006). Alternatively, 
it could occur in a situation, where de jure rights (rights originated from and enforced by the 
government) and de facto rights (rights originated among and enforced by resource users) 
overlap and in conflict (Schlager and Ostrom 1992). People whose tenure is insecure face the 
risk that their rights to land can be threatened by competing claims or even lost as a result of 
eviction. Without security of tenure, households are impaired in their ability to attain 
sufficient food and to enjoy sustainable rural livelihoods. 
 Conventional wisdom associates tenure insecurity with the absence of individualized 
land title. Formal titles that are recognized and enforced by the government implies security 
of land claim (Alston, Libecap et al. 1994). In other words, individualized land title equals 
tenure security (Feder and Feeny 1991; de Soto 2000). International development 
organizations such as the World Bank also has advocated this assumption (Whitehead and 
Tsikata 2003; Peters 2007). Reservations nonetheless have been expressed about the 
conventional concept of tenure security that also underlies the Bank’s position. Writes 
Platteau (1996); (2000) among others, beneficial effects of individualized titling are over-
estimated and community-based approach to tenure security is a preferable alternative. In 
application to Thailand, where individual title deed remains the supreme form of title 
document in terms of tenure security both among the local communities and the officials, 
presence of formal legal title deed is therefore considered in this thesis as one of the indicators 
for de jure tenure security. Additional to the absence of legal title, Angelsen (2007) on the 
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other hand defines tenure security by linking to possibility for eviction. Indeed, the degree of 
confidence that land users will not be arbitrarily deprived of the rights they enjoy over land 
and that the land users are protected against forced evictions is widely adopted as one of the 
indicators for tenure security (Feder and Onchan 1987; Bazoglu, Sietchiping et al. 2011). 
Following the concept, this thesis adopts fear of intergenerational eviction, which also implies 
withdrawal of rights to land, as one of the indicators of de facto tenure security (Table 2).  
Table 2 Tenure security criteria 
Criteria Description 
Legal recognition The formalization of rights to customary land to members of local communities 
Fear of eviction The fear of potential intergenerational eviction and resettlement among local community members 
 
There is an increasing recognition among development researchers that formal tenure 
is not always sufficient to impact landholders’ decision-making, instead it is the perception of 
tenure is what matters (Broegaard 2005), c.f. widely accepted assumption that land titling 
equates tenure security (Feder and Feeny 1991; Deininger and Feder 2009). Therefore, the 
issue of tenure security – both de jure and de facto rights – has become the focus of many 
recent discussions. 
1.2.3.$REDD+$
REDD+ is a mechanism that aims to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation, while delivering benefits such as conservation and sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks by ascribing financial value for carbon stored 
in forests in developing countries (UNFCCC 2010). Activities and objectives of REDD+ are 
described in paragraph 70 of the Cancun Agreements as (UNFCCC 2010):  
“Encourages developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest 
sector by undertaking the following activities, as deemed appropriate by each Party and in 
accordance with their respective capabilities and national circumstances: 
(i) Reducing emissions from deforestation; 
(ii) Reducing emissions from forest degradation; 
(iii) Conservation of forest carbon stocks;  
(iv) Sustainable management of forest; 
(v) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks ” 
 7 
Activities (i) and (ii) are known as REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 
and Forest Degradation). The latter activities, which constitute the ‘plus’ in the term REDD+, 
reflects an inclusion of activities that extend beyond the efforts to curtail deforestation and 
degradation. These activities under which they will be undertaken are both referred to as 
REDD+ in this paper.  
Regarding historical development of REDD+, the mechanism was introduced to the 
international climate change debate originally in 2005; the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 
led by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea proposed an establishment of a mechanism called 
reducing emissions from deforestation (RED) in developing countries in the 11th COP 
(UNFCCC 2006). The principle idea of such mechanism was to address the challenge of 
global climate change, while providing developing countries with positive financial incentives 
for reducing emissions from their forest sector. The issue later turned into the central area of 
interest in the climate change debate in early 2007, fuelled by the publication of the United 
Kingdom government’s Stern review on the economics of climate change. In his report, it is 
recommended that avoided deforestation measures should be included in the post-2012 
commitment period under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) as a cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Stern 2007).  
Reducing emissions from deforestation was then formally adopted in Bali Action Plan 
at 13th COP in 2007. Since its inception, the Parties to the UNFCCC have had extensive 
discussions about the scope of activities. From reduced emissions from deforestation or RED, 
the scope was expanded to REDD with additional consideration to forest degradation 
(UNFCCC 2006). Then the scope was broadened to further include forest conservation, 
sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks and named REDD+ 
because the added activities are also essential for achieving climate goals (Lawlor, Jenkins et 
al. 2010).  
According to Bali Action Plan, the Parties committed to work towards climate change 
mitigation efforts that include: “[…] Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues 
relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing 
countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement 
of forest carbon stocks in developing countries […]” (UNFCCC 2008). The term REDD+ has 
since then gained considerable traction and was used in the Copenhagen Accord rather than 
RED or REDD to describe the international forest carbon policies to reduce emissions from 
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deforestation and forest degradation under the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2009). The text emerged 
from COP 17 in Durban, South Africa in 2011 focuses principally on REDD+ financing, 
reference levels and safeguards. Although REDD+ decisions in important topics related to 
financing, verification, safeguards, drivers of deforestation was not decided in COP 18, 
REDD+ negotiations at COP 19 at Warsaw was regarded as a considerable progress. The 
decisions adopted provide pave the way towards the full implementation of REDD+ activities 
on the ground (UNFCCC 2013). The outcome provides a foundation for transparency and 
integrity of REDD+ action, clarifies way to finance REDD+ activities and how to improve 
coordination support (UNFCCC 2013). The Warsaw Framework for REDD+ is backed by 
pledges of 280 million USD financing from the United States, Norway and the United 
Kingdom (UNFCCC 2013). 
1.3.  Problem statement 
This section begins by outlining the prevailing concern about potential negative impacts of 
REDD+ on tenure of local forest-dependent communities in Thailand, as primarily voiced by 
non-government organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs). Then, the 
existing literature related to prescribed concerns – relationship between REDD+ and tenure 
security – was examined and existing knowledge gaps were identified. 
1.3.1.$Local$concerns$over$REDD+$
The concern about potential REDD+ impacts on local forest-dependent communities has been 
increasingly vocal in Thailand in recent years. At the Bangkok Climate Change Talk 2009, 
REDD+ was widely understood by the Thai participants that its revenues would create 
incentives for the government to strengthen its control of forest resources and thereby 
threatening the rights to forest resources of local communities, or worse, to evict them out of 
the area (Goldtooth and Miller 2009; IWGIA 2009). During the Talk, the representative of the 
Network of Indigenous People of Thailand expressed a concern; despite the demand for all 
countries to uphold the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIPs), which recognizes free, prior and informed consent as a prerequisite for 
resettlement or any project or legislation that may affect them, these principles to safeguards 
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their rights were ignored (Goldtooth and Miller 2009). This growing concern led to the 
rejection of REDD+ mechanism by the Thai public in 2011 during consultation process for 
the draft of national master plan on climate change (ONEP 2011). Principally, the public 
feared that REDD+ would negatively impact tenure security and access to forest resources of 
local forest-dependent communities (ONEP 2011). 
Similarly, at the Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogue held in 2012 in Bangkok, one of the 
key points emerging from the plenary sessions was the concern about land grabbing in the 
name of conservation and national policy reform (AIPP 2012). A recommendation was made 
to the UN-REDD Programme to place more attention on the recognition and exercise of 
indigenous peoples’ rights to their land and forest resources (AIPP 2012). In line with the 
concerns, attendants of the 2012 Policy Dialogue on Forest and Land Tenure Review and 
Reform organized by the Regional Center for People and Forest (RECOFTC) collectively 
agreed on the urgent need for forest and land tenure policy reform in Thailand in order to 
ensure fair and sustainable management of forest resources (Srivijittakar 2012) and to enable 
REDD+ implementation.  
The issue became under the limelight following the public consultation on the REDD 
Readiness Plan (R-PP) draft in March 2013. Many of those who took part in the consultation 
believed that REDD+ might further weaken the tenure security of local communities (GoT 
2013). The draft was principally criticized that the prevailing tenure conflict situation was 
under-represented and potential avenues to enhance tenure security of the local forest-
dependent communities was not provided. According to a local NGO, appropriate safeguards 
and tenure clarification are deemed as a prerequisite to any REDD+ activity in Thailand and 
without them, it is most likely that REDD+ would worsen tenure of local communities 
(Pornpana Kuaycharoen, personal communication, 12 July 2013). Other key organizations 
related to REDD+ development in Thailand, notably the Lowering Emissions from Asia’s 
Forest or LEAF program (Somsak Soonthornnawaphat, personal communication, 1 August 
2013), RECOFTC (Regan Suzuki, personal communication, 15 July 2013) and World 
Wildlife Fund or WWF (Justin Foster, personal communication, 11 July 2013) also agree that 
supportive legal framework particularly tenure clarification and carbon ownership is deemed 
essential in making REDD+ development viable in Thailand. 
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1.3.2.$Literature$on$REDD+$and$tenure$linkage$
The competing notion emerging from the existing literature is that, where tenure security over 
forest is weak, REDD+ can pose opportunities or threats to local communities. On the one 
hand, REDD+ could help strengthening tenure security of local forest-dependent communities 
by expediting tenure reform or addressing the prevailing threats to the integrity of customary 
territories via REDD+ policies.  
 Evans, Arpels et al. (2012) use empirical evidences from Cambodia to substantiate the 
concept of tenure reform as one of REDD+ benefits. The study reports that the local forest-
dependent communities have high perceived tenure insecurity and faces increasing external 
threat to their forest resources (Evans, Arpels et al. 2012). Based on the assessment of the 
REDD+ pilot sites called Seima Protection Forest REDD, the study documents the presence 
of strong government intent to enhance tenure security of customary rights holders (Evans, 
Arpels et al. 2012). Strategies to promote customary tenure recognition and issuance of 
indigenous communal land titles were observed (Evans, Arpels et al. 2012). The study 
highlights that REDD provides an impetus to accelerate tenure security enhancement process 
in Cambodia, against the backdrop of tenure insecurity of local forest-dependent communities 
(Evans, Arpels et al. 2012).  
 Likewise, another REDD+ pilot assessment study conducted in Brazil reveals similar 
results. Larson, Brockhaus et al. (2013) claim that REDD+ compounded by other drivers has 
led the Brazilian government to launch the land tenure formalization program, called the 
Legal Land Program. The program aims to grant titles to about 300,000 actual land users in 
non-designated public land, thereby increasing their tenure security (Larson, Brockhaus et al. 
2013). The tenure security enhancement would nonetheless be conditional to the compliance 
with Brazilian Forest Code in order to ensure forest conservation performance (Larson, 
Brockhaus et al. 2013). In the case of Brazil, the study points out that REDD+ has provided 
an incentive for the government to materialize tenure regularization as one of the readiness 
activities (Larson, Brockhaus et al. 2013). 
 The study of Larson, Corbera et al. (2010) offers another avenue of how REDD+ 
could be helpful in accelerating tenure security improvement for local forest-dependent 
communities. By carefully design REDD+ policies to address the major drivers of 
deforestation and forest degradation, which in many cases also be the threats to the integrity 
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of customary territories, REDD+ could be helpful in securing the borders of customary 
territories (Larson, Corbera et al. 2010). Moreover, by providing REDD+ payments to the 
local communities, the REDD+ funds could strengthen the constitution of indigenous 
territories as political, social and economical entities (Larson, Corbera et al. 2010). 
 On the other hand, a number of scholars proposes an opposing view of REDD+ impact 
on tenure, arguing that the local forest-dependent communities could be dispossessed, 
excluded and marginalized largely in two ways.  
 Firstly, when REDD+ programs insist on imposing tenure security through land titling 
as a prerequisite for participating local communities, a great portion of local communities that 
remains without formal title documents is likely to be excluded. Empirical data obtained from 
carbon forestry project in Uganda proposes that the local forest-dependent communities, who 
are the land users in State-owned land, are excluded from the carbon benefits and would 
potentially be evicted from the present land use area (Eraker 2000). The 50-year concession 
of commercial plantation and carbon offsets generation was granted to the Norwegian 
company called Tree Farms AS by the Ugandan government. Provided that the State is the 
legal owner of the concession area, the actual land users are deemed illegal squatters (Eraker 
2000). In light of the project implementation, the land users of about 8,000 people are 
prohibited from entering and using the concession area for framing, forest product gathering, 
cattle grazing and fishing (Eraker 2000). The study also documents that the government 
would be responsible for evicting the illegal squatters, as suggested by the Norwegian 
company (Eraker 2000). 
 Conforming to the findings of Eraker (2000), Brown, Adger et al. (2004) conclude that 
carbon sequestration projects that require clear and secure tenure as eligibility criteria to 
access carbon funds often are weighted against the local forest-dependent communities. The 
communities generally have less formal rights to forest resources and are henceforth bypassed 
as participants and beneficiaries to carbon forestry projects. The study offers empirical results 
of forestry Clean Development Mechanism projects that exhibit inequitable distribution of 
carbon forestry benefits (Brown, Adger et al. 2004). Only relatively well-off farmers with 
secure individual property rights to forest land are more likely to be beneficiaries (Brown, 
Adger et al. 2004). 
 Jindal, Swallow et al. (2008) alike suggest that using secure tenure as a prerequisite 
would undeniably exclude the local communities, who by and large do not possess secure title 
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document. Additional to the issue of exclusion from carbon forestry benefits, the study claims 
that REDD+ payments although intend to augment the value of standing forest, they might as 
well enhance the political incentives to confiscate the forest by influential groups or the 
government (Jindal, Swallow et al. 2008). Henceforth, the local communities might end up 
with limited use rights or might be evicted from their current land use area (Jindal, Swallow et 
al. 2008). 
 Secondly, when discussing about PES, which is one of the potential modalities of 
REDD+, minimum rights such as management and exclusionary rights are one of the 
preconditions for engaging in PES contractual agreements for keeping the forests. This 
implies that local communities without sufficient rights would undeniably be excluded. 
According to Wunder (2005, 2007), one of the minimum requirements for PES participants as 
proposed is having de facto land and resource use control. The participants do not necessarily 
hold the de jure rights to resources. This implies that informal land users whose land claims 
are widely recognized and respected can be eligible for PES even without formal tenure 
(Wunder 2005; Wunder 2007). Land users whose tenure is perceived as insecure or weakly 
enforced cannot be efficient service providers, since external agents can predictably occupy 
the land or harvest the resources and long-term conservation performance could not be 
guaranteed (Wunder 2005; Wunder 2007). The local forest-dependent communities with poor 
de facto tenure security and/or open-access resources type thus could potentially be excluded. 
 To date there has been little agreement on the REDD+ and tenure debates, where 
tenure security of local forest-dependent communities is poor. There are growing concerns 
over REDD+ implication as the subject of international and national debates. Most concerns 
voiced in Thailand are likely to stem from international experiences, rather than reliable 
evidence from the field in the country. So far too little attention has been paid to assess the 
outcome of REDD+ pilot implementation in the country. This thesis seeks to address the 
knowledge gap by examining the links between REDD+ and tenure of local forest-dependent 
communities based on the REDD+ pilot project in Thailand.  
1.3.3.$$Literature$on$tenure$security$in$Thailand$
A considerable amount of literature has been published on the topic of tenure security of local 
forest-dependent communities in Thailand. Conventional wisdom associates local forest-
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dependent communities in Thailand with severe tenure insecurity due to the legal framework 
that does not reflect the land use realities. 
 Due to the lack of legal title document and possibility of eviction in corresponding to 
the existing legal framework, the study reports that tenure insecurity of local communities 
located inside the State-owned forest land is widely observed (Brenner, Buergin et al. 1999). 
Brenner, Buergin et al. (1999) moreover identify that demand for secure land title was a major 
concern among local communities and suggest that communal tenure should be considered as 
an alternative to facilitate sustainable community forest management (Brenner, Buergin et al. 
1999).  
 Owing to the contradictory forest laws, most local forest-dependent communities in 
Thailand have no formal rights to protect their community forest, provided that the land 
legally is part of the national forest reserve (NFR) or national park (NP) designation 
(Ganjanapan 2000). The lack of formal recognition of customary tenure system and of local 
community forest management results in tenure insecurity of the local communities 
(Ganjanapan 2000). The study provides an observation of attempts by several local 
communities in recent years to exercise their rights to community forest, mostly by resorting 
to rituals notably forest ordination (Ganjanapan 2000). The outcome of such attempts was 
however not assessed. 
 Neef (2001) and Neef, Onchan et al. (2003) depict the pervasive tenure insecurity 
among the local communities principally due to the national forest policies that declare the 
overlapping rights to land. A number of improvement in local practices related to soil erosion 
control measures and modification in agricultural practices, e.g. planting fruit trees and 
perennial crops, abandoning fallow systems and conversion of rain-fed land into paddy fields 
were reported (Neef 2001; Neef, Onchan et al. 2003). The papers highlight that such activities 
represent attempts to enhance the communities’ tenure security, particularly in light of the 
prevailing threats of relocation during the time (Neef 2001; Neef, Onchan et al. 2003). Given 
that the issue is beyond the scope of the study, the detailed analysis of de facto or perceived 
tenure security following the implementation of such measures was not provided in the 
studies. 
 Successive developments in national forest policies since the 1960s place restrictions 
and limitations on rights of the local communities inside State-owned forest land (Walker 
2001). Walker (2004) elaborates that the government conservation policies that do not reflect 
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the local resource-use realities resulted in many local communities were found to be located 
inside forest reserves. Consequently, many of them remain without any formal tenure 
recognition (Walker 2001; Walker 2004). The absence of formal recognition of customary 
tenure resulted in tenure insecurity among the local communities (Walker 2001; Walker 
2004). Tenure insecurity of the local communities was further compounded by persistent 
government program to relocate local communities inside the State-owned forest land to less 
environmentally sensitive location (Walker 2004). Despite reporting the widespread tenure 
insecurity and relocation of many local communities, the study also notes that a few of them 
successfully resisted the forced relocation. Further analysis of such implied de facto tenure 
security was however not discussed (Walker 2001).  
 In the review of existing regulatory framework on natural resources management, 
Lasimbang and Luithui (2005) and Lasimbang (2006) describe prevalent tenure insecurity of 
local communities living inside State-owned forest land as a consequence of centralized, top-
down policy-making process by the government without sufficient attention to the local land 
users. The study identifies the State’s denial of citizenship to indigenous hill people as one of 
the causes of tenure insecurity of local communities in the Northern region. Attempts to 
enhance tenure recognition by a few local communities were mentioned but the change of 
perceived tenure security following the attempt was not described. 
   By contrast to the prevailing absence of de facto or perceived tenure security 
assessment of local communities in the current body of literature, Feder and Onchan (1987) 
calculates lifetime eviction probability of illegal squatters in State-owned land. The study 
compares the lifetime eviction probability between the legal land users with formal title 
document and illegal squatters in State-owned land without any formal title document (Feder 
and Onchan 1987). The study found that even though the probability of the illegal squatters is 
higher than the legal one, which was close to zero, the probability is rather low (7.5%) (Feder 
and Onchan 1987). The study notes that forced evictions of illegal land users even without 
any title documents became rare as resettlement programs created considerable political costs 
to the government (Feder and Onchan 1987). 
 Even though the conventional wisdom dominates discussion of tenure security of local 
forest-dependent in Thailand, local activities to enhance de facto tenure security by certain 
communities that were briefly mentioned by Ganchanapan (2000), Neef (2001), Walker 
(2001) Lasimbang and Luithui (2005) and Lasimbang (2006). In combined with Feder and 
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Onchan (1987), these studies imply that the present de facto tenure security may be different 
from the dominant idea of prevalent de jure and de facto tenure security in the country. 
Therefore, before making the linkage between REDD+ and tenure security in the context of 
Thailand, it is crucial to understand the actual situation of de jure and de facto tenure security 
of local forest-dependent communities in the country as well as in the REDD+ pilot site. In 
response to the lack of recent research with an updated, comprehensive assessment of 
different aspects of rights and tenure security of local communities and to a limited number of 
studies conducted on the REDD+ pilot site in relation to tenure security, the study aims to fill 
in the knowledge gap. 
1.4.  Research objective, questions and 
scope 
This section describes the research objectives and research questions of this thesis along with 
corresponding hypotheses. 
1.4.1.$$Research$objective$$
The central objective of this thesis is to explore feasible avenues of REDD+ implementation 
by examining the relationship and interaction between legal framework related to land tenure 
and REDD+. More specifically, in response to the gaps in previous research on REDD+ and 
tenure in Thailand, the thesis aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of de facto tenure 
security of local communities in relation to domestic legal framework and a thorough 
assessment of how potential threats of REDD+ to local forest-dependent communities and 
land tenure are entrenched at the domestic level. To meet the research objective, the 
following issues are investigated: 
• The legal framework relevant to tenure of local communities  
• The actual impacts of existing regulatory framework on communities and de 
facto tenure of local communities 
• The relationship between REDD+ pilot project and tenure of local communities as 
described in REDD+ policies and strategies 
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• The actual impacts of REDD+ pilot project activities on de facto tenure of local 
communities 
• The relationship and interaction between REDD+ and land tenure  
1.4.2.$$Research$question$
To fulfill the research objective, an overarching research question of this thesis is: “What are 
the relationship and interaction between existing tenure-related legal framework and REDD+ 
and what are their impacts on tenure of local communities?” Based on the overarching 
research question, two research questions will be explored:  
Question 1: Does the present legal framework with non-recognized customary rights produce 
similar de facto impacts in all communities at present? 
• What are the present legal frameworks with relevance to tenure of local forest-
dependent communities in State-owned forest land? 
• What were the de facto impacts of the tenure-related legal framework in the past? 
• What are the factors leading to different de facto impacts of tenure-related legal 
framework among communities at present? 
Hypothesis 1: Communities reveal different de facto impacts due to different local context. 
 
Question 2: How has REDD+ implementation affected de jure and de facto tenure security of 
local forest dependent communities? 
• What is the expected outcome of REDD+ in relation to tenure security of local 
communities? 
• What is the actual outcome of REDD+ in relation to tenure security of local 
communities? 
• What is the interaction between REDD+ and tenure security that could explain the 
deviation of the final result from the expected outcomes? 
Hypothesis 2: REDD+ project activities positively impact tenure security of local forest 
communities. 
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1.4.3.$$Research$scope$
The scope of this research is restricted to land tenure and REDD+. Specifically, the research 
focuses on the de facto tenure of local communities from the aspects of access, use, 
management, exclusion and alienation rights, formal tenure recognition and fear of eviction or 
withdrawal of rights. Regarding tenure for agricultural land of the four communities studied, 
it appears that the community members have individual rights to access, use and manage the 
land with certain limitations, e.g. cutting down perennials and the use of heavy machinery for 
land preparation are forbidden. They also have de facto rights to informally transfer the land 
via inheritance but cannot sell it to non-community members. All four communities similarly 
do not have any formal recognition of their rights to agricultural land. For community 
forestland, the four communities studied appeared to have collective rights to access, 
withdraw and manage the forest area with certain limitations. They could also transfer these 
rights to the next generation informally, as the four communities did not have any formal 
recognition of their rights to the community forest, but they could not sell the land.  
 From the perspective of REDD+, land tenure of community forest area is of the 
essence. This is because community forest is where the potential REDD+ activities, namely 
reforestation, avoided deforestation, maintenance of forests, could occur, as opposed to 
agricultural area under cultivation. It is also worthwhile to mention that if reforestation 
activities were to take place in the name of REDD+, based on the information obtained from 
the four communities studied, it is most likely would occur in non-agricultural area of the 
members. Potentially, such activities could be conducted in degraded forest area within the 
community vicinity. Existing limitations of reforestation activities should however be noted. 
For the two northern communities, many reforestation activities in such area were conducted 
to the extent that nearby degraded area is no longer available. The reforested area are 
managed and maintained principally by the DNP officials and FORRU. For the two western 
communities, reforestation activities that were conducted in the nearby degraded forest area 
were maintained and managed solely by the DNP officials and ended up with frequent forest 
fire occurrences due to limited budget and staffs of the DNP for monitoring and maintenance. 
The issue of limited and insufficient agricultural land in combined with inability to expand the 
area further is commonly voiced by the four communities. Unless financial benefits from 
REDD+ are considerably more attractive than the benefits from agricultural production, 
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provided the low carbon price at present it is unlikely that REDD+ activities, i.e. 
reforestation, would involve agricultural land. The assessment of tenure for the purpose of 
this thesis therefore concentrates on tenure related to community forest area of the local 
communities studied. 
 The geographical setting for this research is in Thailand. The focus of the empirical 
part of the research is on four selected communities in Thailand: Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi 
communities in the Northern region and Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities in the 
Western region.  
1.5.  Thesis structure 
The first chapter introduces the study by elaborating on the problem statement, the research 
objectives and questions for the thesis as well as the structure of the study. Chapter two 
discusses the methodology adopted for this study. It consists of study area description, 
research strategy and methods used for data collection. Chapter three outlines the background 
on REDD+ development in Thailand and provides the information on the country’s forest 
status at present and past development. It also presents the current major drivers of 
deforestation. Chapter four reviews and assesses the existing legal framework and its 
implication on tenure security of local forest-dependent communities. Chapter five and 
Chapter six present research findings and analysis with particular reference to case study area. 
The seventh chapter discusses the main findings as well as its significant contribution to the 
literature in a corresponding manner to the research questions and objectives, as outlined in 
the first chapter. Chapter eight concludes the study by providing policy implications, 
summarizing major findings and outlining research limitations as well as recommendations 
for further studies. 
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CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the research area by providing the background of the four selected 
communities alongside the rationales for the selection. It also presents and justifies the 
methodological approaches chosen for drawing samples from the interested population and 
for collecting data from those samples. The chapter then discusses about the analytical 
framework used in this thesis.  
2.1. Study area 
This section introduces the research area of Mae Sa Mai, Mae Sa Noi, Ton Mamuang and 
Bongti Noi communities. Additionally, it provides background information of the selected 
communities as well as the reasons justifying the selection of the communities as research 
area. 
2.1.1.$Mae$Sa$Mai$and$Mae$Sa$Noi$communities$
The study area of Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities are located in the North of 
Thailand, in Mae Rim district of Chiang Mai province within the boundary of the Mae Sa-
Kog Ma Man and Biosphere Reserve. The Reserve was designated as one of the four Man and 
Biosphere Reserve sites in Thailand by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization in 1977. The Reserve is located in Chiang Mai province of the northern 
region. Additional to two main watershed areas, the Reserve encompasses a large portion of 
two national parks (NP) and four national forest reserves (NFR): Suthep-Pui and Khun Khan 
NPs and Doi Suthep, Mae Khan and Mae Wang, Sameong and Ta Chang and Mae Kanin 
NFRs. The geographical location of the two communities is illustrated in Figure 1. The 
location of the communities is characterized by steep slopes, which are dissected by V-shaped 
valleys. The two communities are situated at 1,200 meters above sea level in Mae Rim district 
in the north of Chiang Mai province (FORRU 2009), with a large part of the land having 
slopes over 35%.  
 Primary reasons for justifying this study site were the findings from existing literature 
indicating tenure conflicts due to its status as national park and national forest reserve 
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designation, in other words, State-owned forest land and past attempts of the communities to 
enhance their tenure security. Moreover, there was a high likelihood of future REDD+ pilot 
project development in the area, based on personal communication with relevant government 
official (Rungnapar Pattanavibool, personal communication, 11 May 2012). Even though the 
two communities have to a certain extent been studied, information on the present de facto 
tenure situation from the aspects of rights to access, withdraw, exclude and alienate, legal 
recognition and fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights from the community forest is not 
readily available in the current literature. Moreover, a thorough analysis of the key drivers of 
tenure changes of the two communities remained absent. Such information is indispensable in 
understanding the relationship between tenure and legal framework in the context of REDD+. 
For these reasons, further fieldwork to be conducted on the communities is justified. It should 
be noted that even if the two communities share certain similar local features that met the 
selection criteria, the communities also have differences with regards to community forests. 
Firstly, the two communities have a clearly separated area of community forest for household 
consumption. Secondly, the two communities do not share local administration overseeing the 
community forest, e.g. village head, village committee members. Thirdly, the two 
communities have independent decision-making concerning the maintenance and 
management of the community forest. Altogether, this implies that tenure arrangement for the 
community forest of each community, which is at heart of this study, could be different. It is 
therefore worthwhile to investigate tenure evolution and arrangements of the two 
communities.  
  
Figure 1 Map of Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities 
“droits réservés” 
 
 Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities are home to Hmong descendants, which are 
one of several ethnic groups in Northern Thailand. Hmong and Thai languages are used as 
primary means of communication in the community. The Hmong originally came from the 
Mae$Sa$Noi$
Mae$Sa$Mai$
Northern$Thailand$
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mountainous area of Southern China. The history of Hmong had a strong link to opium 
cultivation as producers since the loss of China in the Second Opium War (Renard 1997). 
Due to the fact that opium can only be grown for up to fifteen to twenty years on the same 
land, the Hmong were in regular migration (Delang 2002). This had in part driven them to 
move from China to Vietnam, Laos and Thailand, where they continued to grow opium 
(Geddes 1976). Passing through Laos, the Hmong entered into Northern Thailand and settled 
down since 1850. In 1965, a Hmong community was founded under the name of Mae Sa (the 
area later called the Old Mae Sa or Mae Sa Kao) near the present settlement but at a higher 
elevation. The community then relocated to the present area after their prime source of water 
supply dried up in 1965 (Totrakul 2003) and named the new settlement as New Mae Sa or 
Mae Sa Mai community.  
 Given its small size and limited population during the initial years after establishment, 
the community was originally recognized as part of the neighboring community, Pong Yang 
Nok. For all administrative matters, Mae Sa Mai community relied on Pong Yang Nok 
community (Totrakul 2003). Nine years later, Mae Sa Mai community became more 
populated and was consequently legally separated from Pong Yang Nok community (Totrakul 
2003). Mae Sa Mai community received its legal recognition as a community in accordance 
with the Local Administration Act in 1973, prior to the demarcation of the area as part of 
Suthep-Pui NP in 1981, Watershed class 1A in 1982 and yet after the inclusion of the area as 
part of Doi Suthep NFR in 1964. In 1992, parts of the settlement were expropriated in order to 
create the Queen Sirikit Botanical Garden in the area and the community received 
compensation of about 124,000 USD1 in return (Totrakul 2003). Later primarily owing to the 
increase in population of the community, the community was sub-divided for administrative 
purpose and Mae Sa Noi community was officially created in 2004.  
 Traditionally, the community members conducted shifting cultivation with one to two 
years of rotation period. Additional to growing peach and opium poppies for commercial 
purpose, the community members planted cabbage for sale, corn for animal feed and rain-fed 
rice for household consumption. During the 1970s, opium cultivation began to be phased out 
predominantly attributable to the combined efforts of the Department of Public Welfare and 
the Royal Project Foundation. In 1973, the Department of Public Welfare introduced the 
concept of cold climate fruits and vegetables or cash crops. Since 1974, the Royal Project 
Foundation has provided Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities with technical support 
                                                
1 Exchange rate of 1 THB equals to 0.031 USD (5 December 2013) 
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and market access to materialize cash crop cultivation as an alternative livelihood to opium 
cultivation.  
 Forest clearance occurred as part of the transition from opium cultivation to cash 
crops. Its effect was gradually becoming evident in terms of increased erosion, landslide, 
drought and wildlife extirpation (FORRU 2009). In response, since 1997 the community 
members have assisted the Forest Restoration Research Unit (FORRU) in forest conservation 
activities. In 2013, the main occupation of the communities was agriculture, followed by 
commerce and labor at the Queen Sirikit Botanical garden and in Chiang Mai city. Additional 
to Lychee orchards, which chiefly dominated the cultivation area in 2013, the community 
members also grew a variety of vegetables and fruits including cabbage, Chinese cabbage, 
carrot, potato, bell pepper, chayote, tomato and coffee. The choice of these vegetables and 
fruits constantly changes in direct response to market prices. In 2012, Mae Sa Mai and Mae 
Sa Noi communities had a population of 1,210 (132 households) and 707 (92 households) 
respectively. Regarding religion, the majority of the population was Buddhist, followed by 
Christian. 
2.1.2.$Ton$Mamuang$and$Bongti$Noi$communities$
Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities are located in Sai Yok district of Kanchanaburi, 
a province of Western Thailand. Both communities participated in the Biodiversity Corridor 
Initiative (BCI). The BCI was located in Tenasserim range connecting the Western Forest 
Complex consisting of eleven national parks and six wildlife sanctuaries and Kaeng Krachan 
Forest Complex consisting of two national parks and one wildlife sanctuary (Pattanavibool 
and Moinuddin 2009). As of 2013, the activities of the BCI were concentrated on four 
clusters: Sai Yok, Suan Phueng, Tanaosri and Ban Bueng. Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi 
communities are one of the communities of Sai Yok cluster, which represents the proposed 
extension area of Sai Yok national park (Pattanavibool and Moinuddin 2009). At present, the 
location of the communities is regarded as part of the Wangyai Maenamnoi national forest 
reserve designation (Pattanavibool and Moinuddin 2009) with overlapping area with the Sai 
Yok national park designation (Figure 2).  
 The key justification for selecting the site included its status as State-owned forest 
land with overlapping area with national park and national forest reserve designation and its 
recognition as Thailand’s REDD+ pilot site according to the Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-
PIN) submitted to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in February 2009. 
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Additionally, until present, limited studies have been conducted on the two communities of 
interest, particularly from the aspect of tenure and REDD+, despite the on-going tenure 
conflicts. Data obtained from the communities could henceforth potentially enrich the 
national and international debates on tenure and REDD+ to a great extent.   
 Ton Mamuang is home to Thai descendants. Thai language is used as the primary 
means of communication in the community. The community was unofficially founded in 
1967. The community is situated in a plain surrounded by mountains at an elevation of 200 
meters above sea level. In 1969, the community was incorporated as part of Wang Yai 
Maenam Noi national forest reserve. In 1977, the community was legally recognized as a 
community in accordance with Local Administration Act in 1973. Certain parts of the 
community were dispossessed in 1980 and became a part of the Sai Yok national park 
designation. Traditionally, all of the community members engaged solely in agriculture and 
gathering forest products for a living. In the past, corn and sugar cane were the common 
agricultural produce of the community; corn for animal feed and sugar cane for sale. In 2013, 
main occupation of the members was agriculture (60%), followed by commerce (20%), forest 
products gathering for sale (10%) and labor (10%). In 2013, cassava, corn, brinjal, cotton, 
rubber and oil palm were generally grown in the community and the majority of the 
community members were Buddhist, followed by Christian. As of 2012, there were 321 
households accounting 886 people residing in Ton Mamuang community.  
  
Figure 2 Map of Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities 
“droits réservés” 
 
 
 Bongti Noi is home to Karen-Thai ethnic group. Thai language is primarily used as the 
method of communication nowadays. The settlement compasses Tanaosri mountain range, 
which is the natural border between Thailand and Burma. In 1969, the settlement was 
incorporated as part of Wang Yai Maenam Noi national forest reserve (DNP 2013). In 
Western'Thailand'
Sai$Yok$Na)onal$Park$
Bong1'Noi'
Ton'Mamuang'
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accordance with Local Administration Act, the community was officially founded in 1973. In 
1980, certain parts of the settlement became parts of the Sai Yok national park designation. 
Out of all the land that became parts of the national park designation, some plots of land were 
dispossessed, whilst other plots remain being used by the community members. Since 1983, 
certain forested area of the community, which was then considered as part of the national 
forest reserve of Wang Yai Maenam Noi, was cleared and used as forest plantation site for Sai 
Yok Forest Park. The Park was managed under supervision of the local RFD officials and 
later the management responsibility was transferred to the Forest Industry Organization 
(FIO). Traditionally, all of the community members engaged exclusively in subsistent 
agriculture and gathering forest products for a living. In 2013, the major occupation of the 
community members was agriculture (60%) and forest product gathering for sale and labor 
(40%). The former represents the members with land for cultivation and the latter represents 
the landless members of Bongti Noi community. Main agricultural produce of the community 
in 2013 was composed of cassava, corn and oil palm. The majority of the community 
members were Buddhist, followed by Christian. In 2012, there were 110 households totaling 
population of 442 living in Bongti Noi community.  
2.2. Sampling method 
This section describes the sample as well as methods used for drawing the samples from the 
population. Samples were drawn from the selected local communities and other key 
informants including government authorities, donor organizations and non-governmental 
organizations. Primarily, two sampling methods were used in this thesis, they are: quota 
sampling and purposive sampling. 
2.2.1.$Quota$sampling$
Quota sampling is a sampling technique that divides the population into non-overlapping sub-
population that together comprises the entire population. Then, independent samples from 
each category are selected using availability sampling (Daniel 2012). The sample can be 
classified by a number of variables such as gender, age, race, nationality, occupation and 
education level. This method of sampling was chosen for this thesis in order to select a 
representative sample and facilitate sub-group analyses (Lewis-Beck, Bryman et al. 2004; 
Daniel 2012).  
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In application to this thesis, a total sample of thirty-nine to forty participants was 
drawn from each selected village classified by age and gender, i.e. divided equally by age (20-
49 years old and 50-79 years old) and gender (male or female). Gender and age are an 
important consideration in the selection, principally due to their high relevance to the issue of 
forest tenure. Women and men face different constraints – socially, economically and 
politically – and often experience their environments and policy interventions differently 
(TetraTech 2012). In relation to tenure, literature is rich in examples of gender inequality in 
several aspects of rights to forest resources (FAO 1997; Siscawati and Mahaningtyas 2012; 
Sun, Mwangi et al. 2012). This implies that women and men may hold different rights and 
hence perception on forest tenure. Regarding the age, existing literature suggests forest tenure 
conflicts in Thailand in the past and potentially de facto tenure improvement in a few 
communities at present (Ganchanapan 2000; Neef 2001; Walker 2001; Lasimbang and 
Luithui 2005; Lasimbang 2006). This indicates that the perception and attitude towards the 
issue of forest tenure might be different between generations, based on their diverse personal 
experiences on the issue. For these reasons, the study therefore consulted men and women of 
different age classes equally in order to ensure a balance perspective of all gender and age 
classes.  
2.2.2.$Purposive$sampling$
Purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling and is also known as judgmental, 
selective or subjective sampling. Selection of samples of this technique is based on 
professional judgment and prior information, rather than randomization. The samples are 
selected based on a variety of criteria, which includes specialized knowledge of the research 
issue both in terms of relevance and depth or capacity and willingness to participate in the 
research (Jupp 2006). Unlike probability sampling techniques, the objective of purposive 
sampling is not to randomly select the samples with the intention of making statistical 
inferences from that sample to the population. Instead, it is to focus on particular 
characteristics of a population that will best enable the researcher to answer the research 
questions. Underlying logic of this technique is the idea that research participants are not 
always created equal; one informant may advance the study far better than any randomly 
chosen sample (Given 2008).  
 This technique is advantageous, compared to probability sampling; it takes a small 
number of samples, thereby making it less expensive to conduct and easier to implement both 
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in selecting samples and performing computation (Elder 2009). Furthermore, the technique is 
less time-consuming, since it allows the researcher to reach a targeted sample quickly. More 
specifically, the method of purposive sampling used in this thesis is called expert sampling. 
This method is particularly appropriate for a research that intends to gather knowledge from 
individuals that have particular expertise or experience (Given 2008). Due to the described 
characteristics, the purposive sampling was justified for this thesis. The sampling technique 
was used for obtaining in-depth data from samples with direct experience and profound 
knowledge of regulatory framework, tenure situation and REDD+ both at the study sites and 
at the national level. The participants included representatives from relevant government 
organizations, local leaders, local organizations, donor organizations and NGOs.  
2.3. Data collection 
This section explains how primary and secondary data was obtained for this thesis. 
Increasingly, the use of mixed methods – methodological approach that articulates the 
practices of combining quantitative and qualitative data collection within the same study – is 
being acknowledged as an appropriate approach to deal with complex issue and obtain more 
comprehensive explanations (Creswell 2002; Yin 2003). To collect primary data for this 
thesis, surveys were conducted in the study area in conjunction with focus group discussions. 
While the surveys offered quick and quantitative estimates of general situation, the detailed 
rationale behind the answers was not elaborated. Complementary to the surveys, the focus 
group discussions allowed the survey participants to provide explanations and meanings to 
their answers. The data were obtained from the four communities during June-July 2012 and 
July-August 2013. Approximately, the period of one month was spent on each village. 
Regarding housing during the field study, the researcher stayed at the houses of village head 
or village head assistant, local temples, local schools and, when the prior choices were not 
available, nearby tourist accommodations. Additionally, in-depth interviews with key 
informants involved in the implementation of legal framework and REDD+ in the study area 
were conducted to crosscheck, triangulate and enrich the data obtained from the communities. 
Secondary data was obtained by desk research through reviews of existing legal framework 
and literature.  
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2.3.1.$Survey$
Survey generally refers to the selection of samples from a wider group of population in whom 
the researcher is interested in, followed by the data collection from those individuals (Kelley, 
Clark et al. 2003). The researcher then uses information from the sample of individuals to 
make some inference about the wider population (Kelley, Clark et al. 2003). Survey can be 
useful when a researcher wants to collect data at a single point in time on phenomena that 
cannot be directly observed, notably perceptions. Survey has been used extensively in 
assessing interaction with the government policies and community perceptions related to land 
tenure (Liswanti, Shantiko et al. 2012). Therefore, the method was chosen for this study. In 
this thesis, surveys were used for gauging the perceived tenure of the community as a 
consequence of legal framework and REDD+ implementation, which was not readily 
available from other sources. 
 The surveys were conducted on two types of respondents: community member and 
community committee. Regarding the first type, although the surveys were performed on a 
selected portion of the entire community members, the selection was based on stratified 
sampling technique that randomly selected nine to ten independent samples from four 
different stratum. As a result, the total sample of thirty-nine to forty participants was drawn 
on a voluntary basis from each community stratified by age and gender, i.e. divided equally 
by age (20-49 years old and 50-79 years old) and gender (male or female). The techniques 
increases statistical precision of population estimates (Czaplewski, McRoberts et al. 2004). 
When the survey involves a statistically valid random sample, the results from the sample can 
be generalized to the entire population if the response rate is high enough. 
 After piloting the questionnaires, corresponding modifications were made and the 
group-administered technique was chosen over self-administered survey for the following 
reasons. Firstly, as data are collected in a group setting and most group members usually 
participate, the group-administered technique could therefore generate a higher response rate 
(Chambliss and Schutt 2012; Check and Schutt 2012). Secondly, the technique allows for a 
large number of questionnaires to be completed within a short period of time (Bornman 
2009). Such advantage is of the essence, particularly in light of limited time and resources 
available for this field study. Thirdly, the researcher can control the circumstances under 
which the questionnaires are completed (Bornman 2009). Therefore, situations occurred with 
the use of self-administered surveys such as discussions among participants prior to making 
their decisions or completion of survey by a participant for multiple participants could be 
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avoided. Lastly, the researcher can elaborate or clarify the instructions or questions when 
needed (Bornman 2009). The occurrences, where the participants opt for not answering or 
unintentionally select wrong answers due to the need for clarification on the questions, could 
henceforth be minimized. 
 One of the potential drawbacks of the technique is that the answers of the participants 
might not reflect the honest opinion (Check and Schutt 2012), due to potential influence of 
other participants or the lack of confidentiality. Taking into account such drawback, the group 
survey was conducted in a small group of 9-10 participants within the same age class and 
gender without the presence and influence of the local leaders. Furthermore, the participants 
were aware that they would be asked to justify their survey answers during the following 
focus group discussion. 
 For the community committee, most of the time the participating community 
committee included the village head and/or his assistants. The same questionnaires as those 
conducted on the community members were used and at least two community committees 
participated the survey. The surveys were structured around the set of pre-determined close-
ended questions related to land tenure of the community as a result of the legal framework 
and REDD+. Close-ended questions were chosen as they represent the approach that 
respondents usually find them fast and easy to complete by restricting the ranges of possible 
responses to those pertinent to the goals of the survey (Edwards, Thomas et al. 1996). 
Furthermore, they communicate the same frame of reference to all respondents and hence 
they allow the respondents to interpret the closed-ended items in the same way (Edwards, 
Thomas et al. 1996), making comparison across groups more reliable, compared to the open-
ended questions. Only on the topic of pressing concerns, open-ended questions were used. 
Although close-ended questions prevent the respondent from providing narrative answers 
(Edwards, Thomas et al. 1996), the focus group discussion conducted after the survey could 
disclose the richness of responses to the close-ended survey questions.  
2.3.2.$Focus$group$discussion$
Focus group discussion is a rapid assessment, semi-structured data gathering method in which 
a purposely selected set of participants gather to discuss issues and concerns based on a list of 
key themes drawn up by the researcher (Kumar 1987). Focus group discussion can provide 
qualitative information on perceptions, beliefs and ideas from a group of people with a shared 
interest in discussing the topic (IFAD 2010). It creates an accepting environment that puts 
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participants at ease, allowing them to thoughtfully answer questions in their own words and 
add meaning to their answers. The focus group discussion is widely used for evaluating 
project or program and for collecting information in a short time period (Morgan 1996). In 
other words, it can generate complex information at low cost and with the minimum amount 
of time (Liamputtong 2011). Therefore focus group discussion was selected for this thesis for 
evaluating the impacts of legal framework and REDD+ pilot on tenure of local communities.  
 Focus group discussions were conducted on the survey respondents, comprising of a 
total of thirty-nine to forty community members selected from each community according to 
stratified sampling method. The optimal number of participants of each focus group 
discussion is eight to ten. On the one hand, if a group is too small, one person in the group 
may dominate the discussion. On the other hand, if the group is too big, it might be difficult 
for the facilitator/researcher to control the discussion (Escalada and Heong 2009) and some 
participants may be left out during the discussion. For this thesis, nine to ten participants 
within the same range of age and gender formed a focus group, totaling four groups per 
community: male aged 20-49, female aged 20-49, male aged 50-79 and female aged 50-79. 
By grouping the participants according to their age range and gender, the participants are 
expected to be more comfortable in discussing with one another (Richardson and Rabiee 
2001; Rabiee 2004). Homogeneity is the key to maximizing disclosure among focus group 
participants. The participants were recruited on a voluntary basis. Four focus group 
discussions were conducted without the presence of the community head to avoid potential 
influence on the answers of the participants.   
The venue of the focus group discussion should be a neutral place, where it is free 
from distractions and where the participants can talk openly (Escalada and Heong 2009). 
Accordingly, the venue used for the discussions for this thesis generally included school 
buildings, temples, community meeting area and houses of community members. The timing 
for the meeting was arranged with the condition that it would be most convenient for the 
participants. A semi-circular seating arrangement was set for each discussion in order to 
facilitate interaction among participants allowing them to freely see and hear each other.  
 The focus group discussions were structured around a set of pre-determined questions 
related to tenure impacts of the legal framework and REDD+ project. A free-flowing 
discussion in which each participant’s comments stimulate the thinking and sharing of others 
were encouraged. The participants were invited to express their own personal view on the 
issues, even when it was contradictory to other views. 
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2.3.3.$SemiJstructured$inJdepth$interview$
Semi-structured interview refers to an interview generally organized around a set of 
predetermined open-ended questions, with other questions emerging from the dialogue 
between the interviewer and interviewee (FAO 1990; Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). 
Semi-structured interview encourages two-way communication, thereby allowing both the 
interviewer and interviewee the flexibility to probe for details or specific issues (FAO 1990). 
One of the semi-structured interview technique, semi-structured in-depth interviews are one 
of the most widely used interviewing formats for qualitative research (Dicicco-Bloom and 
Crabtree 2006). Semi-structured in-depth interview is a tool for collecting rich information on 
a topic of interest (Guion, Diehl et al. 2011). It is appropriate for situations, where elicit depth 
of information from relatively few people is needed (Guion, Diehl et al. 2011). In practice, the 
technique is widely used for policy evaluation and assessment (Guion, Diehl et al. 2011). The 
individual in-depth interview allows the researcher to delve deeply into social matters and it 
can provide richer and more in-depth information about perception and experience of 
individuals, compared to the group in-depth interview (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). 
For these reasons, the semi-structured in-depth individual interview was chosen for this thesis 
in order to uncover the detailed impacts of regulatory framework and REDD+ project on de 
facto tenure of local communities. 
The interviewees should share critical similarities related to the research question 
(Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). The selection of interviewees was based on an iterative 
process referred to as purposive sampling that seeks to maximize the depth and richness of the 
data to address the research question (Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). After carrying out 
some interviews, performing preliminary analyses, data was further enriched by selecting 
more respondents to fill in emerging questions. This process of data collection and analysis 
was conducted until it reaches a point in the data collection, where no new categories or 
themes emerge – a saturation point signaling that data collection is complete (Dicicco-Bloom 
and Crabtree 2006).  
2.3.4.$Literature$review$
Secondary sources of information serve several purposes in this thesis. Firstly, the assessment 
of legal framework related to tenure of local forest-dependent communities required a 
comprehensive analysis of legal documents. The reviewed legislations comprised of Forest 
Act, Land Code Promulgation Act, Wild Animal Reservation and Protection Act, National 
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Park Act, Reserved Forest Act, Wildlife Reservation and Protection Act, Community Forest 
Act, Communal Titling Bill, Resolution on Watershed Classification, Resolution on Solution 
to Land Conflicts in forest area and Regulation of the Prime Minister’s Office on the issuance 
of Community Land Title Deed. Additionally, journal articles that analyzed and criticized 
legal topics in great detail were also found helpful in the legal assessment.  
 Secondly, the analysis of REDD+ encompassed several crucial aspects: its progress in 
the country, its expected impacts on tenure of local forest-dependent communities and 
concerns about REDD+ of local forest-dependent communities and NGOs. The analysis of 
REDD+ progress and expected impacts entailed a thorough review of climate change and 
REDD+ related documents, notably Thailand’s National Climate Change Plan, the Second 
National Communication of Thailand to the UNFCCC, most updated R-PIN available 
(version of 2009) and corresponding comments of the FCPF as well as the recently submitted 
R-PP (version of 2013). For the local concerns, REDD+ related comments from the local 
NGOs and CSOs expressed in policy dialogues or public consultations were reviewed. The 
comments found with high relevance to REDD+ were from Bangkok Climate Talk 2009, 
national public consultation for the draft of National Master Plan on Climate Change in 2011, 
Indigenous Peoples’ Dialogues in 2012, Policy Dialogue on Forest and Land Tenure Review 
and Reform in 2012 and public consultation on the REDD Readiness Plan (R-PP) draft in 
2013. 
 Thirdly, the tenure situation analysis comprised of the following issues: past tenure 
situation of local forest-dependent communities prior to the policy interventions, responses of 
local forest-dependent communities and present state of tenure of local forest-dependent 
communities both at the study site and at the national level. Typical secondary sources 
include articles and scholarly journals as well as recent books. 
2.4. Analytical framework 
This section describes the analytical framework that was used in this thesis. The proposed 
analytical tool was used for exploring the interactions among regulatory framework, REDD+ 
and de facto tenure in Thailand in order to prove or disprove the hypotheses.  
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2.4.1.$Assessment$tool$
The primary analytical framework used in this thesis is based on the Land tenure and property 
rights (LTPR) assessment tool, which is used for evaluating impacts of LTPR–related 
interventions and complemented with Rapid Land Tenure Assessment (RaTA) analytical 
framework of the World Agroforestry Centre (TUL-SEA 2003). For this thesis, the 
interventions in question are: (i) legal framework related to land tenure, (ii) local responses to 
enhance tenure security and (iii) REDD+ implementation. The outcome focuses on the 
expected and actual impacts on tenure of local forest-dependent communities. 
2.4.1.1. Land Tenure and Property Rights Tool 
The LTPR Tool represents a practical step toward enabling evaluations to take place in a 
consistent manner and can yield improvements in donor programming through careful and 
rigorous evaluation of the impact of these interventions (Balestino, Bilinsky et al. 2008). 
Qualitative in nature, the Tool seeks to understand the impacts from two distinct angles: (i) 
interventions – “What changes or outcomes resulted from the given intervention?” and (ii) 
outcome – “What were the combination of causes that resulted in the given change or 
outcome?” (Figure 3). According to Belestino, Bilinsky et al. (2008), the emphasis on 
integrating the outcome and intervention paradigm helps establishing the extent to which 
interventions contribute to their objectives as well as to other unanticipated outcomes. 
However, the LTPR Tool, when applying it for this thesis, remains with shortcoming 
related to its ability to assess multiple numbers of interventions and outcomes. With multi-
issue interventions or outcomes, the time consuming nature of the Tool’s qualitative 
methodology necessitates a trade-off between depth and breath of data collection (Balestino, 
Bilinsky et al. 2008). This limitation may pose difficulty in assessing tenure impacts of 
different legislations and local responses (interventions) in question and, at times, these 
interventions may have contradicting effects on land tenure (outcomes). This gap can be filled 
by incorporating the RaTA Tool, which aims to analyze different and potentially conflicting 
policies and legislations as well as their consequences on land tenure into the LTPR Tool. 
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Figure 3 Land Tenure and Property Rights (LTPR) Tool 
Source: Balestino, Bilinsky et al. (2008) 
 
2.4.1.2. Rapid Land Tenure Assessment Tool 
RaTA Tool seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the linkage between existing 
land tenure conflicts, external factors and regulatory frameworks in different historical 
periods for various purposes. The analytical framework of RaTA is depicted in Figure 4. To 
apply the RaTA Tool, there are five steps that are used for assessing and managing land 
tenure conflicts to be followed (TUL-SEA 2003): 
• Describe the linkage between land conflict and particular external factors, such as 
politics, economy, environment etc. 
• Identify stakeholder and analyze stakeholders involved in the conflict 
• Determine various forms of perceived historical and legal claims by stakeholders 
• Analyze the linkage of various claims to existing regulatory framework 
• Propose policy options for conflict resolution mechanism 
 Despite its potential as an appropriate analytical tool for this thesis, the Tool however 
does not go into detail on land tenure conflicts, i.e. assessment of each aspect of land tenure 
and tenure security. Furthermore, the Tool does not leave room for differences in the actual 
tenure outcome, compared to the analysis of the written regulatory framework (expected 
outcome).  
Intervention Contributing cause n Contributing cause n+i 
Unexpected 
outcome n+1 
Unexpected 
outcome n+1 
Expected outcome 
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Figure 4 Rapid Land Tenure Assessment (RaTA) Tool 
Source: TUL-SEA (2003) 
 
2.4.2.$Proposed$analytical$framework$
Based on the modification of the two previously discussed frameworks, the analytical model 
that is suitable for this thesis is proposed (Figure 5). The proposed framework attempts to 
understand the impacts of regulatory framework and REDD+ on tenure of local communities 
from two distinct angles: intervention and outcome. The land tenure impact analysis shall be 
conducted in a detailed manner by assessing various aspects of tenure and tenure security. 
Also, the framework recognizes the potential differences between analysis of the regulatory 
framework and REDD+ documents and their actual outcome. To put the framework into 
practice, there are fundamental steps to follow: 
• Interpret the interventions (regulatory framework, local responses and REDD+)  
• Describe the linkage between land tenure outcome and particular external factors, such 
as politics, economy, environment and internal factors, such as local context of the 
communities 
• Investigate the expected and actual impacts of the legal framework, local responses 
and REDD+ on land tenure of local communities 
 
Interpretation of legal framework Stakeholders 
External factors: 
 politics, livelihood, environment 
Land conflict:  
Access, use and security 
Competing claims 
Policy options for 
conflict resolution 
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Figure 5 Proposed analytical framework for the thesis 
Source: Author
Intervention n Intervention n+i 
Contributing cause n Contributing cause n+i 
Expected tenure 
outcome n 
& 
Actual tenure 
outcome n 
Expected tenure 
outcome n+i 
& 
Actual tenure 
outcome n+i 
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CHAPTER 3 THAILAND, FORESTS 
AND REDD+  
This chapter begins with the background of Thailand in relation to its economic development, 
population, geographical location and topography of each region. It subsequently discusses 
about It subsequently discusses about the history of forest politics in Thailand. Then it 
describes the past and present forest situation as well as deforestation level and its primary 
drivers. The chapter ends with the description of the significance of REDD+ in Thailand and 
its progress to date in the country. 
3.1. Country background 
This section describes Thailand country profile in relevance to its economy, population and 
geography. Thailand is upgraded from a lower-middle income economy to an upper-middle 
income economy by the World Bank since 2011 (WB 2013). Despite encountering a number 
of political challenges, Thailand achieved a notable progress with sustained economic growth 
and considerable poverty reduction. During the early 1990s, Thai economy was one of the 
fastest growing in the world at the rate of almost 9% per annum (WB 2013). Upon recovery 
from the Asian Crisis in 1997-1998, the economy regained its pace and reached the average 
growth at approximately 5% during 2002-2007 (WB 2013). Principally owing to the global 
economic conditions, national political uncertainty in 2009 and the devastating floods in 
2011, the economic growth reduced (WB 2013). The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
rebounded from the floods at 6.4% in 2012 (MFA 2013) and was expected to grow at 5% in 
2013 (WB 2013). Attributable to the continued high rates of economic growth, poverty has 
been on a steady decline since the late 1980s (WB 2013). Poverty reduced over three folds 
from 42.6% in 2000 to 13.2% in 2011 (WB 2013). Industry and other services sectors 
dominated the GDP in 2011 accounting for 38% and 25% share of the GDP by value 
respectively (MFA 2013). When considering the share of GDP by labor, agriculture and other 
services sector occupied the largest shares in 2011 at the rate of 37% and 24% respectively 
(MFA 2013). 
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 Thailand is home to 65 million people as of 2010, the majority of whom live in rural 
areas (NSO 2011). The capital city, Bangkok, is home to 13% of the total population (NSO 
2011). The country covers an area of 51,311 thousand hectares in the center of the Southeast 
Asian peninsula (BoT 2012). It is bordered by Burma, Myanmar, Lao people’s Democratic 
Republic, Cambodia and Malaysia. Owing to economic, social and ecological reasons, 
Thailand is usually classified into six geographical regions: central, northeastern, eastern, 
southern, western and northern regions (UN 2008). The central is a vast expanse of plains and 
comprises the Chao Phraya River Basin, making it the most fertile land in the country and 
enjoying the highest per capita income after the Bangkok Metropolitan region (UN 2008). 
The northeastern region is mostly covered by high plateaus (UN 2008). Largely due to lower 
and erratic rainfall in combined with poorer soil conditions compared to other parts of the 
country, the region has the lowest per capita income in the country (UN 2008). The eastern 
region is a coastal area characterized by heavy rainfall and poorer soil conditions than the 
central region (UN 2008). The southern part lies along the coast of Thailand Gulf to the East 
and the Andaman Sea to the West. It has the highest amount of rainfall in the country and 
contains extensive alluvial deposits of tin (UN 2008). The west of Thailand consists of high 
mountains and steep river valleys and is home to many of the country’s major dams and 
mining industry (UN 2008). Northern Thailand is a mountainous area and has been home to 
the majority of hill indigenous peoples (Thomas, Weyerhaeuser et al. 2000; SDC 2009). 
Parallel mountain ranges in a north-south direction forming the western border of Thailand. 
The region has a series of north-south flowing rivers including Ping, Wang, Yom and Nan, 
which unite to form the Chaophraya watershed, which is essential for agriculture in the 
central region of the country (UN 2008). 
3.2. History of forest politics 
This section details the issue of forest politics in Thai forest bureaucracy, policies and 
legislation from the historical perspective. Certain elements of the British colonial impact and 
influence on the present administration remain observable, particularly on the political aspect 
of non-recognized customary tenure. 
3.2.1.$Forest$politics$during$the$colonial$era$
The formation of Thai forestry bureaucracy was a product of the political and commercial 
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interests of Great Britain, on the one hand and the Bangkok administration, on the other hand. 
By the second half of the nineteenth century, the British were in need of teak in order to fuel 
its expanding demand. Due to the lack of their own forests, having lost access to America’s 
forests and finite teak resources of India and Burma (Usher 2009), Britain started taking an 
interest in Siam’s northern teak forest during the mid 1850s (Barton and Bennet 2010). The 
Bombay Burma Trading Corporation Ltd, the British Foreign Office and the Government of 
India collaborated in the 1880s-1890s to formulate a monopoly over teak forest of northern 
Siam (Barton and Bennet 2010). Siam was never formally colonized during nineteenth-
century European imperialism, unlike its neighbours. However, the Britain created British 
vice-consular courts and offices in northern Siam and the British Foreign Office played a 
strong role in founding and administering the Royal Forestry Department (RFD), forestry 
system and laws and the attitudes and educational background of the foresters themselves.  
  A British forester educated in France named Herbert Slade was appointed as Chief 
Conservator of the RFD following its establishment in 1986 (Barton and Bennet 2010). In 
response to the complaints from major British logging company, the bureaucracy system, 
rules and legislations identical to those used in British colonies ranging from India to 
Australia were introduced in Siam (Usher 2009). Prior to the establishment, it was accepted 
that forests were owned by particular persons, e.g. local chiefs in the Northern area for teak 
forests (Pragtong 2000; Sumarlan 2004). These forest owners have the power to forbid 
logging on their land and to demand compensation when they permit timber extraction such 
that they receive the highest benefit (Pragtong 2000; Sumarlan 2004; Usher 2009). During the 
time, the central government received only one-sixteenth of its rightful share of the income 
from teak (Usher 2009). Moreover, Slade also put in motion to ensure the continuity of 
colonial forestry practices and structures in Siam by promoting the education of Siamese men, 
who later became high-ranking officials of the RFD, in forestry school in India and later 
Burma. According to Barton and Bennet (2010), this combination of the monopoly of British 
teak business, the British influence on the RFD and British northern consular and 
international courts, in turn, led Siam to be described by some scholars as an informal empire 
of the Great Britain, c.f. Brown (1988). 
 The dominance of British teak business in Northern Siam also benefited King 
Chulalongkorn (1853-1910). King Chulalongkorn used the threat of British annexation to 
create a centralised model of state forestry and internalize the independence states of Northern 
Siam, while preventing the French imperial expansion into its territory (Barton and Bennet 
2010). Furthermore, the increased income from teak business was necessary in order to fund 
 39 
widespread reforms and infrastructure development in the country (Usher 2009). 
3.2.2.$Path$dependency$on$struggle$for$rights$to$forest$
The centralization of forest resources nevertheless met with resistance. Forest laws in Burma 
and India, as Siam, defined forests as state land (Usher 2009). Establishing state hegemony 
over forest lands however implied taking rights away not only from the northern princes but 
also from communities living in and around teak-bearing forests. Prior to the establishment of 
the RFD, while teak in Northern Thailand was considered the property of the northern 
princes, commoners were allowed to use the smaller trees either by cutting them down or 
buying cut logs from others (Usher 2009). With the introduction of the new regulations, the 
rights to forests of the villagers became restricted. Regulations were put in place to secure 
exclusive state rights and manage timber extraction and the foresters were trained to guard the 
valuable timber resources and were in their full right to forbid villagers from destroying state 
property (Usher 2009). 
  In the years following the founding of the RFD, there were two main rebellions 
occurred in the north. Firstly, the Phraya Phap Rebellion of 1889-90 was a response to new 
taxation measures imposed from Bangkok as well as a reaction to British teak extraction and 
the flow of timber revenues to the capital (Usher 2009). Secondly, the Phrae Rebellion of 
1901 targeted on European and Chinese teak companies (Usher 2009). Other minor 
indications of foresters clashing directly not only with the northern princes but with local 
people accustomed to having access to forest resources were manifested during the time 
(Usher 2009). 
  The essence of Thai forestry has resembled that of the British colony in terms of the 
structure of the Royal Forestry Department, the nature of the forestry system and laws and the 
attitudes and educational background of the foresters themselves (Usher 2009). However, the 
real lasting impact of the colonial forestry system was not systematic forestry use but rather a 
political system that has conditioned forest politics well into the post-colonial era. The RFD 
still claimed a monopoly over a vast area of forest in Thailand and criminalized the millions 
of forest-dependent people living inside the forest lands, although with the new justification – 
forest conservation. Such concept is often labelled as fortress conservation. It refers to an 
approach to preserve wildlife and natural resources through exclusion of local communities 
that traditionally relied on the natural resources in question for their livelihood (Brockington 
2002). Although it was widely adopted in many countries around the world for the 
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establishment of national park system (Igoe 2004), it has been criticized for separating often 
economically impoverished populations from resources that are detrimental to their social, 
cultural and economic needs to benefit conservation agendas (King 2009). Such continued 
criminalization of local communities’ customary rights of forest access and control resulted in 
provoked resentment against the forest conservation regime as well as other forest policies of 
the government in many countries during post-colonial period (Peluso 1992; Bryant 1997), 
including Thailand. 
  Since 1980s, resistance by local communities and NGOs to the activities of the state 
and private companies has been noticeable in contemporary Thai forest politics. Local forest-
dependent communities’ struggles for legal recognition of customary rights to forest have 
challenged and cast doubts on the legitimacy and suitability of the present rigid legal edifice 
that ensured a state monopoly over forests for a century. 
3.3. Forest trends 
This section portrays the past and present forest situation in Thailand as well as dominant 
government strategies to reverse stark deforestation rate in the past. Forest resources in 
Thailand have been officially owned by the State, since the establishment of the Royal 
Forestry Department (RFD) in 1896. The responsibilities relating to forest resources are 
divided between two departments: RFD and Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation (DNP). While the RFD oversees production in forest reserves, the DNP 
manages the protection of forests in the protected area designation. The Forestry Industry 
Organization (FIO) is a State enterprise, which has been responsible for conducting logging in 
government-granted logging concessions. 
 As illustrated in Figure 6, in 1961 the total forest area was 27,362 thousand hectares, 
covering over 53% of the country (Charuppat 1998). Government estimates indicate that 
Thailand’s forest cover steadily declined from 53% in 1961 to 25% in 1999 (Figure 6). The 
forest cover area increased up to 33% in 2008 (RFD 2008). A caution should be made before 
concluding the substantial rise in forest area of Thailand in recent years. The government 
notes that the visual interpretation2 of higher resolution Landsat-TM imagery at the scale of 
1:50,000 was conducted to assess forest cover since the year of 2000, compared to the scale of 
                                                
2 Thailand adopted the FAO definition of forest as tree covered landscape of less than 0.5 hectares, with an 
average tree height of more than five meters and more than 10% canopy cover for forest inventory and 
interpretation of satellite imagery (GoT 2013) 
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1:250,000 adopted in the previous years (GoT 2013). The government suggests that due to the 
use of higher resolution, the recent data showing the rise in forest area is henceforth more 
reliable and more accurate than the lower forest cover shown in the years before (GoT 2013). 
Reservations have been made for the satellite imagery interpretation, as such interpretation 
has not been subject to scrutiny (Lakanavichian 2006; Leblond and Pham 2013). Moreover, 
Leblond and Pham (2013) point out a few methodological flaws and hereafter reject the 
interpretation of the official statistics proposing the rapid increase of forest area in Thailand in 
recent years.  
 
Figure 6 Forest area in Thailand during 1961-2008 
Note: During 1961-1999, forest cover estimates were done using manual methods and not 
well advanced GIS/Satellite imagery. Therefore forest cover data shown should be 
differentiated between data before 1999 and data after 2000. 
 Source: Charuppat (1998) and RFD (2008) 
  
 Although the government estimates provide the rate of deforestation of about one 
percent per year during 1961-1999, different deforestation rates for the similar period were 
reported. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), annual deforestation 
rates were over 3% for much of the 1960s-1990s (FAO 1998). During 1976-1982, the annual 
deforestation rate reached 3.85%, which was considered then among the highest rates of 
tropical countries worldwide (Jantakad and Gilmour 1999). Mangrove forests were severely 
degraded, as mangrove forests sharply declined from 312 thousand hectares in 1979 to 53 
thousand hectares in 1993 (Jantakad and Gilmour 1999). 
 In response to the swift decrease in forest cover, the government implemented several 
strategies to reverse forest loss. Dominant strategies included logging ban, reforestation 
program and expansion of conserved forest area. Firstly, driven by the concerns over the 
effects of legal and illegal logging as well as the disastrous floods in the Southern region, 
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which were in part due to forest clearing for timber, the nation-wide logging ban was imposed 
in 1989 (Hirsch 2000). Following the ban, logging contracts and concessions were cancelled 
and applications for new concessions were dismissed (Waggener 2001). Even with the closure 
of timber concessions since 1989, illegal logging continued to be carried out along the borders 
and the export of timber product and its value has continued to increase (Kesmanee and 
Trakansuphakorn 2008). Secondly, a large area inside and outside the reserve and protected 
area was reforested through many programs notably watershed management, highland 
development, forestry research, Commemoration of the Royal Golden Jubilee and other 
volunteer programs from private and public sectors (RFD 2005). Additionally, large-scale 
commercial forest plantations by private sector were developed in private land or in degraded 
forest reserve. The RFD issues long-term leases on degraded forest reserve for conversion to 
plantation with annual fees charged (GoT 1992). Total reforested area during 1961-2004 was 
approximately 1.68 million hectares (RFD 2005), which accounted about 16% of total forest 
loss of the same period. Thirdly, following the National Forest Policy of 1985 goal of 
maintaining forest area at 40% of the country area, the protected area system of the country 
was expanded through the declaration of more national parks and wildlife sanctuaries (GoT 
1985). By 1992, almost half of the country was declared as national forest reserves (GoT 
2008). As of 2010, the protected area and forest reserve expanded over six and ten folds 
respectively compared to 1965 level, as illustrated in Figure 7.  
 Despite the progressive conservation activities to combat deforestation, the actual 
forest area in 2008 remained well below the forest reserve level (Figure 7). Moreover, the 
government predicts the continued decline in forest cover under the business as usual scenario 
ranging from 45 to 180 thousand hectares per annum and falling gradually to about 160 
thousand hectares annually by 2020 (GoT 2013).  
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Figure 7 Forest area, forest reserve area and protected area in Thailand during 1960-2010 
Note: Data on forest area, forest reserve area and protected area for certain years are not 
readily available. 
Source: Charuppat (1998); RFD (1999); Lakanavichian (2001); RFD (2003); RFD (2007); 
RFD (2008); RFD (2009) and DNP (2011) 
 
3.4.  Drivers of deforestation and forest 
degradation 
This section presents the key drivers of deforestation and forest degradation in Thailand. In 
line with the existing literature, the government acknowledges the conversion of natural forest 
for agriculture, infrastructure and mining as the major drivers of deforestation at present. 
Forest degradation on the other hand is caused to a greater extent by illegal logging and to a 
lesser extent by harvesting of forest products for commercial purpose and uncontrolled forest 
fire.  
3.4.1.$$Land$conversion$for$agricultural$production$
Thailand is often cited as an example of export-oriented agriculture and trade policy leading 
to rapid forest clearance for agriculture (FAO 1998). A number of studies discloses a strong 
linkage between the promotion of cash crop cultivation and deforestation in Thailand during 
the past decades (Dembner 1989; Dearden 1995; Hirsch 2000; Lang 2003; Entwisle, Walsh et 
al. 2005; Lorsirirat and Maita 2006).  
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 Since its establishment in 1959, the National Economic and Social Development 
Board of Thailand, which has been responsible for all public investment planning, has been a 
major promoter of export-oriented cash crop cultivation. Since the First National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (NESDP), export-oriented agricultural production and 
expansion of agricultural land have been continuously sponsored by the government (GoT 
2013). The First Plan starting in 1961 encourages the adoption of cash crop cultivation with 
mechanized farming in replace of the traditional subsistence shifting cultivation and opium 
production, which were prevalent in the Northern region at the time (NESDB 1961). During 
the First Plan period (1961-1966), almost 70% of the agricultural output was channeled into 
exports; additional to rice, which has been the country’s major export item with the high 
export value3, the rapid increase in importance of maize, kenaf and tapioca products as 
foreign exchange earners was also observed (NESDB 1961). The Sixth Plan (1987-1991) 
includes specific measures to particularly encourage the adoption of contract farming in order 
to further accelerate agricultural production by reducing price risks and market uncertainties 
for the farmers (NESDB 1991). The government issued the four-sector co-operation plan to 
facilitate agro-industrial firms, farmers, Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) and government agencies to work together for materializing contract farming in 
Thailand (Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpoongse 2008). The government invested almost eight 
million USD 4  in the BAAC to use as interest compensation for encouraging farmer 
participants (Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpoongse 2008). As of the Ninth Plan (2002-2006), the 
government agencies were found to continue supporting contract farming (Sriboonchitta and 
Wiboonpoongse 2008). In 2004, the government compensated farmers for switching from 
garlic production to other crops under contract farming in light of trade issue between China 
and Thailand (Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpoongse 2008). In the similar vein, the Eleventh Plan 
(2012-2016) aims to increase the share of agricultural sector in the economy (NESDB 2011). 
Moreover, the Plan also promotes bioenergy through increased agricultural production of 
commodities such as tapioca, sugar cane and oil palm as one of the key renewable energy 
resources. 
 The government as well as private company policies in providing guaranteed prices 
for certain cash crops for food, timber and energy have by and large incentivized forest 
clearing and encroachment (GoT 2013). Additionally, farmers have received a range of 
                                                
3 According to Rice Market Monitor Agriculture prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Thailand was the world’s largest rice exporter and the country’s rice exports exceeded ten 
million tonnes in 2011 (FAO 2012). 
4 Exchange rate of 1 THB equals to 0.031 USD (5 December 2013) 
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subsidies and incentives from the government, e.g. demonstration plots, provision of seeds, 
agricultural inputs and marketing services and construction of paddy fields, irrigation 
infrastructure and roads (Walker 2001). Agribusiness involving in the production of cash-
crops, which is concentrated in the hands of a small number of large conglomerates 
(Colchester, Chao et al. 2013), has also obtained financial help from the government through 
the BAAC, tax breaks, duty privileges and other promotional measures (Delang 2002). 
Furthermore, the key export cash crops have been protected by the government in form of 
import restrictions due to political influence exerted by well-connected lobbies (Siamwalla, 
Setboonsarng et al. 1991). Import prohibitions, licensing arrangements, local content rules 
and requirements for special case-by-case approval of imports are applied to a wide range of 
major crops such as soybeans, palm oil, rubber, rice, sugar, onions, garlic, potatoes, tea, 
maize, coconut products and coffee (Warr and Kohpaiboon 2007). As a consequence, from 
1950 to 1990, the cultivation area of cash crops increased considerably, i.e. cultivation area of 
maize and soybean during the period grew about 44 times and 24 times respectively (Figure 
8). By early 1990s, the export value of agro-industrial products reached 2,545 million USD5 
and grew over three folds to the value of 7,667 million USD by 2003 (MoAC 2004). By 2006, 
the agro-industrial product export value increased to 9,407 million USD (MoAC 2007). 
 
Figure 8 Cultivation area of maize and soybean in Thailand during 1950-1990 
Source: Phongpaichit and Baker (2002) 
 
 Regarding the relationship between agriculture and deforestation, the econometric 
studies conducted in 73 provinces of Thailand by Amano, Noochdumrong et al. (1996) 
conclude that agriculture, i.e. cultivation of cassava, cotton, sorghum and soybean, was found 
to have significant correlation with deforestation. Similar result was suggested by Cropper, 
                                                
5 Exchange rate of 1 THB equals to 0.031 USD (5 December 2013) 
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Griffiths et al. (1997) 6. Variable coefficients developed by Amano, Noochdumrong et al. 
(1996) were applied to the more updated data of annual changes in GPD and crop cultivation 
area during 2006-2009, adjusted to 1972 constant prices (GoT 2013). The results reveal that 
deforestation should be around 45,250 hectares per annum, which is close to the average 
annual increase in agricultural area during the same period (GoT 2013). As depicted in Figure 
9, the conflicting relationship between forest area and agricultural area can be observed. 
Amano, Noochdumrong et al. (1996) further suggest that although soybean and sorghum were 
not directly expanding into forest land, they were displacing other crops, which were then 
grown on the newly cleared forest. The situation still continued in 2013, as rubber trees 
replaced sugar and consequently forests were cleared to plant sugar (GoT 2013). Similar 
implication could be made for bio-energy crops that have currently gain attention among the 
farmers (GoT 2013). In response to government policies promoting bioenergy, cultivation 
area of fuel crops has been on a rise. Statistics of oil palm cultivation area show over a six-
fold increase during 1985-2009, for instance (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 9 Agricultural area and forest are of Thailand during 1961-2011 
Note: Data on forest area for 2009 and 2001 are not readily available. 
Source: Charuppat (1998); RFD (2008) and FAOSTAT (2013) 
 
                                                
6 Cropper, Griffiths et al. (1997) found similar results showing that conversion of land for agriculture plays a 
greater role in deforestation, while population pressures play a minor role during 1976-1989. 
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Figure 10 Cultivation area of palm oil during 1985-2009 
Source: ARDA (2013) 
    
 Thai agricultural products have reached a wide range of markets including Europe, 
Middle East, Africa and other Asian countries (Colchester, Chao et al. 2013). The ever 
growing domestic and international demand for agricultural products for food, energy and 
industrial usage is expected to continue (GoT 2008). As Colchester, Chao et al. (2013) 
explained, such growth is driven by countries that are heavily reliant on Thai products and 
investors speculating with high returns from agricultural production investment. The trend 
emerged during the World Food Crisis in 2007-2008 when food prices rose to record highs 
(Colchester, Chao et al. 2013). The loss of forest land to agriculture is therefore anticipated to 
continue at the rate of 45 thousand hectares per year, based on the government’s prediction 
(GoT 2013).   
 Also as illustrated in Figure 9, despite indications of strong correlation between 
deforestation and agriculture in recent years, the agricultural area expansion rate was 
comparatively lower than in the past. One of the potential explanations could be the de-
agrarianization process. The study conducted by Rigg and Nattapoolwat (2001) in Tambon 
Thung Sadok of Northern Thailand documented the pressure of limited cultivation area in the 
1970s in combined with low rice price and water shortage led to the shift from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture (i.e. adoption of contract farming) followed by de-agrarianization 
process (i.e. increased non-farm employment particularly among the young). Such trend, to a 
certain extent, reduced the pressure on forests from agricultural expansion. The similar trend 
of rural transformation was also observed in other Southeast Asian countries (De Koninck, 
Rigg et al. 2012).  
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 Forest clearance for other uses than agriculture, e.g. tourism, has played a 
comparatively minor role in deforestation. Tourism contributed almost 12% of Thailand’s 
GDP and accounted for 7% of national capital investment in 2000 (ICEM 2003). The 
government estimates of forest conversion for tourist resorts were reported approximately 
three thousand hectares in 2007 (GoT 2013). Principally, tourism contributed to the clearance 
of coastal mangrove forests (ICEM 2003). Furthermore, tourist infrastructure development 
including those located inside the protected area has often been associated with negative 
environmental impacts and degradation of natural resources (ICEM 2003). 
3.4.2.$$Infrastructure$development$and$mining$
In addition to agriculture, other factors driving this precipitous forest loss include construction 
of large-scale infrastructure projects and mining. Since the early 1960s, the government has 
approved the construction of dams, roads and mining operations inside national parks, 
wildlife sanctuaries and watershed areas throughout the country (Tantiwiroon and 
Samootsakorn 1986; Pragtong 2000). Directly the creation of infrastructure replaces forest 
area (Tantiwiroon and Samootsakorn 1986; Jantakad and Gilmour 1999; ICEM 2003). The 
Royal Irrigation Department and Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, amongst other 
governmental agencies, have played an important role in relation to forest area for the past 
decades. While the former agency is responsible for construction and operation of over four 
thousand irrigation dams, the latter is responsible for thirteen large hydropower dams 
(Pongtepupathum 2003). The analysis of all approved major public infrastructure projects 
over the past 39 years (1973-2012) in relation to forest removal revealed that irrigation 
projects contributed to the largest number of forest area clearance – approximately 336,000 
hectares (Duangsathaporn 2013). In 2011, dam construction and power lines right-of-way led 
to the forest loss of approximately fourteen and ten thousand hectares respectively (GoT 
2013). Mining resulted in about six thousand hectares of forest removal in 2011 (GoT 2013). 
Indirectly it enabled and facilitated further deforestation by local actors. For example, during 
the 1970s-1980s, road network creation in Thailand unintentionally aided the farmers, who 
theoretically were permitted to settle only within a one-kilometer radius from the road, to 
open new fields further into the forest (Delang 2005). 
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3.4.3.$$Illegal$logging$and$forest$product$gathering$
With the closure of timber concessions since 1989 (Kesmanee and Trakansuphakorn 2008) 
and the termination of auction of seized timber since 2007 (GoT and GoV 2013), access to 
natural timber has become limited. In response, rubber wood industry was developed and 
experienced rapid growth as a substitution for natural timber (Killmann and Hong 2000; 
ITTO 2005). Additionally, Thailand has relied on imports of foreign timber supply to a 
certain extent (Rosander 2008). Illegal logging in natural forests has nevertheless been carried 
out as another alternative supply source to meet the increasing demand for woods (ITTO 
2005).  
 A number of illegal logging operations was increasingly reported in the neighboring 
countries, particularly Cambodia (Nellemann 2012), where Thailand imported timber from 
since the Khmer Rouge regime in the late 1980s (Le Billon 2000). The statistics of illegal 
logging in Thailand nonetheless doubled each year between 2009 and 2011 with the rise in 
the number of confiscation cases from 134 to 687 and in the confiscated timber volume from 
184 to 596 m3 (GoT and GoV 2013). At present, due to the strong demand driving the price of 
timber, illegal logging and timber trade are highly profitable. One of the high value species, 
Dalbergia cochinchinensis or Thai rosewood in particular, has been under significant illegal 
logging pressure. Moreover, speculation by overseas traders that the wood will soon be 
unavailable has contributed to a large increase in market price (GoT and GoV 2013). In 2012, 
the price of Thai rosewood reached 5,000 USD per cubic meter (GoT 2013), henceforward 
encouraging further illegal logging activities. Correspondingly, a large number of illegal 
rosewood logging operations in country alongside Thailand’s neighboring countries in order 
to meet the increasing demand, particularly from China was documented (EIA 2012). From 
2008-2014, over 363,000 pieces of Thai rosewood reported seized in Thailand (EIA 2014). 
The EIA (2014) furthermore suggested that a great portion of rosewood shipments to China in 
2013 originated from Thailand and about 60% of rosewood on offer in Laos in 2014 
originated from Thailand. The value of confiscated Thai rosewood amplified from almost one 
million USD in 2009 to over four million USD in 2012 (GoT 2013). Although illegal logging 
is widely understood as one of the degradation drivers in Thailand, the exact extent of its 
contribution remains difficult to assess.  
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3.4.4.$$Uncontrolled$forest$fire$
Forest fire is usually caused by attempts to accelerate the germination of edible plants namely 
mushrooms, whereas smoke and heat are generally used for forcing animals from their 
hideouts (Rakyutidharm 2002). Burning of ground cover is often conducted for enhancing the 
growth of grasses as fodder for domestic animals (Rakyutidharm 2002). Forest fires remain 
one of the primary causes of forest degradation in Thailand, although its significance 
dramatically reduced at present compared to during the 1990s. The continuous decline of 
forest fire area is observable with an exception of an increase in 1998. Potential explanation 
for the unexpected rise was the extended drought related to El Nino Southern Oscillation 
event during 1997-1998 (Akaakara 2002; TDRI 2004). As shown in Figure 11, forest fire area 
decreased from 1,940 thousand hectares in 1992 to nine thousand hectares in 2013 (DNP 
2013). Possible reason for the decline is a combination of climatic conditions that are not 
suitable for forest fire and successful forest fire management by the government including fire 
fighting, awareness raising, training and research (TDRI 2004; Clark, Back et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 11 Forest fire area during 1992-2013 
Source: DNP (2013) 
 
3.5.  REDD+ in Thailand 
This section presents key issues related to REDD+ in Thailand. It begins with the government 
recognition of REDD+ as a crucial tool in combating deforestation and forest degradation and 
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in mitigating climate change. Then, the development of REDD+ in Thailand to date, notably 
institutional arrangement, funding and technical assistance as well as pilot program, is 
described. 
3.5.1.$$Significance$of$REDD+$$
The government recognizes the significance of REDD+ in two ways: as a means to reduce 
deforestation and forest degradation and as the win-win strategy for GHG mitigation in the 
country.  
 The government estimates suggest that Thailand’s forest cover steadily declined from 
53% in 1961 to 25% in 1999. Even with a new benchmark of forest area of 33% that was 
established in 2000 owing to the change in the imagery scale and method of calculation, 
deforestation and degradation of forest would continue to be aggravated in the near future. 
The predicted forest loss is expected to negatively affect the livelihoods of many forest-
dependent communities and environmental sustainability of Thailand. REDD+ is believed to 
serve as an apparatus to combat deforestation and forest degradation, while addressing local 
livelihoods concerns. In other words, REDD+ is anticipated to provide multiple benefits 
beyond carbon, namely poverty reduction, food security, biodiversity conservation and 
climate change adaptation and mitigation. 
 REDD+ has been recognized as one of the major strategies in national climate change 
mitigation principally in the National Master Plan on Climate Change and the Second 
National Communication to the UNFCCC. Thailand ratified the UNFCCC in 1994 and 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 (MNRE 2009). The Office of Natural Resources and 
Environmental Policy and Plan (ONEP) of the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MNRE) is designated to function as the national focal point on climate change 
under the UNFCCC and to draft the National Master Plan on Climate Change (Pitisombat 
2011; NDF 2012). The forty-year master plan, which was set to continue through 2050, aims 
to provide a framework and strategies for effective response and preparedness to manage 
climate change challenges in adaptation, mitigation, capacity building and institutional 
readiness (ONEP 2011). The ultimate goal of the Plan is for Thailand to become a Low 
Carbon Society by 2050 (ONEP 2011; Pitisombat 2011). In this Plan, forest is highlighted, as 
one of the core strategies for climate change mitigation. According to the Plan, REDD+ 
activities are promoted; the government aims to enhance forest carbon stocks through 
maintaining existing forest area and increasing additional forest area in the country (ONEP 
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2011). In accordance with the Plan, Thailand’s Second National Communication to the 
UNFCCC also centers the national mitigation efforts on forestry sector, regarding it as one of 
the best options available for GHG mitigation in Thailand (ONEP 2011). The expansion of 
conserved forest area, which includes national forest reserve, wildlife sanctuary, national 
park, class one watershed area and conserved mangrove forest, is considered as win-win 
strategies (ONEP 2011). While the conserved forests could be helpful in maintaining 
ecological balance and enhancing biodiversity, they could also reduce GHG emissions by 
preventing encroachment and deforestation (ONEP 2011). As part of the mitigation effort, the 
priorities as prescribed in the next four-year implementation plan of the MNRE include 
protection and rehabilitation of conserved forests, watershed area and degraded forest land 
(ONEP 2011). 
3.5.2.$$Progress$of$REDD+$$
With regards to concrete actions to implement REDD+ in the country, there are three major 
developments to date: institutional arrangements, financial and technical assistance and pilot 
projects. 
 Firstly, the government established the REDD+ Task force in 2011 as an inter-
ministerial and multi-sectorial committee. The Director-General of the Department of 
National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) chairs the REDD+ Task force. The 
REDD+ Task force is under the supervision of Climate Change Technical Sub-committee, 
which in turns is under the supervision of the National Climate Change Committee (Figure 
12). The REDD+ Task force comprises of various stakeholders from government and non-
government agencies including NGOs, local forest-dependent communities, private 
organizations and research institutions (Table 3). Main responsibilities of the REDD+ Task 
force are to: (i) formulate guidelines for conducting REDD+ readiness activities; (ii) prepare 
action plans in correspond to national REDD+ policy and strategy; (iii) appoint Technical 
Working Groups for REDD+ readiness; (iv) review and revise REDD+ related plans; (v) offer 
technical support to the Climate Change Technical Sub-committee; (vi) coordinate relevant 
stakeholders to provide information needed for REDD+ activities; and (vii) organize 
workshops and seminars supporting to REDD+ activities as appointed by the Climate Change 
Technical Sub-committee. 
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Figure 12 Institutional arrangements for climate change policy-making 
Source: R-PP of Thailand version 2013 (GoT 2013) 
 
Table 3 Composition of the REDD+ Task force Committee 
Organization List of stakeholders 
Government Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation  
Royal Forest Department  
Department of Marine and Coastal Resources  
Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning  
Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization (Public Organization)  
Bureau of the Budget  
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board  
Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency  
Forest Industry Organization  
Department of Agricultural Extension  
Department of Land  
Land Development Department  
Department of Provincial Administration 
The Treasury Department  
Agricultural Land Reform Office  
Academia Kasetsart University Faculty of Forestry  
King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi 
Private sector Suan Kitti Group 
Non-government organization Sueb Nakhasathien Foundation 
Good Governance for Social Development and the Environment Institute  
Thailand Environment Institute  
Indigenous Peoples Foundation for Education and Environment  
Raks Thai Foundation 
Sustainable Development Foundation 
Inter Mountain Peoples Education and Culture in Thailand Association  
Local community Northern Forest Community Networks 
North-eastern Forest Community Networks 
Southern Forest Community Networks 
Central and Western Forest Community Network 
International organization Regional Center for People and Forests 
Source: R-PP of Thailand version 2013 (GoT 2013) 
 
Cabinet 
National Climate Change Committee  
(chaired by the Prime Minister) Climate Change Convention Office 
Climate Change Technical Sub-
Committee 
(chaired by the Permanent Secretary of MNRE) 
Climate Change Negotiation Sub-
Committee 
REDD+ Task Force 
(chaired by the Director General of DNP) 
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 Secondly, concerning financial and technical support for REDD+ development, the 
government of Thailand signed a Participation Agreement to access the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness Fund and became one of the thirty-six developing 
countries located in tropical area that are selected as REDD+ Country Participants to the 
FCPF. 7  The FCPF assists developing countries in reducing GHG emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation and fostering conservation, sustainable management of 
forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The R-PP Formulation Grant of 200,000 
USD was signed for Thailand in 2009 and was fully disbursed as of June 2013 (FCPF 2013). 
Facilitated by the fund obtained, Thailand prepared the R-PP draft for submission to the FCPF 
in March 2013 (FCPF 2013). In July 2013, four regional dialogues were organized in different 
regions of Thailand and in September 2013 a national dialogue was organized in Bangkok 
(FCPF 2013). These dialogues were funded by Swiss Development Corporation as part of 
REDD+ capacity development program (FCPF 2013). Collaboration between CSOs and DNP 
authorities was observed in planning and delivery of the dialogues (FCPF 2013). The CSOs 
Working Groups on REDD+ were formed in four regions and they were responsible for 
identifying the participants to attend the dialogues, providing inputs into the agenda and 
facilitating the regional dialogues along side the DNP authorities (FCPF 2013). These 
Working Groups are likely to continue playing a key role in REDD+ readiness (FCPF 2013). 
Presently, the R-PP draft is being finalized as inputs from the regional and national dialogues 
are being incorporated (FCPF 2013). The revised R-PP is expected to be submitted to the 
National Climate Change Committee in November 2013 and then to the MNRE in early 
December for final approval (FCPF 2013). Upon final R-PP submission to the FCPF which is 
tentatively in December 2013 and the assessment by the FCPF, the R-PP Preparation Grant 
would be disbursed most likely in April 2014 (FCPF 2013). Additional support for REDD+ 
development in Thailand would come from other donors. The donors that already committed 
to support activities identified in the R-PP of 2013 include International Tropical Timber 
Organization (ITTO), World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Treemaps Project, Lowering Emission 
from Asia’s Forest (LEAF) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). 
 Thirdly, as described in the R-PIN submitted to the FCPF in 2009, Thailand piloted 
REDD+ implementation in the Tenessarim Biodiversity Corridor Initiative (BCI) with the 
focus on the following issues: (i) participatory multi-stakeholder consultations for REDD; (ii) 
channeling financial resources to local people through Village Funds for livelihood 
                                                
7 As of 2012, the primary contributors to the FCPF Readiness fund during 2009-2013 were Germany (52.5 
million USD), Canada (41.4 million USD) and Norway (30.2 million USD). 
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improvement; (iii) participatory benefit sharing and providing benefits to local communities 
residing adjacent to the forests; (iv) zoning and providing user rights to local communities to 
improve livelihoods and consequently to lower deforestation; and (v) restoration of degraded 
forest and enabling carbon sequestration by using long rotation indigenous species (GoT 
2008). The project was expected to provide deliverables related to carbon sequestrations, 
benefits to local communities and enhanced tenure security of forest-dependent communities 
by 2012 (GoT 2008). It should be noted however that the importance and status of the BCI 
was reduced from REDD+ pilot project to forest activities with potential to inform REDD+ 
activities, as illustrated in the R-PP submitted in 2013. Elaboration of its achievements in 
relation to the REDD+ measures as described in the R-PIN was not presented in the R-PP.
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CHAPTER 4 LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
RELATED TO TENURE 
This chapter prescribes the present legal framework related to tenure in Thailand, which 
includes a broad array of policies and legislations that explicitly or implicitly define the rights 
to forest land and resources. The key legal frameworks analyzed include the Land law, Forest 
law, Forest Land Conflict Resolutions and Community Forest law. The chapter ends with the 
overview of the interaction between the customary and statutory tenure over forest. 
4.1.  Laws on forest land and resources 
tenure 
There section discusses a number of laws related to rights to forest land and resources tenure. 
The legal framework with high relevance to forest tenure in Thailand include policies and 
legislations on land, forest and land conflict resolutions and community forest.  
4.1.1.$Land$law$
The legal pattern of forest land and resources tenure in Thailand is a product of a long 
historical process. Traditionally, before 1900 all land and forest resources belonged to the 
King and he granted land tenure to his subjects who cleared and cultivated it (Engel 1978). 
Such grants could be passed on to heirs, mortgage or sold (Lasimbang 2006). However in 
1901 King Rama V introduced the modern land law that is in contradiction to the customary 
tenure arrangement, leading to a confusion in land tenure system (Yano 1968). In the same 
year, the Department of Lands was established to formalize title deeds (Lasimbang 2006). 
The fundamental land law in Thailand is the Land Code and Promulgation Act, which was 
legislated in 1954. To an extent, the Land Code reconciles customary and modern land law 
concepts by allowing a room of opportunity for customary landowners to make a claim for the 
possession of land and to receive the land use claim certificate (GoT 1954). Section 5 of the 
Act allows the land users without any title document to notify the District Officer within 180 
days from the enforcement date of this Act and failing to do so shall be regarded as the 
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renouncement of his/her customary land rights. In reality, most rural populations living in 
remote areas were unaware of this law and even those living close to provincial towns were 
unaware of this time stipulation (Lasimbang 2006). By failing to take advantage of it, a 
number of local forest-dependent communities became illegal encroachers (Lasimbang 2006). 
A particular group of forest-dependent communities – the hill tribe people – moreover was 
initially excluded from getting titles over land on the basis that they were not Thai citizens 
when the Act came into being (Lasimbang 2006). According to the Act, any land not acquired 
by law shall be regarded as State property (Chapter 1 Section 2) and the Director-General of 
the Department of Lands manages the use of public land by reserving, selling, leasing or 
allocating for concession (Chapter 1 Section 8, 9 and 10).  
4.1.2.$Forest$law$
The first forest policy of Thailand was implemented through the establishment of the Royal 
Forest Department (RFD) in 1896. After the creation of RFD in 1896, all forest lands were 
transferred from local chiefs to the RFD (Pragtong and Thomas 1990; MNRE 2008). The 
RFD was originally established under the Ministry of Interior and was transferred to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative in 1935, where it remains today8 (Usher 2009). The 
State ownership of forests was consolidated by the implementation of Forest Act of 1941 
(Usher 2009). The Act defines forest in political rather than biological terms. It declares that 
any land not acquired under the Land Code would be considered as forest (Section 4 Clause 
1) and such land, including those under customary ownership, automatically brought such 
land under State ownership. The Act is embedded with a number of elements that weaken the 
rights of local forest-dependent communities. To log any timber or collect any forest product, 
a royalty fee is required to be paid to the authority (Chapter 1 Section 9). Additionally, 
according to Chapter 5 Section 54 of the Act, clearing, burning, occupying any forest land is 
prohibited (GoT 1941). In other words, human settlement and agricultural activity are not 
allowed within the State-owned forest boundary. 
 The concept of national park as means to protect the forest in Thailand originally came 
from the American national park model. The nineteenth-century American national park idea 
is based on the concept of wilderness preservation for educational and recreational value 
(Fisher, Srimongkontip et al. 1997). In other words, it implies the backbone idea of fencing 
off an area and removing its inhabitants in order to protect the nature and provide recreational 
                                                
8 According to Usher (2009), the responsibilities for the national park on the contrary were transferred to the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in 2003. 
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place for urban tourists. In spite of innumerable cultural, ecological and political differences 
between the two countries, Yosemite and Yellowstone national parks have been explicitly 
used as models for conservation in Thailand (Usher 2009). Correspondingly, conserved 
forests in Thailand were created based on the core belief that within the boundaries there 
should be no human disturbance. Alongside the establishment of National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation divisions within the RFD in the 1960s, the Wildlife Preservation Act of 1960 
and the National Park Act of 1961 were enacted. 
 The Wildlife Preservation Act of 1960 forms the basis of the Wildlife Preservation and 
Protection Act of 1992. The Act of 1992 offers a legal support to designate wildlife 
conservation areas in any land not acquired by law, which directly implies the non-
recognition of customary tenure. The Act has implication on access and use rights, as it makes 
forest resources use of local forest-dependent communities residing inside the wildlife 
sanctuary unlawful. Inside the sanctuary, according to Section 36, no person can hunt 
wildlife, collect or endanger any nest within a wildlife sanctuary except for educational 
purpose and then only with permission. Furthermore, no person can occupy, possess (Chapter 
6 Section 38) or access the land without official permission (Chapter 6 Section 37). Inside the 
sanctuary, cutting or clearing trees is prohibited (Chapter 6 Section 38). Violators to Section 
38 shall be punished with imprisonment and/or fine (Chapter 8 Section 54) and be evicted 
from the sanctuary (Chapter 6 Section 40). 
 The National Park Act of 1961 has wide ramifications for forest land and resources 
tenure of local forest-dependent communities. It does not recognize customary ownership of 
forest land. Chapter 1 Section 6 of the Act specifies that the government have the power to 
determine any land with natural features of which are of interest and to be maintained and 
preserved for the benefit of public education and pleasure as national park and emphasizes 
that the national park land must not be owned or legally possessed by any person other than 
public body. Moreover, Section 16 of the Act noticeably limits access and use rights of local 
forest-dependent communities to use forest land and resources. Inside the park, possessing 
land, clearing or burning the forest, collecting forest products, hunting, husbandry or any 
activity that may endanger soil, rock, flowers, leaves is not allowed (Chapter 3 Section 16). In 
other words, human settlement or agricultural activity is forbidden. Violators to the Section 
shall be punished with imprisonment and/or fine (Chapter 5 Section 24-27) and be removed 
from the national park area (Chapter 2 Section 21 and 22). The authorities are empowered to 
confiscate any instruments, including agricultural tools, used by the violators and can 
demolish any construction that is regarded as any change to the condition of the park in order 
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to restore to its natural condition (Chapter 3 Section 22). The National Park Committee 
consisting of different government organizations has the duty and rights to manage the park 
for the purpose of protection and maintenance (Chapter 2 Section 15). 
 The National Reserved Forest Act, alongside the National Park Act of 1961 forms the 
basis for determination, control and management of conserved forest in Thailand. According 
to Section 4 of the Act, the definition of forest resembles the one of the Forest Act of 1941, 
which refers to land including mountains, creeks, swamps, canals, marshes, basins, waterway, 
islands or seashore that has not been acquired by a person in accordance with the land law. 
Section 12 and 13 of the Act declare that any customary land user inside any reserve forest 
designation can file a written application to district or sub-district officials within 90 days 
after the Act comes into force to receive compensation. However, most local forest-dependent 
communities were not informed of these legal changes to their customary territories, most 
likely due to remote sites of their communities and/or language barriers in the case of hill 
tribe communities (Lasimbang 2006). This Act led to many local forest-dependent 
communities becoming illegal encroachers on their customary forest land. Access and use 
rights of local communities are restricted by the Act. Inside the reserve forest, no person can 
occupy, possess land, clear or burn forest, make a construction or collect forest products 
(Chapter 2 Section 14). In other words, any human settlement or agricultural activity is 
prohibited. Additionally, logging and collecting forest products require a permission from the 
Director-General of Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation or DNP 
(Chapter 2 Section 15 and 16). The authorities are empowered to evict the violators to this 
Act of the NFR area (Chapter 2 Section 25). The Director-General of the DNP has duties to 
control and conserve the condition of the NFR, according to Chapter 2 Section 19. 
 Another forest conservation legislation with equally essential implication on forest 
tenure is the Resolution on Watershed Classification (RoWC). With the original purpose of 
upstream watershed rehabilitation by reforesting abandoned shifting cultivated area, the RFD 
initiated watershed management programs in 1953 (RFD 2005). In 1975, the Watershed 
Management Division within the RFD was established and currently, the responsibility for 
watershed management in Thailand falls under the Watershed Management and Conservation 
Office within the DNP (ICEM 2003). The first watershed classification was made in 1975, 
categorizing watershed into three classes (Lasimbang 2006). In class one, no resource 
utilization could take place and all residents were to be evacuated. Such concept created high 
controversy and in response the revised version of watershed classification was presented in 
1983 (Lasimbang 2006). The RoWC establishes different categories of watershed from one to 
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five, based on important physical features and degree of the watershed (Table 4). It is worth 
emphasizing that the watershed classification was purely based on ecological factors, while 
ignoring socio-economic factors such as water availability, infrastructure and the location of 
surrounding communities. As shown in Table 4, the strictest of these classifications is Class 
1A that entails a prohibition on forest product gathering and a decision that reforestation 
programs should be undertaken immediately (Krairapanond and Atkinson 1998). By 1987, 
Watershed Class 1 and 2 had been endorsed by the Cabinet as areas to be highly protected and 
rehabilitated as headwaters and henceforth all residents occupying these areas were to be 
relocated (Krairapanond and Atkinson 1998).  
Table 4 Watershed classification and area 
Watershed 
Class 
Description Proposed management Area  
(1000 ha) 
Ratio 
(%) 
1A High elevation (over 500 meter) 
with steep slope (over 35 %) 
Remain permanent forest 
cover 
8,446.4 17 
1B Similar to 1A but some areas 
were cleared for cultivation or 
occupied by settlement 
Should be reforested or 
maintained in permanent 
agroforestry 
762.7 1 
2 High elevation with steep slope 
(30-50%)  
May be used for grazing or 
cropping with soil and water 
conservation measures 
4,276.9 8 
3 Uplands with steep slopes (25-
35%) 
May be used for economic 
interest, e.g. logging, mining, 
grazing, agriculture, with soil 
and water conservation 
measures 
3,928.4 8 
4 Gently sloping land (6-25%) Suitable for agriculture with 
moderate conservation 
measures 
8,103.4 16 
5 Gentle to flat areas Suitable for agriculture with 
fewer restrictions 
25,148.4 49 
Water bodies   543.5 1 
Total   51,311.5 100 
Source: The Office of Environmental Policy and Planning 1996 in ICEM (2003) and ONEP 
(2013)  
 
 Although total forest protection activities should be conducted in watersheds under 
Class 1A, where either resource utilization or human settlement is allowed, a number of local 
forest-dependent communities that have been settled in these area needed to be relocated 
(Krairapanond and Atkinson 1998; Lasimbang 2006). Compounded by the fact that the 
classifications were made without public consultation, the implementation of the RoWC 
generated violent disputes between the local forest-dependent communities and the authorities 
(Lasimbang 2006). In 1995, in response to the public pressure, the RoWC was revised. 
Consequently, the local communities can continue to reside in and use the land, if they can 
prove their formal land ownership with historical aerial photos and academic reports showing 
low environmental impacts of their settlement (DNP 2010). Access to aerial photos for time 
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series analysis in Thailand was however difficult and available historical assessments of land 
use change were limited to small areas (Thomas, Weyerhaeuser et al. 2000). It is henceforth 
doubtful whether the local communities would have sufficient capability to prove their 
historical settlement. 
4.1.3.$Forest$land$conflict$resolution$mechanism$
The expansion of physical territory covered by conservation areas resulted in a situation, 
where new boundaries have enclosed and overlapped with the settlements and forests of 
thousands of communities. In combined with resettlement attempts, the conflicts over forest 
land and resources between the local forest-dependent communities and the government has 
been increasingly prominent. To alleviate land conflicts in State-owned forest lands, rather 
than relinquishing the complete control over customary territory, the RFD launched a 
program in 1981 issuing a five-year use license or Sor Tor Kor (STK) to households living 
inside and using degraded land of the national forest reserve for agricultural or residential 
purpose (Lohman 1995; USAID 2010). The license provides a recognition of cultivation 
rights inside the State-owned forest land (RFD 2008). The license is renewable and 
transferable by inheritance but it could be revoked if the land is left unused for at least two 
consecutive years (RFD 2008). The license nonetheless cannot be converted into a title deed 
or certificate of use. By 1990, approximately 700,000 households obtained STKs (Barney 
2005). Tenure security strengthening as a result of the program was however criticized. While 
some scholars believe that such outcome was attributable to the fact that the grant was given 
for a short-term and the authority could seize the land based on their subjective judgment 
(Childress 2004; Giné 2005), others suggest that it was due to overall framework of the 
program namely farm size limitation, array of land certificates and limited implementation 
facilities (Neef and Schwarzmeier 2001). Moreover, many STKs were informally sold, even 
though the certificate is non-alienable by law (Lakanavichian 1995). 
 Additional effort to alleviate tenure conflicts of the forest-dependent communities in 
the forest reserve was the provision of Sor Por Kor (SPK) 4-01 documents by Agricultural 
Land Reform Office (ALRO). Launched in 1993, the program was initially managed by the 
RFD and later transferred to the ALRO because the SPK certificates were often purchased by 
outsiders opening doors for misuse and land speculation (Rock 2004). The SPK 4-01 
certificates provide rights for farming purpose for up to 2.4 hectares of land (Chapter 3 
Section 39). By 2011, the total area of 8,320 thousand hectares was allocated to landless 
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farmers by the program (ALRO 2012). However, numerous corruption scandals were 
uncovered involving the misdirection of the SPK land reform certificates to local elites 
(Barney 2005). One of such scandal in Phuket province in 1996 in part led to the fall of the 
first Chuan Leekpai government (Barney 2005). The assessment of both STK and SPK land 
reform programs reveals the overall unsatisfactory effects of further concentration of land 
holdings in the hand of local and provincial elites (Lohman 1995).  
 The unsatisfied results of the past forest land allotment program in combined with 
intensive expansion of conservation area had aggravated the conflicts further. By the mid-
1990s, the RFD’s focus on conservation grew dramatically (Usher 2009). The redefinition of 
forestry’s mandate was followed by an immense expansion of physical territory of 
conservation areas and by a large-scale relocation scheme primarily occurred in the North and 
Northeastern regions. On the ground of watershed protection and the establishment of 
national park, national forest reserve and wildlife sanctuaries, local forest-dependent 
communities in the North encountered threats of eviction. While the resettlement attempts by 
the government owing to wildlife sanctuary demarcation in Phayao province were 
documented (Jonsson 2010), the tensions between a local community and local authorities as 
a result of the national park designation in the area overlapping with customary territory were 
observed in Chiang Mai province (Roth 2004). In northeastern Thailand, the forest-dependent 
communities in Pa Kham in Buri Ram province (1989- 1994), Thap Lan in Nakhorn 
Ratchasima (1994); and Dong Yai in Buri Ram (1994) without land titles were resettled 
owing to reforestation program in the area (Fey 2007). Driven by uncertain rights to land and 
threats of eviction from the State-owned forest area, more than two thousand local forest-
dependent people from six northern provinces marched in protest against the RFD’s desire to 
evict them from forest reserve land in 1995 (Fey 2007).  
 Similarly in 1997, the Assembly of the Poor organized a 99-day protest in Bangkok 
demanding for customary tenure recognition (Baker 2000). The core of the network consisted 
of insecure local forest-dependent communities living inside the State-owned forest land 
(Baker 2000). The protest represents the peasant struggle over rights to land and forest 
resources. The protest ended with the issuances of three Cabinet Resolutions of 1997 halting 
the forced eviction of local forest-dependent communities from State-owned forest land and 
allowing the long-settled groups to remain in the forest land on the condition that they 
participate in forest conservation (Baker 2000). Proof of historical settlement including 
communities’ history and age of fruit trees and permanent buildings was used for settling land 
rights conflicts in local forest-dependent communities (Lohman 1999). In 1998, the situation 
 63 
however changed. In early 1998, a large portion of forest in northern Thailand was affected 
by forest fire, which led to the situation where the government authorities blamed the forest-
dependent communities particularly the hill tribe population as the primary cause (Lasimbang 
and Luithui 2005). Following the incidence, the forestry chief raised the possibility to remove 
the forest encroachers even though they settled before the declaration of the protected area 
and suggested that the three 1997 Cabinet Resolutions were impractical since they encouraged 
more forest encroachment (Lasimbang and Luithui 2005).  
 The three Cabinet Resolutions of 1997 were subsequently cancelled and were replaced 
with the Cabinet Resolution of 30 June 1998 or the Resolution on Solution to Land Conflicts 
in forest area (RoSLC). The RoSLC stipulates that only those households, who have settled in 
the area prior to the demarcation of the area as forest, may be granted permission to continue 
living in or using the area with no further expansion of land-use area (GoT 1998). However, if 
the officials consider that the settlement area is potentially harmful to the environment, even 
if the household can prove of its existence before, it shall be relocated, similarly to those 
households found to settle in the area after the demarcation (GoT 1998). In other words, the 
strategy of forced eviction of forest-dependent communities living in sensitive areas was re-
introduced in this Resolution. 
4.1.4.$Community$forest$$
The concept of community forests was perceived as a promising alternative to state-controlled 
conservationism and became an important political debate in 1990s (Buergin and Kessler 
2000; Pearmsak 2000), as changes in the national political landscape towards a more 
decentralized political system were intensified (Aulin, Buhl et al. 2011). In 1998, the 
Community Forest Act was proposed by the Assembly of the Poor, Northern Farmers 
Network, academics and the Northern Community Forest Network to legally recognize 
communal use rights in forests (Zurcher 2005). After a number of modification to the original 
draft, the Community Forest Act draft was passed by the National Legislative Assembly in 
2007 with criticisms over sections that potentially restrain the rights of local communities to 
use and manage community forests in protected area. To elaborate, Section 25 limits the 
eligibility of the participating community, and thereby limiting the rights to access and 
manage the protected area of communities living outside but along the rims of the protected 
area countrywide. Section 34 does not allow logging or agriculture within the protected areas 
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(Weatherby and Soonthornwong 2008). By 2009, the Act nevertheless effectively lapsed 
(Scheyvens, Kothari et al. 2011) 
 As a flagship policy of the Abhisit Vejjachiva government to solve the land-use 
disputes over forest land and resources tenure, the Regulation of the Prime Minister’s Office 
on the issuance of Community Land Title Deed was passed in 2010. It allows the local forest-
dependent communities to collectively manage and use State-owned forests for a certain 
period of time but not providing any legal recognition for customary tenure (Erni 2010). In 
other words, the State retains its ownership of the forests. The Regulation requires that the 
holder of the community title renew the title periodically with the respective government 
agencies that formally own the land. Strong opposition of this Regulation came from the 
Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment (MNRE). Principal reason for the 
disagreement was the disapproval of the customary tenure recognition in State-owned forests 
(Erni 2010). Moreover, the Director General of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife 
and Plant Conservation at the time also pointed out that the community title deeds would be in 
breach of existing laws, notably National Park Act and National forest reserve Act (Erni 
2010). A few community title deeds were issued despite the opposition. Since the change of 
the governing political party, however, further issuance of community title deed is yet to be 
seen.  
4.2.  Summary 
The question of forest tenure and customary rights of local forest-dependent communities in 
Thailand has usually been linked to serving political and economical interests of the 
government. During the early twentieth century, forest tenure was consolidated in the hand of 
the government for the reasons of income from timber production and national security 
against colonization. Following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 until the early 1980s, a 
particular group of local forest-dependent communities composed of Hmong ethnic 
descendants was believed to organized insurgency to support communism (Sumarlan 2004; 
Fey 2007). For the sake of national security, one of the government responses to these 
perceived threats was non-recognition of customary tenure. This resulted in a combination of 
declaration of conservation forest in the area with insurgency and forced resettlement of the 
local communities to the area with ex-soldiers and government workers (Hearn 1974; 
Sumarlan 2004). During the 1990s, the government still retained the centralized view to forest 
tenure, although supported by a different reason – an ecological one.  
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 Negative ecological impacts of agricultural activities conducted by local forest-
dependent communities allegedly were responsible for high rate of deforestation and water 
imbalance in the country (Lasimbang 2006; Fey 2007). In 1998, the Director General of the 
RFD at the time ruled out the principle of coexistence between man and the nature (Ridmontri 
1998). Such ecological justification for rejecting customary tenure to forest and watershed 
area was regarded as a more publicly acceptable framing of the older desire to make forest 
land and resources as the legitimate subject of the government. More recently since the mid-
1990s, economic benefits from tourism inside the national parks and wildlife sanctuaries 
resulted in infrastructure and private construction for tourism inside the parks as well as 
relocation of local forest-dependent communities inside the designation (Leepreecha 2005) 
 For different reasons over time, the government has continuously approached and 
viewed forest land and resources as the legitimate domain of the government. Neither the 
realities of the actual land users, nor their customary tenure has been incorporated into the 
legal framework. Rather than recognizing the customary tenure of local forest-dependent 
communities, the government has regarded them as illegal encroachers, who invaded the 
State-owned forest land as they were driven by poverty (Usher 2009). The concept of Reserve 
Settlement Commission adopted during the colonial era in certain countries, i.e. Ghana 
(Wardell, Reenberg et al. 2003), that allows for the identification and protection of customary 
rights to forest lands of the local communities prior to the gazettement of forest reserves was 
not employed in Thailand. As a consequence, the two tenure systems produce the overlapping 
claims in forest land and resources inside the State-owned forest jurisdiction and undoubtedly 
the two systems have incessantly been in confrontation. In its antagonism towards the local 
forest-dependent people, the government put forward relentless efforts and at times exercised 
heavy-handed measures through the years to have them evicted. Consequently, Thailand’s 
forest areas have been plagued by conflicts between the authorities and local communities.  
 In spite of legal obligation and attempts to remove people from the forests by the 
forestry agencies, the number of encroachers inside State-owned forest land grew 
significantly over the years from five million in 1974 to ten million in 1980 (Usher 2009). 
According to RECOFTC estimates of encroachers living in or near State-owned forest land as 
described in Usher (2009) reached fourteen millions by 2006. The legal status of millions of 
people living within State-owned forest area, including substantial number of long-term 
occupants, was problematic, as they do not have any legal recognition. The local forest-
dependent communities, who have been regarded as illegal encroachers in forest land, were in 
legal violation by their very presence in their customary territory (Ratanakhon 1978). The 
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lack of formal recognition of customary tenure system and of local community forest 
management results in tenure insecurity of these local communities (Brenner, Buergin et al. 
1999; Ganjanapan 2000). 
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CHAPTER 5 DE FACTO TENURE 
IMPACT OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter presents the findings of forest land and resource tenure situation in Thailand, 
based on the data obtained from the two selected communities in the Northern region. It 
prescribes the past tenure situation and conflicts, corresponding response of the two 
communities to solve the tenure conflicts and to enhance tenure security. The chapter also 
portrays the present tenure situation and it ends with the pressing concerns and the tenure type 
preference of the communities. 
5.1. Past tenure situation 
This section outlines the historical tenure conflicts of the communities by associating them to 
the relevant regulatory framework. Furthermore, it demonstrates past pivotal efforts of the 
communities to solve such conflicts and to enhance tenure security.  
5.1.1.$Past$tenure$conflicts$
The national forest reserve (NFR) Act provides a room of 90 days after the reserve forest 
demarcation for any customary landowner to declare him or herself in order to receive 
financial compensation. Perhaps due to language barriers, remote location and the absence of 
public consultation prior to the demarcation, the two communities were unaware of the Doi 
Suthep NFR establishment as well as the call for customary landowners to claim for their 
rights. Not doing so within the prescribed timeframe was regarded as the customary 
landowner renounced his or her own rights to land. After the declaration of the community 
area as part of the reserve forest, the communities appeared to be rather unaffected even 
though the NFR Act strictly forbade occupying or using forest land and resources. The 
communities continued with their settlement inside the NFR designation, agricultural practice 
of shifting cultivation with one-year rotation period, hunting and subsistence gathering forest 
products without any official permission. All in all, the communities’ tenure over their 
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agricultural land and the surrounding forests, which were then regarded as their traditional 
community forest, was not disturbed. 
 The impacts on tenure of the communities became observable about one year after the 
designation of Suthep-Pui national park. According to the national park (NP) Act, any activity 
related to gathering forest products, using or possessing land inside the national park area was 
regarded unlawful, as it might create disturbance to the original state of the park. As a 
consequence, the communities became illegally using their agricultural land, their residential 
area and the surrounding forests. Since 1982, the DNP/RFD officials had been actively 
enforcing the NP Act in the settlements. One of the initial responses was the formation of 
local guarding and warning system. Once the authorities were spotted approaching to the 
communities, the members would communicate within the group in order to flee from the 
land-use area before the authorities arrive. As mentioned by the head of the sub-district 
(Kaew Mon-ut, personal communication, 12 June 2012) and Tambon Administration 
Organization (TAO) representative (Duangjun Sansuya, personal communication, 13 June 
2012), in the past when the wrongdoers were caught by the authorities, the remaining 
community members would deny to provide any evidence or witness of such wrongdoing and 
many times they would block the road preventing the authorities from taking away the 
wrongdoers. The Pong Yaeng Nai community head and the TAO representative further noted 
that such strong collective action is generally the Hmong typical characteristics that did not 
exist among the surrounding Thai communities. The warning system was however not always 
effective. A large number of the community members was nevertheless arrested and their 
agricultural tools were confiscated on the account of utilizing NP land. During that time, there 
was no distinction between traditionally cultivated land or newly cleared land, as anyone 
occupying or utilizing NP land was regarded as violators to the NP Act. As stipulated by the 
Act, the arrested violators were penalized in forms of fine and/or imprisonment. This marked 
the beginning of accumulated resentment of the communities against the DNP/RFD officials.  
 Being classified as part of the watershed class 1A, the enforcement of NP Act and the 
RoWC in the settlements was further strengthened. As forced eviction was recommended in 
the RoWC as one of the potential arrangements for existing settlements inside the watershed 
class 1A, during 1985-1986 threats of forced relocation became progressively pronounced as 
certain communities in Thailand were being relocated. In combined with the resentment due 
to the arrest and punishment of many community members, occasionally it led to retaliations. 
In the 1990s, one of the arbitrary arrests resulted in violent gunfire between the two parties. 
According to the village head assistant of Mae Sa Mai, the overlapping claims made by the 
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officials were deemed legitimate due to the widespread negative perception of shifting 
agriculture and hilltribers at the time. Shifting agriculture was regarded as an unsustainable 
cultivation method that requires continuous clearance of forest land, whilst the hilltribers were 
reckoned the forest destroyers. Therefore it was in direct contradiction to forest conservation 
effort of the government.  
 In response to the nation-wide protest, the RoSLC allowed for temporary settlement 
and use of land inside the NP without further expansion, until the process of historical 
settlement investigation is finalized. The criterion as historical settlement proof nonetheless is 
rather incompatible with the communities that traditionally performed shifting cultivation. To 
illustrate, when doing shifting cultivation the land users tend to leave big trees standing and 
when rotating to another piece of land, the used land revert to natural vegetation. Given that 
the criteria of used land of the government is the completely cleared land without natural 
vegetation, historical aerial photographs alone would not be able to properly detect the trace 
of shifting cultivated land. The implementation of the RoSLC in the meantime had led to 
demarcation of agricultural plots, community forest and conservation forest of the two 
communities by the DNP officials both by ground truthing and GPS mapping. 
5.1.2.$Past$efforts$to$solve$tenure$problem$
Driven by strict enforcement of laws and fear of forced eviction, the communities collectively 
employed several strategies in order to enhance their tenure security and to survive the threat 
of eviction. Aside from the assistance of various NGOs to negotiate with the authorities for 
enhanced tenure security, crucial strategies conducted and performed by the communities 
include forming the Natural Resource Conservation Group, establishing the conservation 
forest, hosting experimental forest restoration plots and participating in protests for their 
rights to forest land and resource.  
5.1.2.1. Natural Conservation Group 
Amongst the initial conservation efforts was the formation of Natural Resources Conservation 
Group in late 1980s. The Group was principally composed of leading community committee 
members built a community-wide consensus towards the creation of the conservation forest 
locally called Dong Seng. Originally the area was covered with evergreen forest. It was then 
cleared for cultivation of rice, cabbage, corn, potato and other cash crops. In 1990 as a result 
of series of community meetings and majority vote for approval of conservation forest, about 
20-30 community members gave up their agricultural area in the upper watershed headwater 
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in order to preserve as the conservation forest of the communities. Gradually over the course 
of four years, cultivation activities were phased out and the conservation forest of 80 hectares 
was created.  
5.1.2.2. Conservation forest 
The conservation forest was maintained and protected by the two communities. Community 
rules created by the Natural Resource Conservation Group limited the use and prescribed 
punishment for any violator. The community members normally entered the area only for the 
Forest Ordination ceremony and for constructing firebreaks9. According to the community 
rules, forest product collection or hunting was forbidden in the area. Anyone violating such 
rules would be fined. For example any hunting activity would be fined at the rate of 500 THB 
per number of legs of the animal hunted. The fine collected would then go to the community 
funds. Primary objectives of the conservation forest most likely were: (i) to demonstrate the 
community’s willingness and ability to conserve forests in order to replace their negative 
image among the public and the DNP of forest destroyers with forest guardians; (ii) to use as 
a protection from forced relocation; (iii) to keep headwater area forested in order to maintain 
downstream water quality and quantity; and (iv) in light of the nation-wide discussions on the 
Community Forest Act during the time that was expected to be passed, to grab more land 
when the Act comes into effect. 
 With the evidence of improved forest condition of the conservation forest area after 
four years of establishment, the local DNP officials had altered their negative attitude towards 
the communities. Then discussion and negotiation between the two parties then became 
possible, as they collaborated for forest conservation in the communities. Certain conflicts 
caused by expansion of agricultural land into the forest land nonetheless remained, essentially 
due to the absence of clear boundary of individual agricultural plots at the time.  
5.1.2.3. Experimental forest restoration 
Additional to the conservation forest, in collaboration with Forest Restoration Research Unit 
(FORRU) of Chiang Mai University, the communities have assisted in preparing experimental 
forest restoration plots in its vicinity that had been continuously enlarged during the period of 
1997-2012, from 0.48 to a total of 30.72 hectares (Stephen Elliot, personal communication, 2 
August 2013). In combined with the community forest conservation initiative, the effort was 
                                                
9 The community has a community forest, which used to be an agricultural area and was forced to be given up by 
community’s majority vote for approval of community forest. After reforesting the area, the community uses the 
forest area for gathering forest products and timber for community ceremony. The area is about 4.8 hectares. 
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well received by the DNP. The community received a number of awards as forest guardians 
and in 2008 the DNP selected the communities as one of the sites that received funding for 
reforestation program from the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) due to their 
outstanding conservation performance. 
5.1.2.4. Assembly of the Poor 
In 1997 the communities joined force with other forest-dependent communities in Chiang Mai 
to protest in front of the City Town Hall of Chiang Mai province and later participated the 
Assembly of the Poor to protest further in Bangkok for 99 days. Consequently, the protest has 
eventually led to the issuance of the Cabinet Resolution of 30 June 1998 or RoSLC.  
5.2. Present tenure situation of Mae Sa 
Mai community 
The community members seem to have rights to enter, to use with certain restrictions, to 
manage, to exclude incompatible use of land as well as to transfer these rights to the next 
generation. Even without any formal recognition, the members commonly did not fear of 
eviction or withdrawal of rights to the community forest. 
5.2.1.1. Rights to access and to withdraw 
Concern with rights to access and use the community forest, all of thirty-nine respondents 
(100%) and the village head assistants collectively indicated that the community members 
could enter and gather non-timber forest products from the community forest for household 
consumption without any official permission (Figure 13). In response to the question of what 
are the forest products that the members usually collect, most respondents indicated bamboo 
shoot, mushroom and medicinal plants. Over half of the younger male and female participants 
as well as the village head assistants further explained that due to a number of fatalities 
associated with poisonous mushroom in the past, the popularity of mushroom gathering and 
consumption in the community was dramatically reduced. All of the thirty-nine respondents 
(100%) mentioned that collecting forest products for commercial purpose was not allowed, as 
stipulated in the community rules (Figure 13). Such rules were purposively established to 
prevent a situation where greedy members intensively collect forest products and thereby 
degrading the community forest condition, as explained by a few older male participants. 
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 Approximately 87% of the participants as well as the village head assistants indicated 
the community members could not hunt animals (Figure 13). A few participants of the older 
male group commented that the violator would be fined 3,000-5,000 THB for four-legged 
animals and 2,000 THB for fowls. The village head assistant revealed that the community 
committee once fined a violator 5,000 THB. The minority of five respondents principally 
comprising of the younger male group believed that the community rules allowed the 
members to hunt small animals such as bird and squirrel, but not big animals (Figure 13).  
 With regards to timber, over two-thirds of all participants (92%) indicated that the 
community members could use timber in the community forest (Figure 13). As voiced in all 
groups, the members needed to ask for approval of the village committee or village head 
before extracting the timber from the forest and only for community events, e.g. funeral, 
wedding etc. (Figure 13). The village head assistants then confirmed such notion. An 
individual of the younger female group stated that given the limitation of timber use inside the 
community forest, some members illegally logged trees outside of the community forest in 
order to build houses. However, the village head assistants added that most of the members of 
the younger generation tended to build their houses with cement rather than wood due to its 
greater durability and to avoid potential conflicts with the community committee and the DNP 
officials. 
 
Figure 13 Access and withdrawal rights of Mae Sa Mai community 
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for maintaining, replacing dead trees with seedlings and constructing firebreaks every year 
(Figure 14). According to a few younger female participants, each household had to send one 
representative to construct firebreaks annually. The representatives were then classified into 
groups and each group was responsible for creating firebreaks in a different designated area of 
the community forest. Furthermore, during dry season, the community members guarded the 
area that was prone to forest fire around the clock on a voluntary basis, as discussed in the 
younger male focus group. As mentioned by over half of the older male participants, the 
community had been responsible for management and maintenance of the community forest 
for the past decade. 
 In relation to involvement of the authorities in the management and maintenance of 
the community forest, the 46% majority of the respondents principally comprising of female 
groups believed that the DNP had not been involved in the management of community forest, 
while the other 33% of the respondents held an opposing view (Figure 14). After cross 
checking with the village head assistants, the minority view was found more accurate. This 
might be due to the fact that many female members had not been directly participated in the 
management and maintenance activities, as often as the male groups and hence may lack of 
in-depth information of the activity. Over half of younger and older male participants revealed 
that the DNP contributed to the firebreaks construction every year, once informed by the 
community of the exact dates (Figure 14). Additionally, according to the village head 
assistant, the community often asked for and received financial support from the Tambon 
Administration Organization to construct firebreaks.  
 
 
Figure 14 Management rights of Mae Sa Mai community 
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5.2.1.3. Rights to exclude 
Related to exclusionary rights, about 92% of the respondents as well as the village head 
assistants expressed the belief that the community members could exclude any incompatible 
user that was either a villager from other villages or an investor (Figure 15). Only two 
respondents felt uncertain whether the investor would be too powerful for the community 
members to exclude (Figure 15). A few respondents revealed that the members could 
collaborate with the DNP to exclude incompatible land users, given that the DNP held 
ownership rights to land.  
 When the respondents were asked if the competitive land users had been the DNP 
officials, over 85% of the respondents commented that the community members could also 
exclude them (Figure 15). The reason commonly provided by all groups and the village head 
assistants was the unofficial permission by the DNP to use and responsibility to maintain and 
manage the community forest through negotiation between the community committee and the 
local DNP officials. As remarked by a few older and younger male participants, this implies 
that as long as the community could continue to maintain the community forest, the 
community should then have the rights to exclude any competitive land user including the 
officials. The minority of six respondents chiefly led by the participants of the older female 
group believed that the community members could not exclude the DNP primarily because 
the DNP was the legal owner of the community forest land (Figure 15).   
 
 
Figure 15 Exclusion rights of Mae Sa Mai community 
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5.2.1.4. Rights to alienate  
With respect to alienation rights, all of the thirty-nine respondents (100%) as well as the 
village head assistants indicated that the community members could transfer the community 
forest to the next generation (Figure 16). A few respondents specified that the members could 
transfer only the assigned rights to use and the responsibility related to the community forest 
to descendants, not the legal ownership of the land. All of the participants (100%) agreeably 
commented that the community members could not sell the community forest land (Figure 
16). As noted by a few participants of the older male group and the village head assistants, the 
community rules stipulated that the community members could use and should maintain and 
protect the community forest for the next generation but no one could sell the community 
forest land. Moreover, an individual from the younger male focus group stated that if the 
community had sold the community forest, implying that the community could not protect the 
forests, then there would certainly be consequential land conflicts with the DNP.  
 
 
Figure 16 Alienation rights of Mae Sa Mai community 
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conserve and maintain the community forest, the officials would not have sufficient reasons to 
withdraw their rights to the community forest. The minority of the respondents (22%) 
revealed the fear of withdrawal of rights to the community forest based on the absence of any 
legal title document to the community forest and the potential future changes in laws related 
to national park designation (Figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17 Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest of Mae Sa Mai 
community 
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Figure 18 Legal recognition of community forest of Mae Sa Mai community 
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due to the fear of mushroom poisoning. Conforming to the village head and his assistant, most 
respondents (88%) agreed that the collection of forest products for commercial purpose was 
prohibited by the community rules (Figure 19). The minority of five respondents was 
uncertain yet some of them also noted that they had never seen any member selling forest 
products (Figure 19). 
  A 90% majority as well as the village head and his assistant disclosed that hunting 
animal inside the community forest was not allowed, as stipulated by the community rules 
(Figure 19). A few younger male participants noted that for any violator, after the initial 
warning by the community committee, s/he would be fined following the community rules 
and if continued, the committee would hand over the violator to the DNP officials. Regarding 
timber products, a great portion of the respondents (83%) believed that the community 
members could use timber from the community forest occasionally for community events, 
such as wedding and funeral, upon approval of the village head or community committee 
(Figure 19). The village head and his assistant confirmed such notion. A few older male 
participants indicated that the members were usually allowed to log two to three trees and the 
trees should be no more than 20-30 years old. As elaborated by the village head, had any 
member violated or logged trees without permission of the village head or his assistant, the 
community committee would warn the violator and if continued, the violator would be sent to 
and punished by the DNP officials in accordance with the NP Act. The use of timber for 
personal purpose, such as building houses, was not allowed, as discussed among the younger 
female participants. 
 
Figure 19 Access and withdrawal rights of Mae Sa Noi community 
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5.3.1.2. Rights to manage 
With regards to management rights, by consensus the respondents (100%) as well as the 
village head and his assistant stated that the community had been responsible for applying 
fertilizer in the forest, replacing dead trees with seedlings, constructing firebreaks and 
guarding against forest fire (Figure 20). Most respondents highlighted that the community 
rules that were established and enforced by the community committee in order to regulate the 
use and maintain the community forest. A few individuals of the younger male group noted 
that the community rules were accepted by the local DNP officials.  
 In response to the question on the level of involvement of the DNP in community 
forest management, 65% of the respondents believed that the DNP had not been involved in 
the management of the community forest at all (Figure 20). The minority of 18% primarily 
comprising of older male participants reported the involvement of the DNP in form of funding 
for firebreak construction at times (Figure 20). In fact, the village head and assistant identified 
that upon the community’s request the DNP usually provided man labor and the TAO often 
provided financial support for firebreak construction. The remainder of 18% was uncertain of 
the DNP’s involvement (Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20 Management rights of Mae Sa Noi community 
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participant expressed hesitance about the ability of the community members to exclude 
investors, who might be comparatively more powerful.  
 When the participants were asked if the DNP officials had been the competitive user, 
the overall response (78%) revealed that the community members could also prevent such 
user, similarly to the village head and his assistant (Figure 21). Over half of the younger male 
participants suggested that the members could exclude any incompatible land users including 
the DNP thanks to the GPS maps and demarcation of the community forest conducted by 
local DNP officials. A few individuals of the older male and younger female group 
commented that the community could collectively protest against any competitive use of the 
community forest. The minority of the respondents predominantly from the older female 
group based their belief that the community could not exclude incompatible use of land of the 
officials due to past incidence of land appropriation by the government in the neighboring 
forest for rattan plantation. 
 
Figure 21 Exclusion rights of Mae Sa Noi community 
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group, he noted that at present the community forest had been transferred for the past six to 
seven generations already.  
 All of the forty participants (100%) as well as the village head and his assistant 
concertedly commented that the community could not sell the community forest land although 
for various reasons (Figure 22). Over half of the younger female participants indicated the 
community wished to maintain the forest for the next generation. As elaborated by a few older 
female individuals, the ownership of the community forest land remained with the DNP and 
the members held only certain rights and responsibilities to the community forest. 
 
 
Figure 22 Alienation rights of Mae Sa Noi community 
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Figure 23 Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest of Mae Sa Noi 
community 
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Figure 24 Legal recognition of community forest of Mae Sa Noi community 
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Figure 25 Pressing concern of Mae Sa Mai community 
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land (Figure 26). 
 
Figure 26 Pressing concern of Mae Sa Noi community 
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5.4.2.$Tenure$preference$$ $
When being asked whether the community members would like to have recognition of their 
rights to the land, all of the participants of both communities harmoniously replied yes. 
Primarily, the reason frequently voiced among all groups to substantiate such desire was to 
enhance the community’s tenure security to the land. The question was then further divided 
into the preferable format of tenure for the community forest as well as agricultural land. 
 For the community forest land of Mae Sa Mai community, the majority of the 
respondents (98%) indicated the preference for communal tenure. General explanation for the 
choice of communal tenure over individual tenure to community forest land by all groups was 
related to the long-term ability to conserve the forest. A few younger male participants 
mentioned the benefit of communal title that could prevent the sale of community forest land 
in the pursuit of personal wealth. Other respondents from the older male group pointed out 
that the communal title would allow sharing of resource use and encourage collective effort to 
conserve the community forest. As explained by a few individuals of the younger female 
group, the community forest area was too large for a handful of individuals to maintain. Only 
one younger female participant revealed the preference of individual title to the community 
forest attributable to the greater flexibility in decision-making on the use and management of 
the land. 
 In relation to community forest of Mae Sa Noi community, all of the forty participants 
(100%) seemed to prefer communal tenure to community forest. The rationale for such 
preference that was mentioned in all groups was the non-alienation attribute of the communal 
title, as means to prevent the sale of community forest land. Other reasons provided related to 
the communal rights to use the forest products and shared responsibility in management and 
maintenance of the community forest. 
5.5. Summary  
For decades, government policies towards forest management have been top-down and the 
concept that co-existence of human and forests is deemed impossible. The demarcation of Doi 
Suthep national forest reserve in 1964, Doi Suthep-Pui national park in 1981 and Watershed 
Class 1A in 1982 overlapping the settlements was conducted without public consultation or 
consent. Since the 1980s, rapid expansion of conserved forest network and stringent 
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enforcement of forest conservation laws have been noticeable. In many countries in Southeast 
Asia with ethnic minorities, the negative view of shifting cultivators as forest destroyers was 
magnified (Delang 2002). Similarly, in Thailand, the typical negative image of the local 
forest-dependent communities in highland particularly the Hmong hilltribers was pronounced 
(Hirsch 2000; Delang 2002; Sumarlan 2004; Forsyth and Walker 2008). Furthermore, 
deforestation was believed to cause irregular rainfall and compromise regular water runoff, 
worsening flooding and drought (Forsyth and Walker 2008). Such water imbalance had large 
implication on the majority of the Thai population (64% in 1994), who were at least part-time 
rice farmers and dependent on constant supply of stream water (Delang 2002). Furthermore, 
upland ethnic minorities in the past were regarded as communist insurgents, illegal 
immigrants and drug producers and traffickers and therefore should be closely monitored and 
controlled (Leblond 2010; Lee and Tapp 2010). In combined, various pressures backed by 
environmental protection and national security rationales were exerted on communities 
residing in upper watersheds at mid to high elevation (Leblond 2010), including the two 
communities studied. Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities consequently lived under 
insecure rights to forest land and resources without any legal recognition and were incessantly 
exposed to threats of arbitrary arrest and relocation by the authorities in the past. 
 In light of the rising tenure insecurity, one of the key responses of the communities 
was the focus on forest conservation activities. The communities initiated a number of forest 
conservation activities, e.g. formation of Natural Resources Conservation Group in late 
1980s, the creation of the conservation forest in 1994, the assistance to Forest Restoration 
Research Unit (FORRU) in creating forest restoration plots since 1997. The characteristics of 
strong collective action of the two communities made possible the creation and successful 
continued management of the conservation forest that required the dispossession of 
agricultural land of several community members as well as strict enforcement of community 
rules governing the use and management of the forest resources. Moreover, such strong 
collective action along with certain level of negotiation skills led to the acceptance of the 
communities’ rules governing the access, use and withdrawal rights to the community forest 
by the local authorities.  
 Another factor that appears to contribute to tenure security improvement of the 
communities is the presence and assistance of local mediators. Various NGOs and research 
institutions that had collaborated with the communities played an essential role both indirectly 
and directly. Indirectly, they instilled the concept of forest conservation as means to enhance 
de facto tenure security and to gain trust from the officials. The Royal Project Foundation 
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encouraged and facilitated the communities to change from shifting cultivation to permanent 
cultivation, which were regarded by the authorities as less destructive to forest (Bunrongsak 
Sainoi, personal communication, 25 June 2012). By doing so, the communities learned that 
the potential avenues to gain acceptance and lower tenure conflicts with the authorities are to 
adopt environmental-friendly approach to cultivation and/or forest conservation activities. 
Along the same line, FORRU, the reforestation research unit hosted by Chiang Mai 
University provided the communities with opportunities to showcase their willingness and 
capacity to conserve the forest. FORRU also helped conveying scientific evidences of 
positive conservation outcome of the communities to the authorities on several occasions 
(Stephen Elliot, personal communication, 2 August 2013). Directly, a number of 
organizations entered into negotiations with local authorities to enhance tenure security of the 
communities. The Royal Project Foundation initiated the demarcation of agricultural area of 
participating community members and negotiated for the use of land on behalf of its members 
with the local authorities (Bunrongsak Sainoi, personal communication, 25 June 2012). The 
Uplands Program, an international collaborative research program conducted in the 
communities, together with its Thai partners also negotiated with the local authorities for the 
two communities to have the rights to permanently settle in their present location (Neef 
2012).  
 Additional to the three major factors that could be described as specific local context 
of the communities leading to de facto tenure security, another complementary external factor 
is the growing public pressure on the government to provide tenure security to local forest-
dependent communities in Chiang Mai in 1997 and later in Bangkok led by the Assembly of 
the Poor. Consequently, the protest, which augmented political pressure on the government, 
eventually led to the issuance of the Cabinet Resolution of 30 June 1998 or RoSLC. 
Following the implementation of RoSLC in the communities, the GPS maps of the individual 
agricultural land, community forest and conservation forest were created. Furthermore, the 
DNP officials also demarcated the boundary of the settlements to inform the members of their 
periphery. The mapping process was finalized approximately in 2008. Upon the GPS 
mapping, another layer of collaboration between the communities and the authorities was 
added, as their level of trust grew. The community committees of both Mae Sa Mai and Mae 
Sa Noi were assigned to guard against expansion of agricultural plots beyond the boundary 
and to ultimately hand over the wrong-doers to the local authorities. With the clear boundary 
and strong collaboration between the communities and the DNP, the number of members 
expanding their land became significantly lowered as well as the conflicts between the 
 88 
communities and the DNP officials. At times, the community committee captured the 
members, who cleared land beyond his boundary and sent them to the DNP officials with 
consent, as opposed to the past where the committee sided with the community members 
against the DNP whether the members were truly guilty or not. The communities’ forest 
conservation initiatives were well received by the DNP officials and the public. The 
community obtained a number of awards as forest guardians and in 2008 the authorities 
selected the community as one of the sites that received funding for reforestation program 
from private sector due to their outstanding conservation performance.  
 Even without any legal recognition of their tenure, it is widely understood in the 
communities that the local authorities informally recognized their tenure due to the direct 
involvement of the authorities in plot allocation and community mapping. Furthermore, the 
communities were able to initiate and enforce the community rules governing the access, use 
and management of the community forest autonomously with an acceptance from the 
authorities. Moreover, the majority of the respondents revealed excludability vis-à-vis all 
incompatible land users of the settlements including the authorities and the absence of fear of 
relocation. Correspondingly, when being asked about their pressing concerns, tenure conflicts 
were not mentioned as one of the top three priorities. As a few members explained, the 
communities no longer had tenure conflicts with the authorities as in the past. In other words, 
the communities appear to have de facto tenure security to their forest land and resources. The 
illustration of tenure analysis of Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities is shown in Figure 
27. 
 
Figure 27 Tenure impacts analysis of Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities 
Intervention 1 
•  National Reserve Forest Act 
•  National Park Act  
•  Cabinet Resolution on Watershed 
Classification 
Contributing cause 1 
•  National forest conservation goal 
•  Public concerns over deforestation 
•  Natural disastors  
•  Negative image of hill tribers 
Intervention 2 
•  Forest conservation activities as 
response to tenure insecurity 
•  Strong collective action 
•  Local mediators 
•  Cabinet Resolution on Land Conflicts in 
Forest Area 
Contributing cause 2 
•  Public protestt for tenure security  
Expected tenure outcome 2 
•  Non-recognition of customary tenure  
•  No title document  
•  Resettlement 
Actual tenure outcome 2 
•  GPS maps and plot allocation by authoriities 
•  Community-initiated rules for community 
forest 
•  Excludability vis-a-vis authorities 
•  No fear of eviction 
Expected tenure outcome 1 
•  Non-recognition of customary tenure  
•  No title document  
•  Resettlement 
Actual tenure outcome 1 
•  Non-excludability vis-a-vis 
authorities 
•  Widespread fear of eviction 
 89 
CHAPTER 6 DE FACTO TENURE 
IMPACT OF REDD+ 
This chapter presents the findings related to REDD+ pilot measures and activities performed 
in Thailand. It discusses about the evolution of tenure situation of the selected communities 
and identifies the tenure changes occurred as a result of REDD+ pilot implementation. The 
findings were obtained from two local communities, Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi 
communities that participated the Tenessarim Biodiversity Corridor Initiative (BCI) located in 
Kanchanburi province of Western Thailand. 
6.1. Overview of pilot project activities 
This section discusses about the context of the REDD+ pilot project in Thailand. Moreover, it 
describes the expected activities as well as the actual activities conducted in the pilot project.  
6.1.1.$BCI$as$REDD+$pilot$
The BCI was launched to address long-term ecosystem fragmentation by securing recognition 
of a biodiversity landscape as part of the regional program implemented in Greater Mekong 
Sub-region (GMS). In Thailand, the BCI is located in the Tenasserim corridor, comprising 
remnant forest between Sai Yok national park and Maenam Phachee wildlife sanctuary. The 
proposed corridor includes a 10-kilometer wide strip from the Thai border and covers a total 
area of 1,807 square kilometers. Using the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the governments 
of Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden provided financial support to the Department of 
National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) of the Ministry of Natural Resources 
and Environment to implement BCI starting in 2006. The first stage of the BCI was expected 
to finish by December 2009. However, given the disagreement over funding arrangements 
between the Thai government and the ADB, the second stage of the BCI was uncertain at the 
time. The Wildlife Conservation Society contributed to the BCI by conducting an initial 
biodiversity survey of the pilot site and the Center for People and Forest (RECOFTC) 
provided training to local communities on how to set up and manage village funds.  
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 Between 2005 and 2010, development pressure and the resulting land use changes 
increased ecosystem fragmentation in landscapes across the GMS. The objective of the BCI 
was therefore to link protected areas in order to: (i) ensure species could move between? 
habitats and maintain viable populations; (ii) enhance and maintain ecosystem services; and 
(iii) promote and enhance local community welfare through conservation and sustainable use 
of natural resources. A combination of budget constraints for the continuation of the BCI and 
the possibility of REDD+ funds from the Facility for Infrastructure Development ORIO of the 
Netherlands in 2009 led to a proposal in which an emission reduction component was added 
to the BCI activities.  
 According to the R-PIN submitted to the FCPF in 2009 and its Annex, Thailand 
proposed to pilot REDD measures in BCI site with expected completion and deliverables10 by 
the end of 2012. The REDD activities included:  
Carbon sequestration 
(i) Total amount of carbon sequestration per hectare and per year in the 70-kilometer 
corridor between the Western Forest Complex and Kaeng Krachan Complex; 
(ii) Restoration of native species in 5,000 hectares of degraded forest at least around the 
protected area as carbon sequestration zone and 5,000 hectares of enrichment planting 
area; 
(iii) Assessment of potential sales of certified emission reduction obtained from the project 
in the voluntary carbon market;   
(iv) Updated data of from the BCI to be fed into national deforestation level and land use 
change according to the type of forest ecosystem affected and the production of forest 
cover and land use maps comparing the situation in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 by 
June 2010; and  
(v) Strengthened enforcement of the existing protected area and expansion of the 
protected area designation in agreement with local communities. 
Benefits to the local communities 
(vi) Cash and non-cash benefits to 7,000 households living adjacent to the corridor forests; 
(vii) 5,000 hectares of livelihood plantations in buffer zones with eight-year rotation of fast 
growing species for the use of beneficiary households in the government owned 
degraded land whereby 70% of the revenue goes to participating households and 30% 
flows back to the village fund; 
                                                
10 Excluding the activities (xi) and (xii) 
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(viii) Demarcation of 5,000 hectares for agro-forestry and provision of funds to households 
to grow non-timber forest products for household consumption; 
(ix) Provision of US$10,000 as capital for twenty selected communities as the village 
revolving funds linked to income-generating activities; and 
(x) Performance-based cash incentives of US$70 per hectare per year to households 
through village funds for protection of up to 10,000 hectares of intact forest and for 
maintenance of the restored area. 
Tenure security of forest-dependent communities 
(xi) Enhancement of land tenure and tenure security of forest dependent communities and 
other forest adjacent dwellers. Such communities and people were regarded as 
stewards of the forest providing protection against forest encroachment; and 
(xii) Provision of rights and assignment of responsibilities relating to community forest 
management to the local communities in form of contract between the government 
and the local communities.  
6.1.2.$REDD+$activities$performed$
According to the BCI update report of 2012 (Moinuddin, Pokhrel et al. 2012) and personal 
communication with key project developers from the Asian Development Bank and the DNP, 
the actions undertaken were: 
 Firstly, regarding reforestation of the degraded protected area, about 120 hectares of 
degraded land inside the Sai Yok national park were restored with the participation of the 
community. Upon completion of reforestation of the area, the members of Ton Mamuang or 
Bongti Noi communities did not take part in the use, protection or maintenance of the 
reforested area. The DNP had been responsible for the area. According to government 
officials, most budgets for reforestation projects in Thailand lasted at least eight years: 
plantation in the first year and maintenance from the second to the eighth year. However, the 
BCI fund was provided only for restoration work during the first year. The DNP, whose 
mandate included forest maintenance, then relied on the departmental budget to carry out the 
work. Given the limited departmental budget, insufficient manpower and large reforested 
area, the Ton Mamuang community assistant village head reported the occurrence of forest 
fires in the reforested area (Somchai Lima, personal communication, July 25, 2013). 
 Secondly, the review of land use and land use changes using a geographic information 
system was undertaken. Based on the review, four management zones were proposed: 
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agroforestry (sustainable land use), livelihood plantation (buffer zone), carbon sequestration 
(natural regeneration and man-made restoration) and deforestation avoidance incentive zones 
(undisturbed area). As of 2013, the proposal has not yet been implemented in the framework 
of the BCI. 
 Thirdly, a preliminary assessment of estimates of GHG emission sequestration 
potential was conducted in the southern part of the BCI. The assessment revealed carbon 
storage values ranging from 55-83 million tonnes from the forested area of 283,094 hectares.  
 Fourthly, extension of the Sai Yok national park designation into the community area 
was discussed unofficially with several community committee members. Implementation 
modalities and public consultation have not yet been conducted. 
 Lastly, the revolving fund was disbursed to 20 selected communities to encourage the 
creation and expansion of income-generating activities in the communities. Prior to 
distribution of the fund, a detailed socio-economic study was conducted and workshops on 
fund management and utilization were organized. In the Bongti Noi and Ton Mamuang 
communities, the funds were disbursed in the form of loans as capital investment for local 
occupational groups, such as herbal farming, organic fertilizer production and bamboo 
weaving. Each member was eligible for a one-year loan with a flat interest rate before the 
loan rotated to other members. Certain percentages of the interest obtained from the loan were 
used for communal purposes, for example improvement of the irrigation system, a fund for 
the elderly, and the construction of firebreaks. 
 In 2013, a number of the communities who had participated in the BCI appeared to 
lose their revolving fund. According to the project developers and the head of Suan Phung 
sub-district (Sakol Kunapitak, personal communication, 3 August 2013) who oversees a few 
participating communities with the loss of fund, three central factors are suspected to 
contribute to this situation, including local contexts, unconditional agreement and infrequent 
monitoring. Local contexts such as high indebtedness level, weak leadership, low forest 
conservation capability, and limited collectivity are conceivably the most important. This is 
because against a similar backdrop of unconditional agreement and infrequent monitoring, 
some participating communities managed to further increase their fund, while others lost or 
diverted it entirely. In fact, for many communities that lost the fund, the situation was 
predictable. During the fund management workshops, DNP officials admitted detecting a few 
communities with weak local factors suggesting that failure was likely. However, the officials 
understood that removing any communities that had already been selected was not an option, 
given that the selection was made by other project partners during the preliminary stage of the 
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project. So the communities with high failure potential were not removed. Furthermore, the 
fund was made unconditional due to the probable discontinuity of the post-2009 BCI at the 
time and the fund was not tied to any particular performance. In other words, there was no 
punishment or corrective actions when the conditions of the fund were not respected. 
Combined with the infrequent monitoring of performance, this led to lax management and 
control of the fund, resulting in its loss or in its diversion by certain community members in 
some participating communities. 
6.2. Tenure insecurity as obstacle to 
REDD+ 
According to the project developers, the activities listed as REDD+ activities in the 2009 R-
PIN that were undertaken, such as reforestation and expansion of NP designation, were not 
regarded as REDD+ activities. In fact, the REDD+ activities were postponed and were 
expected to be implemented during the second stage of the BCI. The project developers 
further suggested that the REDD+ component was not implemented during the first stage of 
BCI mainly due to the absence of expected funding from the Facility for Infrastructure 
Development of the Netherlands (ORIO). The agreement on REDD+ funding was not reached 
mainly due to the Thai government’s reluctance to clarify tenure over State-owned forestland, 
which involved considerable risks for REDD+ investment. This issue is one of the critical 
obstacles Thailand is facing today. 
 The existing laws – primarily the National Park Act and National forest reserve Act – 
stipulate that the occupation or use of State-owned forestland would be deemed illegal and 
only DNP or RFD officials are authorized to carry out any activity inside the state-owned 
forestland. On the one hand, implementing REDD+ inside the state-owned forest area implies 
that the government officially hire the communities located in the forest area to participate in 
reforestation and maintenance work. However, should the government does not recognize 
their tenure, the government could either officially compensate them or, alternatively, 
acknowledge the communities who illegally reside inside State-owned forestland and are the 
actual land users, as project partners. If these communities are excluded from the project, with 
its limited manpower and budget, alone, the DNP would not be able to effectively and 
completely prevent potential degradation of the forested area, as required by the ORIO funded 
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REDD model. Such a situation could reduce the actual amount of carbon sequestrated from 
the project in the future (non-permanence risk). Furthermore, Thailand still lacks sufficient 
knowledge and expertise in carbon accounting. To be eligible for REDD+, the project 
requires accurate baseline calculation as well as a series of project carbon accounting. Due to 
the lack of familiarity with the topic and of in-house expertise, this issue tends to be regarded 
as a complicated matter for the government to execute.  
 Admittedly, certain modification to existing laws are indispensable to enable REDD+ 
development of State-owned forestland11. With similar interest in developing REDD projects 
in Thailand, the USAID-funded Lowering Emissions from Asia’s Forest (LEAF) program 
decided to shift their interest to Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES). The PES project aims 
to reduce the occurrence of forest fire in the Northern region, which is one of the pressing 
concerns of the local DNP office. In addition to the lack of clarity concerning the national 
ramifications of REDD and carbon ownership, the reason given for this shift was to avoid 
carbon bureaucracy, which could be costly and time-consuming (Somsak 
Soonthornnawaphat, personal communication, August 1, 2013). Owing to the problem of 
carbon bureaucracy, i.e. the cost incurred by carbon monitoring, calculation, verification and 
marketing, PES appeared to many donors to be preferable to REDD (Karsenty, Vogel et al. 
2013).  
6.3. Past tenure situation  
This section contains the issues related to tenure conflicts of Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi in 
the past as well as efforts to resolve them. 
6.3.1.$Past$tenure$conflicts$
Perhaps due to remote location, absence of public consultation prior to the demarcation and in 
the case of Bongti Noi community language barrier, both communities were unaware of the 
Wangyai Maenam Noi NFR establishment in 1969 as well as the clause of the NFR Act 
calling customary landowners to claim for their rights. Failure to claim for their rights within 
the prescribed timeframe signified the renouncement of his or her rights to land. The NFR Act 
                                                
11 Forest resources in Thailand have officially been owned by the State since the establishment of the Royal Forestry 
Department in 1896. In 2002, the responsibility for forest resources was divided between the RFD and the newly established 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation or DNP (Lakanavichian, 2006). 
 95 
states that no person could occupy, use the land or gather forest products inside the 
designation in order to prevent any damage caused to the nature of the national forest reserve. 
After the reserve forest declaration, the communities continued with their settlement inside 
the designation, agricultural practice of shifting cultivation, hunting and subsistence gathering 
forest products without any official permission. By and large, the communities’ tenure was 
not disturbed. 
 The impacts on tenure became apparent a few years after the designation of Sai Yok 
national park in 1980. According to the NP Act, any activity related to gathering forest 
products, using or possessing land inside the NP area was regarded unlawful, as it may create 
disturbance to the original state of the NP. As a consequence, the communities became 
illegally using their agricultural land as well as their existing residential area. The DNP/RFD 
officials had actively enforced the NP Act in the settlements. Continuously, a large number of 
the community members was arrested and their agricultural tools were confiscated on the 
account of utilizing NP land. During that time, there was no distinction between traditionally 
cultivated land or newly cleared land, as anyone occupying or utilizing NP land was regarded 
as violators to the NP Act. Furthermore, gathering forest products inside the NP designation 
was also deemed illegal. As stipulated by the Act, a few agricultural plots of Bongti Noi 
members was appropriated and the arrested violators were penalized in forms of fine and/or 
imprisonment by the DNP. This has led to the resentment between the communities and the 
DNP/RFD officials.  
 Upon the strict enforcement of the NP Act, the RFD officials similarly began to 
impose stringent implementation of the NFR Act in the national forest reserve part of the 
settlements. In early 1980s, the Sai Yok Forest Park, an area of the NFR designated for forest 
plantation, was established encompassing certain parts of the settlements. During the 
beginning of its establishment, the Forest Park cleared the assigned land, which was originally 
covered with perennials, and planted trees only in a small part of the newly cleared land, 
leaving many patches of land empty. Seeing the newly cleared land being left unused, a few 
community members of both communities began to use the land as their agricultural area. 
Many claimed that they were not aware that they were using the land of the RFD, given that 
there was no boundary at the time. After a few years, the RFD realized and began to exercise 
their rights to the land. Once the RFD officials running the Forest Park realized the intrusion, 
the officials arrested and penalized the community members, who used the Forest Park area 
for agriculture, based on the NFR Act. The officials also uprooted the members’ plantation at 
times. The responsibility of the Forest Park management was transferred to the FIO in 1992, 
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meanwhile the RFD officials remained in charge of arresting the encroacher on behalf of the 
FIO. The Forest Park successfully retracted a few plots of land back from some community 
members that used their land for agriculture. The landless community members had to 
become labor and collect forest products for commercial purpose for a living. 
 To compensate the deforestation occurred from gas transmission pipeline route in the 
early 1990s and to commemorate the King’s 50th anniversary of his coronation, the PTT in 
collaboration with the RFD launched a 192-hectare reforestation program inside the Wangyai 
Maenam Noi boundary, which included the area overlapping the settlement of Ton Mamaung 
community in 1996. This led to a situation where a few plots of land of some community 
members were dispossessed to be used for reforestation site. Moreover, the community 
committee of Ton Mamuang attempted to ask for rights to use the reforested PTT site as their 
community forest and was rejected, fuelling further conflicts between the community and the 
officials. The on-going confrontation in both communities had led to an accumulated 
resentment against the DNP/RFD/FIO officials and at times forceful retaliation. In 2003, a 
community member of Bongti Noi member was arrested for using his agricultural land, which 
is located inside the NFR area, and his plantation was uprooted without warning. Such 
incidence led to gunfire between the two parties. 
6.3.2.$Past$efforts$to$solve$tenure$problem$
The communities generally used the strategy of negotiating for compromises and requesting 
title document in solving tenure conflicts. In response to a large number of arrest and lawsuits 
against a few community members of Bongti Noi in recent years, the village head began to 
negotiate with the DNP officials by filing a request for measures to alleviate the on-going 
tenure conflicts to the DNP Headquarter in Bangkok in 2013. As a result, a compromise was 
made to arrest only the members, who cleared forest land beyond the current agricultural area. 
In a similar vein, the community committee of Ton Mamuang requested the RFD officials for 
title document to both community forest and agricultural land in 2006-2007. There was no 
noticeable progress on the matter as of 2013. 
 Community-initiated forest conservation activities were not adopted as one of the 
strategies for enhancing tenure security. Perhaps, this lack of community performance on 
forest protection might be one of the causes of the absence of trust from the officials that the 
community members would be able to conserve the forest. This observation was made by the 
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former village head of Ton Mamuang community in light of the PTT and the RFD’s rejection 
to transfer the reforested area to the community as community forest.  
6.4. Present tenure situation of Ton 
Mamuang community 
The community members seemed to have rights to enter, to use with certain restrictions, to 
manage, to exclude incompatible use of the community forest land to an extent as well as to 
transfer these rights to the next generation. Without any title document, the community 
members in general remained with fear of eviction and withdrawal of rights to their 
community forest. These rights appeared to be unchanged after the implementation of the 
project. 
6.4.1.1. Rights to access and to withdraw 
Concern with rights to access and use the community forest, the respondents (100%) as well 
as the village head assistant and former village head indicated that the community members 
could enter and gather non-timber forest products from their community forest for household 
consumption without any official permission (Figure 28). The forest products usually 
gathered, as mentioned in all focus groups, comprised of mushroom, bamboo shoot, repellent 
plants and bamboo. For commercial purposes, the local RFD officials in collaboration with 
the district office specified a particular period of the year allowing the members to gather 
bamboo shoots for sale, as unanimously commented by all respondents (Figure 28). Often, the 
period ranged from fifteen to sixty days per year, depending on ecological circumstances each 
year. Due to the attractive price of bamboo shoots compared to the agricultural products 
commonly cultivated 12  and the widespread perception of forest products as cost-free 
commodities, most if not all members intensively gathered the bamboo shoots for sale every 
year13. 
 After the permitted period, the middlemen who normally bought bamboo shoots from 
the community would refuse to buy more, following the agreement made with the RFD and 
                                                
12 According to the village head assistant, in 2013, the community members earned 4-13 THB per kilogram of 
bamboo shoots and Cassava price was at 6 THB per kilogram. On average the member could earn about 500 
THB per day from gathering bamboo shoots. 
13 According to the village head assistant, termite mushroom was also another popular forest product that the 
community members generally harvest, given that the price of 2013 was 400-500 THB per kilogram. 
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the district office. As described by a few individuals of the older female group, most members 
then stopped collecting bamboo shoots for sale due to the difficulty in finding alternative 
market access. Many participants of the younger and older male stated that the officials would 
arrest anyone collecting bamboo shoots for commercial purpose after the permitted period. 
An older male participant remarked that the officials had been highly stringent on the 
members on forest product gathering. On the contrary, other individuals of the younger and 
older male group as well as the village head assistant viewed the arrangement in a positive 
light. Some believed that it was an effective means to prevent over-exploitation of bamboo 
shoots and others trusted that it could ensure sufficient supply of fully-grown bamboo, which 
the members needed for weaving in summer. 
 Approximately 88% of the respondents as well as the village head assistant and the 
former village head disclosed that hunting animal inside the community forest or the 
neighboring forest was not allowed (Figure 28). Over half of the older male group participants 
noted that it was the regulation imposed by the RFD officials, whilst many younger male 
participants reasoned the religious belief for no hunting because the community forest was 
located inside the temple area. As voiced by many participants of the younger female group, 
the officials would arrest any members who violated such regulation. The minority of five 
respondents (13%) believed that the members could hunt small animals in the surrounding 
forest for household consumption, although with associated risk of being arrested by the 
officials (Figure 28).  
 Concerning timber, about 95% of the respondents believed that the community 
members could not use timber from the community forest (Figure 28). The officials imposed 
such regulation, according to over half participants of the older male group. Many individuals 
from the younger and older male group stated that given that the community forest was 
located inside the temple area, the members do not gather timber from the community forest 
due to religious belief. Either because of the regulation or religious belief, it was mentioned in 
all focus groups that some members resorted to surrounding forest for timber instead, 
although illegally. Only a small minority of two respondents (5%) revealed that the members 
could use timber from the community forest or surrounding forest, nevertheless with risks of 
being apprehended by the officials. All respondents (100%) as well as the village head 
assistant and the former village head collectively disclosed no change in their rights to access 
and to use due to the BCI project (Figure 28). 
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Figure 28 Access and withdrawal rights of Ton Mamuang community 
 
6.4.1.2. Rights to manage 
Concerning rights to manage the community forest, over half of the participants (60%) as well 
as the village head assistant and the former village head agreed that the community members 
constructed firebreaks for the community forest on a yearly basis (Figure 29). On the one 
hand, a great portion of the female participants believed that the community was not involved 
in management activity of the community forest. A few older female participants noted the 
community rarely did anything to the community forest land due to religious belief, as it was 
part of the temple area. On the other hand, the majority of the male group disclosed the annual 
firebreak construction around the community boundary and the community forest. The village 
head assistant and the former village head confirmed the comments of the male groups. 
Perhaps, the misunderstanding was due to the fact that most members that actually 
participated in the firebreak construction were mainly the male members.  
 In relation to the RFD involvement in the management of community forest, the 
majority of the respondents (85%) indicated no involvement (Figure 29). The minority were 
either uncertain or believed that the RFD provided support in firebreak construction. Indeed, 
the village head assistant and the former village head confirmed that the RFD had provided 
financial support for the firebreak construction upon request, although usually with three to 
six months delay in payment. Vis-à-vis the BCI project, all respondents (100%) as well as the 
village head assistant and the former village head unanimously agreed that no change in their 
rights to manage occurred as a result of the project (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29 Management rights of Ton Mamuang community 
 
6.4.1.3. Rights to exclude 
Related to exclusionary rights, about 88% of the respondents as well as the village head 
assistant and the former village head expressed the belief that the community members could 
exclude any incompatible user that was either a villager from other villages or an investor 
(Figure 30). Many older female participants explained that the members could contest the 
competitive land user, as the community had conserved the area as community forest for a 
number of years. Only a small number of five respondents (12%) primarily from the female 
group revealed hesitance in ability of the community members to exclude powerful investors. 
 In the case that RFD officials were the competitive land users, 93% of the respondents 
commented that the community members could not exclude them (Figure 30). Over half of 
the younger male participants as well as a few older female participants asserted that the RFD 
had formal ownership over the entire settlement including the community forest. Only a small 
number of three respondents (8%) believed that the community members could try to exclude 
the RFD officials but uncertain of the outcome. Concern with the BCI project, all respondents 
(100%) as well as the village head assistant and the former village head unanimously agreed 
that no change in their rights to exclude occurred as a result of the project (Figure 30). 
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Figure 30 Exclusion rights of Ton Mamuang community 
 
6.4.1.4. Rights to alienate  
With respect to alienation rights, all of the 40 respondents (100%) as well as the village head 
assistant and the former village head indicated that the community members could transfer the 
community forest to the next generation of the community members without any official 
permission (Figure 31). According to a few individuals of the younger male group, such 
transfer the rights to use and responsibility to conserve the community forest occurred for 
many generations already.  
 Similarly, 100% of the respondents as well as the village head assistant and the former 
village head agreeably commented that the community members could not sell the 
community forest land (Figure 31). Commonly voiced reasoning for such belief was the need 
to conserve the community forest for the next generation. About the project, all respondents 
(100%) as well as the village head assistant and the former village head unanimously agreed 
that there was no change in their rights to alienate as a result of the project (Figure 31). 
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6.4.1.5. Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights  
Concerning fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to the community forest, similarly to the 
former village head, 30 of all 40 participants (75%) revealed the fear (Figure 32). During the 
discussion of the older female group, some expressed the fear based on the on-going conflicts 
between the members and the officials over the past years, while others pinpointed the 
absence of title document as the cause of the fear. A minority of 25% contrariwise revealed 
no fear of withdrawal of rights to the community forest (Figure 32). Some younger and older 
male participants trusted that the community could protest against any withdrawal of rights. 
However, a few of them noted that the members might not win the fight anyhow. An older 
male individual described the community members’ attempt to confront to the local 
authorities as sweeping back Atlantic with the broom. All respondents (100%) as well as the 
village head assistant and former village head unanimously agreed that there was no change to 
the fear of withdrawal of rights to community forest occurred as a result of the project (Figure 
32). 
 
Figure 32 Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest of Ton Mamuang 
community 
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With regards to legal recognition of community forest, all participants (100%) as well as the 
village head assistant and the former village head unanimously agreed that the community 
members did not have any formal recognition or title document to the community forest 
(Figure 33). As voiced in the discussion of the older younger male and older female group, 
the community committee filed a request for a title document to the community forest a few 
years ago but the members did not notice any progress. All the community members (100%) 
as well as the village head assistant and the former village head collectively agreed that there 
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was no change regarding their legal recognition to their land as a result of the project, 
although the former village head often asked the staff for help on the issue (Figure 33). 
  
Figure 33 Legal recognition of community forest of Ton Mamuang community 
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were not allowed. An individual contested the notion during the younger male focus group 
discussion by mentioning that the restriction varied depending on the official encountered, 
e.g. wild orchids collection was allowed by some officials but not others. As expressed by all 
participants (100%), the community members could gather forest product for commercial 
purpose without official permission. Most respondents explained that specifically for bamboo 
shoots the RFD and DNP officials in collaboration with the district office and the middlemen 
regulated the timeframe for collection, ranging sixty to seventy-five days each year (Figure 
34). A few individuals of the younger female group explained that after the period, no 
members could gather the bamboo shoots for sale, only for household consumption. After the 
period, the members usually stopped collecting due to limited market access; the middlemen 
would refuse to buy more products after the allowed period. Many older female group 
participants viewed the action positively, as it ensured that the bamboo shoots would have 
sufficient time to grow and can later be used for weaving by summer.  
 As regards hunting, about 85% of the respondents as well as the village head and his 
assistant believed that hunting animals was not allowed (Figure 34). According to the 
discussion of the younger male group, the authorities established and imposed such 
regulations and if violated, the authorities would arrest the wrongdoer, as voiced in all focus 
groups. The minority of 15% led by the younger male group participants understood that 
hunting small animals was allowed although with certain risks of being apprehended by the 
officials.  
 Concern with timber, most respondents (85%) revealed that the members could not 
use timber from the surrounding forest without official permission (Figure 34). According to 
a few younger male participants, it was one of the regulations imposed by the RFD and DNP 
officials. If violated, the DNP or RFD officials, as voiced in all focus groups, would prosecute 
the violators. A small number of six respondents (15%) that believed that the members could 
use timber products from the forest reasoned that some members could collect timber without 
official permission. As explained by a few of them, given that the permission was usually not 
granted, some community members illegally fell trees for household use without the 
awareness of the officials. All respondents (100%) as well as the village head assistant and 
the former village head collectively disclosed no change in their rights to access and to 
withdraw forest products due to the project (Figure 34). 
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Figure 34 Access and withdrawal rights of Bongti Noi community 
 
6.5.1.2. Rights to manage 
With regards to management rights, close to 70% of the respondents as well as the village 
head and his assistant stated that the community had not been responsible for maintaining or 
managing the neighboring forest that the community used as a community forest (Figure 35). 
According to a few participants of the younger male and older male groups, the members 
assisted the officials in firebreak construction and reforestation activities in the surrounding 
forest from time to time in exchange with monetary return of 200 THB per person per day. As 
mentioned in the younger female focus group, the members were not allowed to do anything 
inside the surrounding forest except for collecting forest products. Otherwise, the officials 
might arrest the members.  
 Indeed, the majority of the participants (85%) believed that the RFD and DNP 
officials had been responsible for managing and maintaining the surrounding forest (Figure 
35). Over half of the older male respondents explained that other than forest product 
gathering, the members were not allowed to conduct other activities in the area without the 
official permission. A small minority of 15% was either uncertain of the answer or believed 
that the officials had not been actively maintaining the surrounding forest. Vis-à-vis the BCI 
project, all respondents (100%) as well as the village head and his assistant unanimously 
agreed that no change in their rights to manage occurred as a result of the project (Figure 35). 
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Figure 35 Management rights of Bongti Noi community 
 
6.5.1.3. Rights to exclude 
About the rights to exclude incompatible use of the community forest land, about 80% of the 
respondents as well as the village head and his assistant indicated that the community 
members could not prevent any incompatible use of the community forest land if the 
competitive land user had been a villager from other communities or an investor (Figure 36). 
Over half of the younger female respondents disclosed that the members from other villages 
usually gathered forest products from the community’s surrounding forest and vice versa. As 
voiced in all focus groups, anyone can access and use the forest. In the case of complete 
different in land-use such as conversion to agriculture or hotels, most respondents believed 
that the members could not prevent the incompatible use because they were not the owner of 
such land. 
 In the case that the DNP or RFD officials were the incompatible land-users, 93% of 
the respondents expressed that the members could not exclude them (Figure 36). Common 
reasoning provided was the fact that the DNP and RFD was the legal owner of the forest land. 
Only a small minority of 7% expressed an opposing view. A few individuals forming the 
minority trusted that the members could resist as some landless members gathered forest 
products for a living. Concern with the BCI project, all respondents (100%) as well as the 
village head and his assistant collectively agreed that no change in their rights to exclude 
occurred as a result of the project (Figure 36). 
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Figure 36 Exclusion rights of Bongti Noi community 
 
6.5.1.4. Rights to alienate 
With regards to the ability to transfer the rights to community forest or neighboring forest, the 
response of the participants and the village head as well as his assistant was rather mixed. Just 
over half of the respondents (53%) believed that the members could transfer the rights to the 
community forest to the next generation of the community members (Figure 37). Over half of 
the older female and older male participants suggested that the community members had used 
the surround forest area for many generations and therefore it should be possible to transfer 
the rights to the next generation as well. The minority of fourteen respondents (35%), 
principally comprising of the younger male group, appeared to be more skeptical. Some of 
them reasoned the belief with the lack of legal document proving their rights to use the land in 
combined, while others reasoned with the potential change in local officials and henceforth 
the policy governing the use of surrounding forests (Figure 37).  
 Unanimously, all the respondents (100%) agreed that the surrounding forest land 
could not be sold. Prime reason echoed in all group discussions was the fact that the DNP and 
RFD were the owner of the land, not the community members. If anyone attempts to sell, as 
noted by the village head, the DNP and RFD would prosecute them. About the BCI, all 
respondents (100%) as well as the village head and his assistant agreed that there was no 
change in their rights to alienate as a result of the project (Figure 37).  
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Figure 37 Alienation rights of Bongti Noi community 
 
6.5.1.5. Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights 
Concerning the fear of eviction and withdrawal of rights to the community forest, a 75% 
majority of the participants revealed the fear (Figure 38). A great portion of the younger 
female participants mentioned that some community members had on-going conflicts with the 
RFD and FIO officials and henceforth believed that the increased limitation of rights of the 
community members to forest would be highly possible. Over half of the younger male 
participants reasoned their fear with the lack of attestation of their rights and potential change 
in forest product use restriction in light of change in policy or officials. As illustrated in 
Figure 38, the minority of 25% principally comprising of older male participants was more 
optimistic and trusted that the community had used the surrounding forest for decades and 
therefore could win the fight against the withdrawal of rights. If not, the members lose the 
income that they gained from selling forest products, according to a few older male 
individuals. All respondents (100%) as well as the village head and his assistant unanimously 
agreed that there was no change to the fear of withdrawal of rights to community forest 
occurred as a result of the project (Figure 38). 
Yes No 
Village head and 
assistant 
Male less than 50 
years old 
Male more than 50 
years old 
Female less than 
50 years old 
Female more than 
50 years old 
Have there been any 
changes due to the 
implementation of the BCI? 
Can the members sell the 
surrounding forest to any 
interested party? 
Yes No 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
45 
Yes No Uncertain 
Can the members transfer the 
surrounding forest to the next 
generation? 
N
um
be
r o
f r
ep
on
de
nt
s 
 109 
 
Figure 38 Fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest of Bongti Noi 
community 
 
6.5.1.6. Legal recognition 
When discussing about the legal recognition, the respondents (100%) as well as the village 
head and his assistant concurrently agreed that the community had no formal recognition of 
their rights to the surrounding forest, where they have relied on for forest products gathering 
(Figure 39). According to the village head, the community did not make any request for any 
legal recognition. All the community members (100%) as well as the village head and his 
assistant collectively agreed that there was no change regarding their legal recognition to their 
land as a result of the project (Figure 39).  
  
Figure 39 Legal recognition of community forest of Bongti Noi community 
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6.6. Pressing concern and tenure 
preference 
This section covers the issue of present concerns of the two communities. Moreover it 
discusses about tenure type preferences of the community members to their agricultural and 
community forest land as well as willingness to sell land upon receiving formal tenure 
recognition. 
6.6.1.$Pressing$concern$$
When being asked about the top three urgent concerns in the communities, the issue of on-
going tenure conflicts with the officials was reflected in all focus groups of both communities 
although in different ranking. In Ton Mamuang community, a number of land dispossessions 
that occurred throughout the past decade were mentioned by each focus group as the prime 
cause of concern. A few younger male participants noted the NP expansion that began about 
three to four years ago that incorporated certain agricultural plots of another participant of the 
focus group and the DNP officials had yet to return them. About ten years ago, the RFD 
appropriated agricultural plots of the members for the PTT reforestation project, according to 
the discussion of older male group. The former village head suggested that successive 
appropriation of land in combined with the rejection to transfer the PTT reforested site to the 
community as the community forest was likely due to the lack of trust of the officials that the 
members were able to conserve the forest. Another cause of concern for future tenure 
conflicts, as mentioned in the older male group, was the potential changes in the official head 
to the one who would strictly enforce the laws. Other concerns of the community included 
limited water supply, high education-related expenditure, low price of agricultural produce 
and infertile land after consecutive cultivation (Figure 40).  
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Figure 40 Pressing concern of Ton Mamuang community 
 
 For Bongti Noi community, a few individuals of the younger and older male groups 
revealed the concern of frequent change in the head of the local forestry officials, which each 
change often resulted in considerably stricter enforcement of laws and thereby attempt to 
challenge the rights to use agricultural land of the members. As mentioned in the younger 
female group discussion, two members were being on trial on the ground of encroachment on 
Forest Park located inside the national forest reserve designation. An individual of the older 
member suggested that to certain extent the conflicts were also based on the use of past 
satellite images, which were inappropriate material to prove for historical use of land in the 
case of shifting cultivation. Other problems included elephant disturbances in plantation, high 
expenditure for children’s higher education and non-asphalt road that became easily damaged 
by heavy rain (Figure 41). 
 
Figure 41 Pressing concern of Bongti Noi community 
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6.6.2.$Tenure$preference$
When being asked whether the community members would like to have a formal recognition 
to their rights to land, all of the participants harmoniously replied yes. Primarily, the reason 
frequently voiced among all groups to substantiate such desire was to enhance the 
community’s tenure security to the land and to assure that the members at present and in the 
future would not have to confront with the officials over land tenure. The question then 
further divided into the preferable format of tenure for the community forest as well as 
agricultural land. 
 For community forest land of Ton Mamuang community, approximately 93% of the 
respondents disclosed the preference for communal tenure, as opposed to individual tenure, 
for the community forest. The choice of communal tenure to community forest land was 
related to the fact that the community forest belonged to all community members, not only a 
group or individual members, as described by over half of the older male group. As 
mentioned by a few individuals of the older female group, the communal title was desirable 
tenure for all communal property, such as community forest, temple and school. Doing so 
would ensure that the community forest would not be sold by any individual member for 
short-term monetary gain. Only three respondents preferred individual title to the community 
forest land, as it was deemed to have more flexibility with regards to land-use decision-
making. It should be noted however that the former village head mentioned that if the 
community could obtain the reforested PTT land as the community forest, the community 
would not sell but might use the area for other communal purposes, such as building a 
football field and creating garbage disposal site. This implies the possible conversion of 
community forest upon receiving title document. 
 For Bongti Noi community, ideally communal tenure is also a desirable option to 
almost all respondents (98%). Common explanation for the desire for communal title deed 
was the wish to prevent potential withdrawal of rights to the community forest. The choice of 
communal tenure as opposed to individual tenure, as voiced by a great portion of the older 
female participants, was due to the fact that the community forest should be collectively 
owned, managed and maintained and should be accessible to all community members. Only 
one member appeared to believe that the individual tenure to the land was a better option, as 
he understood that having an individual tenure implied that the land could be sold in time of 
need. 
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6.7. Summary 
In the past, forest conservation policies planning and implementation in Thailand largely 
relied on the forest without people paradigm that simply excluded local forest-dependent 
communities from any meaningful role. The establishment of Wangyai Maenam Noi national 
forest reserve in 1969, Sai Yok national park in 1980 and Sai Yok forest park in 1983 was 
conducted without public consultation or consent overlaying the customary territory. Since 
the 1980s, rapid expansion of conserved forest area and stringent enforcement of forest 
conservation laws was noticeable. Consequently, various pressures were exerted on the 
communities residing inside the newly demarcated conservation forests. The Karen origin 
Bongti Noi and its neighboring Thai ethnic Ton Mamuang communities subsequently lived 
under insecure rights to forest land and resources without any legal recognition and were 
unremittingly exposed to threats of arbitrary arrest by the authorities and widespread fear of 
eviction in the past. 
 In response to a large number of arrests and lawsuits against the community members 
as well as occasional land dispossession by the authorities on the ground of using State-
owned forest land following the NP and NFR Acts14, the two communities requested for title 
document from the local authorities in order to enhance their tenure security. Perhaps owing 
to the lack of community-initiated forest conservation activities exhibiting forest conservation 
capability and weak collective action as well as insufficient negotiation skills, as of 2013, the 
request of both communities remained pending. REDD+ measures as described in the R-PIN 
2009 were expected to bring greater tenure security to the participating communities. The 
results from the Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities however revealed no observable 
impacts on tenure. The communities reported asking the BCI project developers on several 
occasions to act as mediator between the communities and the local authorities in order to 
enhance de facto tenure security. The demand was nevertheless not responded. Moreover, as 
part of the planned REDD+ measures as described in R-PIN of 2009, the expansion of Sai 
Yok national park was initiated and a community member already reported having his land 
prepared for agriculture dispossessed in light of the expansion.  
 Concerning de facto tenure situation, Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities 
appeared to have rather insecure tenure due to the following reasons. Firstly, ability of the 
                                                
14 According to the Sai Yok Forest Park officer, the NFR Act has been used to cope with any violation occurred 
in Forest Park area, as opposed to Reafforestation Act. 
 114 
communities to access, use and withdraw forest products from the community forests in other 
words the communities’ rights to community forest seem to be designed, imposed and 
regulated by the authorities, as opposed to community-initiated rules. Secondly, the 
communities disclosed that they remained without exclusionary rights vis-à-vis local 
authorities. Prime reasoning provided was the fact that the authorities were the owner of the 
land15. Thirdly, the majority of the members remained with the fear of eviction or withdrawal 
of rights to both agricultural land and community forest, as their rights were challenged 
consistently particularly with the change of the chief of the local authorities. Correspondingly, 
when being asked about the communities’ pressing concerns, on-going tenure conflicts 
ranked as the first issue of concern. The illustration of tenure analysis of Ton Mamuang and 
Bongti Noi communities is shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42 Tenure impacts analysis of Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities 
                                                
15 This reflects the perception of the local communities. However, to be legally correct, these organizations 
namely the RFD or the DNP are representatives of the government responsible for managing the national forest 
reserve and national park designation. It is the State, who has the ownership rights to the forest land. 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION  
This chapter reflects on the major findings of the research in terms of its contribution to the 
literature regarding the linkage between tenure and REDD+. The literature review suggests 
that tenure has been a significant underlying issue for REDD+ and particularly for whether 
REDD+ would present more risks or opportunities for forest-dependent communities. This 
chapter provides the discussion, which attempts to enrich the following topics: legal 
framework and tenure, tenure and deforestation and tenure clarification and REDD+ 
competing agendas.  
7.1. Legal framework and tenure  
The findings complement the existing literature of tenure security in Thailand on the aspect 
that the prevailing tenure-related legal framework negatively affected de facto tenure security 
of, most if not all, local forest-dependent communities in the past. Additionally, the findings 
inform the existing body of knowledge that the de facto tenure security reality at present 
became more complex and context-dependent, even without significant changes in the legal 
framework. Some communities remain having rather low level of de facto tenure security, 
when compared to other communities. The principal sources of such de facto tenure security 
were believed to come from local context namely characteristics of strong collective action, 
strategic response to tenure insecurity and assistance of local mediators. 
7.1.1.$Tenure$of$local$communities$in$Thailand$
A number of notable works related to tenure conflicts with specific relevance to Thailand 
generally depicts tenure insecurity among local forest-dependent communities as a result of 
overlapping claims made by the government. Even though the conventional wisdom 
dominates discussion of tenure security of local forest-dependent in Thailand. Local activities 
to enhance de facto tenure security by certain communities that were observed by 
Ganchanapan (2000), Neef (2001), Walker (2001) Lasimbang and Luithui (2005) and 
Lasimbang (2006). In combined with Feder and Onchan (1987) that suggest relatively secure 
de facto tenure of communities inside State-owned forestland due to low eviction probability, 
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this implies that the present de facto tenure security may be different from the dominant idea 
of prevalent de jure and de facto tenure security in the country. In a similar vein, this study 
confirmed such implication as well as the hypothesis that different local communities have 
different level of de facto tenure and security at present. The findings, on the one hand, 
partially conform to the mainstream literature about the negative impacts of legal framework 
on tenure of local forest-dependent communities in Thailand. In all of the four communities 
from the Northern and Western regions of Thailand studied, the community members mostly 
remained without any formal title document or legal recognition to their rights to land on the 
ground that the settlements are located inside State-owned forest land designation. In the past, 
all of the four communities experienced high level of tenure conflicts vis-à-vis local 
authorities and often resulted in arbitrary arrest and prosecution of the community members 
as well as violent retaliation. The members were arrested on the ground of residing and using 
the land inside the NFR or DNP designation for agriculture or forest product gathering. The 
members of four communities commonly feared of forced relocation in the past, as 
resettlement programs were being implemented nation-wide.  
 At present, the access and withdrawal rights to community forest of the two 
communities in the Western region were imposed and enforced by the authorities. The 
members largely remained without de facto excludability vis-à-vis authorities, justifying that 
the authorities were the legal owner of their land. The members also revealed the fear of 
forced eviction, as a few land appropriation occurrences was observed during the last decades 
and as their perceived rights to land were constantly challenged upon the changes of the local 
authorities’ chief. Correspondingly, in such communities, on-going tenure conflicts in other 
words tenure insecurity were reported as one of the pressing concerns with highest priority. 
On the other hand, these findings enrich the traditional mainstream understanding of tenure 
situation of local forest-dependent communities in Thailand with updated information on the 
changes of de facto tenure security recently occurred in some communities. The findings 
suggest that tenure situation of local forest-dependent communities evolved over time and 
became more complex and diverse, depending on the local contexts. As oppose to the two 
communities in the Western region who reported relatively low level of de facto exclusionary 
rights, fear of eviction and authority-initiated community rights to community forest, the two 
communities in the Northern region reported having community-initiated rules as well as 
local enforcement in relation to the rights to access, withdraw and manage community forest, 
having de facto exclusionary rights vis-à-vis local authorities and not having the fear of forced 
eviction. Undoubtedly, tenure insecurity was not reported as one of the top three pressing 
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concerns of the two communities. To this extent, these findings support the analysis of Feder 
and Ochan (1987) by providing updated empirical evidences that highlights de facto tenure 
security in certain local communities in Thailand even without any legal recognition. In the 
context of REDD+, based on the suggestions made by Wunder (2005) and (2007), such local 
forest-dependent communities as the Northern ones with sufficient de facto rights therefore 
have potential to participate in REDD+ implementation in the form of PES in Thailand. Even 
without de jure tenure, such communities have capacity to engage in long-term and successful 
forest conservation activities. 
7.1.2.$De$facto$tenure$security$without$titles$
Conventional wisdom with specific relevance to Thailand associates tenure insecurity as a 
result the absence of individualized land title (Walker 2001; Walker 2004). Formal titles that 
are recognized and enforced by the government implies security of land claim (Alston, 
Libecap et al. 1994). In other words, individualized land title equates tenure security (de Soto 
2000). International development organizations such as the World Bank also had advocated 
this assumption (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Peters 2007). Reservations nonetheless have 
been expressed about the conventional concept of tenure security that also underlies the 
Bank’s position. Titling projects however often failed principally due to the lack of 
harmonization with customary laws (Ganjanapan 2000; van Asperen 2007)16. Wrote by 
Platteau (1996); (2000) among others, beneficial effects of individualized titling are over-
estimated. Similarly, recent research shows that existing tenure arrangement without any 
formalization could offer tenure security (Bomuhangi, Doss et al. 2011).  
 Indeed, the findings obtained from the two communities in the Northern region of 
Thailand provide additional empirical evidences to substantiate the concept of perceived 
tenure security even without formalization of rights, as suggested by Bomuhangi, Doss et al. 
(2011) and implicitly by Feder and Onchan (1987). The two communities in the Northern 
region reported having perceived or de facto tenure security against the backdrop of local 
tenure arrangements without any title document. Both communities trusted that they could 
exclude incompatible use of agricultural and community forest land vis-à-vis other villages, 
investors and the government officials. They mostly did not fear of forced eviction from their 
settlement, even though the National Park and National forest reserve Acts explicitly 
                                                
16 Ganjanapan (2000) suggested that land titling caused land disputes in Thailand due to contradictions between 
traditional practices and legal principles in relation to inheritance, demarcation of land boundaries and land 
transaction. 
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prohibited illegal occupation and the Constitution offers no protection of rights to the illegal 
squatters inside State-owned forest land. Moreover, they successfully negotiated with the 
authorities to accept the community-initiated rules governing the rights to access, use and 
manage community forest of the communities. The communities also enforced these rules 
themselves and collaborated with the authorities only when needed.  
 In relation to the factors contributing to such de facto security, Bomuhangi, Doss et al. 
(2011) did not discuss in their study, whilst Feder and Onchan (1987) suggest the political 
infeasibility of relocation program as the primary cause of enhanced security. However, such 
reason was not found to be highly relevant in case of the two Northern communities studied. 
Instead, the findings demonstrate three principal local factors contributing to de facto tenure 
security in these communities, which include strong collective action, strategic response to 
tenure insecurity and assistance from local mediators. These factors were not observed in the 
Western communities studied. 
 Firstly, under the similar condition of no legal recognition of tenure in all of the four 
communities studied, this implies that the authorities had leverage to apply the law at their 
convenience. In the two Northern communities, where there is a strong collective community 
initiative, this ambiguity allows them to negotiate their rights to land with the local 
authorities. To elaborate, on the one hand the two Northern communities were able to 
collectively and successfully conserve the forest and to negotiate with the local authorities to 
recognize the community rules governing the rights of the communities to access, withdraw 
forest products and manage the community forest. On the other hand, the communities in the 
Western region with weak collective action left rooms for the authorities to establish and 
enforce rules governing the communities’ rights to access, withdraw and manage the 
community forest to a much greater extent than in the two Hmong communities in the North. 
Strong collective action is deep rooted in the Hmong culture (Helsel, Mochel et al. 2004). 
Despite the acculturation pressures, Hmong families and clans continue to be close-knit 
(Thao, Leite et al. 2010). In combined with certain negotiation skills, the Hmong communities 
successfully harnessed their collective power and negotiate with the authorities for 
recognition of the local system of forest resources use and management. The negotiation skills 
are suspected to stem from their past experiences in opium trade. As noted in Chouvy (2009) 
and Lee and Tapp (2010), after the national opium ban in 1958 in Thailand, opium cultivation 
continued for over two more decades. For being allowed to cultivate opium, many Hmong 
households negotiated and at times bribed some local authorities (Chouvy 2009; Lee and 
Tapp 2010).  
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 Another key factor leading to de facto tenure security is strategic response to tenure 
insecurity. Rather than continuous or further degradation of forest in response to increased 
threats of eviction and tenure insecurity, the communities opted for forest conservation 
activities to exhibit their conservation capability. These activities include the establishment of 
natural conservation group, the creation of conservation and community forests, the continued 
management and maintenance of communal forest and the frequent participation in 
reforestation activities. These activities generated trust that the communities could conserve 
the forest and resulted in greater collaboration between the authorities and the communities in 
forest conservation and forest fire prevention. Mutual trust and collaboration were 
incrementally strengthened and eventually led to a number of elements signifying informal 
tenure recognition, such as the verbal agreements between the communities and the 
authorities to allocate rights and responsibilities to the community forest to the community, 
GPS maps of the settlements encompassing both individual agricultural plots and communal 
community forest and demarcation of the settlements by the authorities. These elements were 
commonly voiced by the members of the Northern communities as principal reasons for the 
absence of fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to their land. Despite the fact that the 
occupation and use of land inside the National Park and National forest reserve remain 
unlawful, strong involvement of the authorities in plot allocation, settlement demarcation and 
GPS map creation principally translated to perceived tenure security among the community 
members.  
 Assistance of the local mediators is also found helpful in creating de facto tenure 
security. Unlike the two communities in the West, the Northern communities collaborated 
with a number of research institutes and NGOs, which provided both indirect and direct 
backing to enhance tenure security of the communities. Indirectly they instilled the concept of 
forest conservation as means to enhance de facto tenure security and to gain trust from the 
officials. The Royal Project Foundation encouraged and facilitated the communities to local 
cultivation approach towards the one regarded more positively by the authorities as less 
destructive to forests. By doing so, the communities learned that one of the potential avenues 
to gain acceptance and lower tenure conflicts with the authorities are to adopt environmental-
friendly approach to cultivation and/or forest conservation activities. Along the same line, 
FORRU provided the communities with opportunities to demonstrate their willingness and 
capacity to conserve the forest. The organization was also helpful in conveying scientific 
evidences of positive conservation outcome of the communities to the authorities as well as 
the public. Secondly, directly, a number of organizations entered into negotiations with local 
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authorities to enhance tenure security of the communities. The Royal Project Foundation 
initiated the demarcation of agricultural area of participating community members and 
negotiated for the use of land on behalf of its members with the local authorities. Similar role 
of the Royal Project Foundation in other communities in Thailand was also reported (Heyd 
and Neef 2004). The Uplands Program, an international collaborative research program 
conducted in the communities, together with its Thai partners also negotiated with the local 
DNP authorities for the two communities to have the rights to permanently settle in their 
present location (Neef 2012). 
7.2. Tenure security and deforestation 
The findings of the two Northern communities confirm Angelsen (2007) theory associating 
somehow tenure insecurity with forest protection. Against the backdrop of rising tenure 
insecurity, the members of the two communities responded by enhancing their forest 
conservation effort among other things. Additionally, the findings suggest that types of tenure 
might be a critical component that determines the linkage between tenure insecurity and forest 
conservation. Moreover, the preference of certain type of tenure over another represents a 
self-constraint behavior that could be explained by sociological theory referred to as “Ulysses 
and the Sirens”, suggesting that, sometimes, people may benefit collectively from being 
constrained in their options. 
7.2.1.$Confirmation$of$Angelsen$theory!
The two Northern communities are located inside reserve forest, national park as well as 
watershed class 1A designation. Following the NFR and NP Acts and Resolution on 
Watershed Classification that forbid living inside or utilizing resources, the local community 
henceforth became illegal settlers. Their rights to land were consequently limited and were 
challenged by the authorities, who represented the de jure legal owner of the forest land. 
Furthermore, fear of eviction became a phenomenon that the communities often came across. 
 Tenure of the communities began to be severely affected after the demarcation of the 
national park. Many community members were arrested and prosecuted on the ground of 
using land inside the national park designation. Moreover, threats of forced eviction became 
increasingly pronounced, as other local communities similarly located inside the NP and 
Watershed class 1A designation in the region were being relocated. Driven by strict 
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enforcement of the laws and possibility of eviction, the community used several strategies to 
enhance their tenure security over their settlement and nearby forest land.  
 Among the first conservation efforts was the formation of Natural Resources 
Conservation Group comprising influential key village committees in late 1980s. The Group 
built a community-wide consensus towards the creation of conservation forest. The 
conservation forest had been maintained and strictly protected. Community rules created by 
the Natural Resource Conservation Group limited the use and prescribed punishment for any 
violator. The community members normally entered the area only for the Forest Ordination 
ceremony and to construct firebreaks17. According to the community rules, gathering forest 
products or hunting was not allowed in the area. Anyone who violated the rules would be 
fined.  
 With the evidence for improved condition of the conservation forest area, the local 
DNP officials began to change their negative attitude towards the communities. Discussion 
and negotiation between the two parties then became possible, as they collaborated on forest 
conservation activities. In addition to the conservation and community forest, in collaboration 
with the Forest Restoration Research Unit (FORRU), the community also helped prepare 
experimental forest restoration plots in its vicinity, which expanded continuously. Combined 
with the conservation forest initiative, the community’s conservation effort was well-received 
by the officials.  
 Applying the Angelsen theory to the case, under a situation of rising tenure insecurity 
with the emerging fear of forced eviction and absence of legal title document in the past, the 
community members responded by increasing their efforts to conserve the forest rather than 
clearing it. The land used for reforestation had previously been cleared and used for 
agriculture and therefore most likely would have remained agricultural land had the 
conservation forest not been established. The counter argument of the land degradation-
deforestation hypothesis as described in Angelsen’s paper asserting that insecure tenure 
usually leads to deforestation to replace the degraded land does not apply here for two 
reasons. Firstly, tenure insecurity led not only to reforestation but also to a strong initiative to 
increase the productivity of the remaining agricultural land instead of continuously clearing 
new land for agriculture. This contradicts, at least formally, the conventional wisdom 
                                                
17 In addition to the conservation forest, the community has a community forest where they can gather forest 
products for household consumption and timber for communal use in events or ceremonies. As of 2013, the 
community forest covered an area of about 4.8 hectares. The community forest was formerly an agricultural 
area. It was given up after the community’s majority vote approving the creation of a community forest to be 
used as after being reforested. 
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associating plantation and investment in land productivity with individual land titles. 
Secondly, with support for improvement of agricultural techniques, the possibility to sell 
agricultural produce on the regional and national market, and the construction of 
infrastructure by the Royal Foundation project18 and by other organizations, the community 
could neither be described as having poor infrastructure nor lack of market access. 
7.2.2.$Additional$layer$of$tenure$types!
It is noteworthy that the decision to create the conservation forest, which implied the 
withdrawal of land from individual ownership and management, expresses a preference for 
communal tenure over individual tenure with regards to forest protection of the community. 
Also, when the community members were asked about their preference for a type of tenure 
for their conservation forest, the majority of the respondents in Mae Sa Mai community 
(98%) and Mae Sa Noi community (100%) revealed their preference for communal tenure for 
the communal community forest. The explanation for the choice of communal tenure over 
individual tenure given by all the groups was linked to the long-term ability to conserve the 
forest. One of the most frequent explanations put forward for this preference was that the 
communal tenure would prevent a situation in which communal forest land could be sold by a 
member of the community in pursuit of personal wealth. This type of comment most likely 
stems from the fact that illegal sales of forest land located inside the NP or NFR generally to 
investors for building resorts and holiday homes, by local individuals without an eligible title 
document has been a commonplace throughout the country in past decades, including in the 
Northern region. Although the occurrence of illegal sales of state-owned forest land was 
somewhat reduced thanks to active confiscation and prosecution in recent years, it was only 
logical to assume that the community associates communal tenure with the high likelihood of 
conserving the forest.  
 On the other hand, the community also associates the idea of individual tenure with 
the likelihood of the land being sold and/or cleared and used for agriculture. This implies that 
had the conservation and community forest depended on an individual tenure system, against 
a backdrop of tenure insecurity, it could also lead to a continuous clearance of forest land for 
agriculture or sale of forest land with subsequent conversion to resorts, instead of forest 
conservation. In this sense, the type of tenure was indeed a critical component that linked 
                                                
18 The Royal Project Foundation office was founded in Mae Sa Mai vicinity in 1974 with the purpose of 
promoting the cultivation of cash crops to replace opium. The Foundation collaborated with Mae Jo University 
through research on cash crop seeds improvement in order to support the local community. 
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tenure insecurity to successful forest conservation, a situation predicted by using Angelsen’s 
(2007) framework. However, Angelsen (2007) does not discuss this aspect of his framework 
further.  
 An emerging body of literature documents the role of community and collective 
actions to prevent degradation of common pool resources such as forests. Agrawal (2008) 
pointed out that the bigger the forested area under community ownership, the higher the 
likelihood of better forest outcomes. In the same line of thought, Hyde, Belcher et al. (2003), 
reported increased forest cover in some parts of China where local communities manage the 
forest. Similarly, Van Laerhoven (2010) emphasized the role of community in forest 
management as an important predictor of forest stability. On the other hand, based on a 
review of over one hundred empirical cases, Robinson, Holland et al. (2011)  reported mixed 
outcomes for the forest of communal tenure type. By and large, the literature suggests that the 
relationship between communal tenure and forest outcomes are context specific and can 
therefore be either negative or positive. However, only a limited number of studies explored 
the relationship between communal tenure and forest outcomes against the backdrop of tenure 
insecurity. De Koning, Capistrano et al. (2008) found that insecure community tenure could 
lead to deforestation and conflicts, as forests are exploited for short-term benefits. The 
findings reached by De Koning, Capistrano et al. (2008) nonetheless contradict the empirical 
data we collected in the two Northern communities. The results of this paper therefore suggest 
that greater attention needs to be paid to the effect that different tenure types have on forests 
where tenure is insecure.  
7.2.3.$SelfJconstraint$behavior$of$local$community$
members!
Interestingly, when faced with the choice between individual and communal tenure for their 
conservation forest, the majority of the community members preferred the latter. In the same 
way, concerning their agricultural land, the community with the majority vote set up a 
community rule that if any member sold their agricultural land to an outside party (non-
relative, non-community member), the transaction would be annulled by the community 
committee. The rationale behind this choice was to prevent the sale of the land to an outside 
party for short-term monetary gain, which could result in members becoming landless and 
possibly in changes in land-use patterns, among other undesirable impacts on the community. 
This choice expresses a self-constraint behavior that fits the sociological theory of Ulysses 
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and the Sirens. In book XII of the Odyssey, Ulysses and his crew must pass the Siren’s island. 
Knowing that anyone who heard their song would be irresistibly drawn to them and killed, 
Ulysses asked the sailors to plug their ears with wax and to bind him: “ …you must bind me 
hard and fast, so that I cannot stir from the spot where you will stand me... and if I beg you to 
release me, you must tighten and add to my bonds” (the Odyssey). As Elster (2000) framed it, 
this represents a situation where a rational agent constrains his actions at some future time 
because he is afraid that he would be less rational when that time arrives. Based on a similar 
line of thinking, the members preferred communal tenure, which was understood to be 
relatively difficult to sell, to the individual tenure (tying themselves down) to avoid being 
tempted by a short-term desire for money (Siren’s song). A desire for money among the 
community members is generally triggered by the need to survive or by social/capitalist 
pressure, e.g. new phone, electrical appliance, motorcycle or other vehicle. In so doing, they 
would be protected against being tempted by a short-term monetary gain (the sale of their 
land) and would keep their land for their descendants in the future. Their assumption of what 
could happen (sale of land) after obtaining the individualized title deed was largely based on 
the situation they observed in nearby villages, where most individual title holders 
immediately sold their land in exchange for short-term monetary gain. Without proper 
financial management, many of those individuals generally became landless and had to work 
as labor or rent their former land for agriculture.  
7.3. Tenure clarification and competing 
agenda  
The findings of this study do not support the previous research suggesting positive outcome 
on tenure of local communities. Instead, they provide empirical evidences that REDD+ might 
not be sufficient to expedite tenure reform. These findings also discusses about tenure reform 
in light of REDD+ and pinpoint the likely cause of the absence of strong political will of the 
government to support tenure clarification and REDD+, which are incompatible government 
agendas.  
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7.3.1.$Tenure$insecurity$impact$on$REDD+$
In contrast to the literature e.g. Larson et al. (2010), Evans et al. (2012) and Larson et al. 
(2013), the results of implementation of the REDD+ in this study revealed that REDD+ did 
not provide adequate incentives for the government to accelerate tenure clarification for the 
local forest-dependent communities. In the context of the study, the government was reluctant 
to transfer forest rights to local communities and all local community stakeholders recognized 
that the land tenure system was not clear. Due to the embedded risks in tenure insecurity, 
financial investment for REDD+ was discouraged and later withdrawn. As explained by 
Cotula and Mayers (2009), the absence of tenure clarity could lead to removal of REDD+ 
investment. In addition to reputational risk (i.e. being associated with projects with, or 
perceived as having, adverse social costs) mentioned by Cotula and Mayers (2009), the 
findings suggest another potential source of concern to investors: the risk of non-permanence 
(reversal of emission removals in the future due to activities performed by the local 
communities who are the actual land users).  
 As a result of the lack of funding, REDD+ activities planned for the project were not 
completed and consequently no significant impacts of REDD+ on tenure were observed. 
However, a few planned REDD+ measures (as identified in the 2009 R-PIN) were actually 
implemented: reforestation, construction of a dam, estimation of potential carbon 
sequestration capacity, and preliminary steps for the expansion of the national park, although 
these were not considered as REDD+ measures by the project developers. It is worth 
mentioning that, even though with limitations, the preliminary results reveal signs of negative 
impacts on tenure of local communities, as the expanded national park area included land that 
had already been cleared and prepared for cultivation by one of the community members of 
Ton Mamuang. If such activity were to be included and completed as REDD+ activities in the 
future, the present study therefore reveals a potential tendency that is in agreement with the 
reports in the literature suggesting negative REDD+ impact on tenure of local communities in 
cases where forest land tenure is not clear, e.g. Eraker (2000), Adger et al. (2004) and Jindal 
et al. (2008). This notion remains to be confirmed by further studies during the second stage 
of project implementation, when REDD+ measures are expected to be fully implemented. 
7.3.2.$Tenure$reform$
The findings suggest that tenure reform with positive tenure outcome for local forest-
dependent communities is at heart of the long-term success of REDD+ particularly in the 
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context of Thailand. Even though there is a tendency in REDD+ policy discussions to equate 
comprehensive legal reforms of regulations, policies and laws related to land tenure with 
improved community forest tenure security and hence improved enabling conditions for 
REDD+, tenure reforms are embedded with a number of challenges. Firstly, national tenure 
reforms are often a lengthy process with high complexity (Bolin, Lawrence et al. 2013; Rothe 
and Munro-Faure 2013). The necessary careful preparation and institutional development to 
accommodate the reform is likely to take decades (Adams, Sibanda et al. 1999). Secondly, the 
resources available for REDD+ readiness are generally not sufficient to carry out national 
tenure reforms (Rothe and Munro-Faure 2013). Such tenure reforms most likely need to be 
associated with a wider and bigger initiative to tenure by the government with long-term 
budgetary commitment (Adams, Sibanda et al. 1999; Rothe and Munro-Faure 2013). Thirdly, 
tenure reforms are generally highly contested processes that do not always produce the 
expected outcomes (Nelson 2010), and in several cases efforts to clarify tenure actually 
heightened conflicts (Deininger and Feder 2009; Wainwright and Bryan 2009). 
 In the case of Thailand, one of the major tenure reforms in the past was the land titling 
program in 1984 with the support from the World Bank and Australian government. While its 
proponents note that the program increased land values and tenure security (Feder, Onchan et 
al. 1988), civil rights groups claim that the program did not recognize community property 
resources and led to elite capture of land at the expense of poor rural population (Leonard and 
Narintakrakul na Ayutthaya 2002). Ganajanapan (2000) similarly suggests that the traditional 
practices of tenure arrangements, which the land titling replaced, already provided tenure 
security to the land users. Contradictions were found between customary practices and legal 
principles in relation to inheritance, demarcation and alienation of land (Ganjanapan 2000). 
The land titling led to land disputes among heirs, families and relatives, rather than greater 
tenure security as anticipated (Ganjanapan 2000). Even if the reform is designed to be in 
complimentary to the customary tenure arrangement de jure, the reforms do not necessarily 
change de facto tenure if the enforcement of the newly established legal rights is weak (Bolin, 
Lawrence et al. 2013). More importantly, many of the causes of tenure insecurity are driven 
by political and economic factors with an interest in maintaining business as usual practices 
(Bolin, Lawrence et al. 2013).  
 The findings of Thailand disprove the initial assumption made at the outset that there 
would be strong engagement and ownership within the government towards REDD+ given its 
potential role in sustainable development and potential financial flows. In fact, a more 
cautious approach has been expressed by the Thai government, who appeared to adopt a “wait 
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and see” position, until more substantial progress has been achieved on reaching an 
international REDD+ agreement and certainty in future finance. Consequently, the 
government avoided making considerable changes in the current legal framework and 
priorities, including the ones that are inconsistent with REDD+ objective from the perspective 
of tenure and deforestation, even in light of REDD+ pilot implementation.  
7.3.3.$Competing$agenda$
Additional to the “wait and see” position of the government, another potential cause of the 
absence of strong political will to promote REDD+ in Thailand could as well be the 
competing government agenda – policies or priorities that are inconsistent with REDD+. In 
the context of this thesis, the relevant agenda includes the ones related to tenure and 
deforestation.  
 One of the lasting effects of the colonial forestry system in contemporary Thai forestry 
is the forest politics that enabled the government to own the vast forest area of the country, 
while criminalizing the local communities residing inside the land legally classified as 
protected areas. For the past decades, Thai government has been reluctant to give up control 
of forest area with valuable timber resources to the local communities and has limited 
response to the grassroots movement calling for legal recognition of community rights to 
forest land that was initiated since the 1990s. The Community Forest draft Act had been the 
source of national debate as well as the heart of the community forest movement for over two 
decades. While the light green NGOs 19  and academics proposed evidences that the 
communities are able to protect and sustainably use the forest resources, the dark green NGOs 
and other conservationists including the conservative fractions of government authorities 
denied the ability of local communities to sustainably manage the forest resources and 
promote exclusion of people from forests (Brenner, Buergin et al. 1999; Sumarlan 2004). 
After undergoing a number of rewrites, the draft Act was rejected, passed and eventually 
rescinded. A more recent example relates to the Prime Minister’s Office on the issuance of 
Community Land Title Deed that provides temporary use and management rights to local 
communities inside State-owned forests. Even though the issue was regarded as one of the 
government priorities by the Prime Minister’s office, it met with strong resistance from 
forestry departments namely the RFD and the DNP, who generally viewed the policy as 
                                                
19 The terms light green and dark green refer to different ideologies of NGOs with relevance to environmental 
issues in Thailand. The light green NGOs emphasize on social issues, whilst the dark green NGOs concentrate 
on conservation objectives.  
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means to legalize the illegal squatters and as encouragement for further forest encroachment 
(Boonchai 2013). Since 2011, additional Community Title Deed is yet to be issued despite the 
calls for its continuity by the Land Reform Network and academics.  
 Regarding deforestation, one of the fundamental government policies20 that have been 
in competition with forest conservation in Thailand rests within agricultural sector. A number 
of studies discloses a strong linkage between the promotion of cash crop cultivation and 
deforestation in Thailand for the past decades (Dembner 1989; Dearden 1995; Hirsch 2000; 
Lang 2003; Entwisle, Walsh et al. 2005; Lorsirirat and Maita 2006). In a similar vein, the 
national REDD Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) submitted to the FCPF in 2013 
suggests that the conversion of natural forest area to agriculture is categorized as one of the 
prominent and direct causes of deforestation in Thailand (GoT 2013). Since its establishment 
in 1959, Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board, which has been 
responsible for all public investment planning, is a major promoter of cash crop cultivation 
for export (Lang 2003). Thai agribusiness companies had a strong influence on national 
agricultural policies (Levin and Panyakul 1993). Agribusiness involving in the production of 
cash-crops often received financial help from the government through the Bank of Agriculture 
and Agricultural Co-operatives, tax breaks, duty privileges and other promotional measures 
(Delang 2002). During the mid-1960s, the returns of cash crop exports played a major role in 
the national balance of payments, fueling the replacement of forest land by cash crop 
production further (Phongpaichit and Baker 2002). Phongpaichit and Baker (2002) reported 
44 times increase in maize cultivation area during 1950-1990 and 24 times increase in 
soybean cultivation area during 1950-1990, whilst ARDA (2013) reported doubling of palm 
oil cultivation area in the country during 2004-2009. In 2003, the government announced the 
campaign to establish the country as the kitchen of the world, which to some extent 
encouraged agricultural production further (Murray 2007).  
 Moreover, contract farming has been a key element of Thai government’s 
development plan reflecting a strategy of private-led integrated agricultural development 
(Singh 2005; Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpoongse 2008). Guaranteed prices for certain cash 
crops for food, timber (eucalyptus)21 In 2008, allegedly incentivized by Charoen Phokaphan 
(CP) Group, one of the largest agribusiness companies in Thailand, through provision of 
                                                
20  For discussion of other causes of deforestation occurred in Thailand, please see Delang (2002) and 
Phongpaichit and Baker 2002) and the R-PP (2013 version) for more recent discussions on the issue. 
21 Contract farming has become an important arrangement for eucalyptus production in Thailand (Boulay and 
Tacconi 2012). Forest industry companies generally provide low price seedlings, fertilizer, technical advice and 
training as well as guarantee the purchase of the timber at a fixed price for mature trees (Boulay and Tacconi 
2012).  
 129 
seedling, fertilizer and pesticide without upfront payment and unofficial promise to buy the 
produce, about 25% of national forest reserve in Petchaboon province was encroached for 
cultivating cassava, sugar cane and maize (Tansettakij 2008) and about 50% of forest in 
watershed area of Nan province was cleared for maize cultivation (Wangsap 2012). Similar 
occurrences of forest clearance were reported in Chiang Mai province for maize cultivation in 
2008 (Noonsong 2008) and in Kanchanaburi for rubber, cassava, sugar cane and animal feed 
maize cultivation in 2013 (Poojadkarn 2014). It should be noted that soybean and maize are 
one of the main ingredients to produce animal feed, in response to the growing number of 
contract farming for poultry, livestock and aquaculture production in the country. By 2011, 
rubber, canned chicken22, sugar, cassava, pet food, palm oil and maize were amongst the top 
twenty agricultural export items of Thailand (FAO 2011). 
 Over the past decades, agricultural intensification – increasing agricultural inputs to 
improve production rather than expanding land under cultivation – has been widely adopted 
in Thailand. The technique is often posited as a strategy for reducing forest encroachment. 
Empirical analyses nevertheless show weak relationship between intensification and reduced 
deforestation (Ewers, Scharlemann et al. 2009; DeFries, Rudel et al. 2010). One of the 
explanations includes the fact that intensification modifies land rents as yields and surpluses 
increase, thus generating financial incentive for further forest clearance for agricultural 
expansion (Phelps, Carrasco et al. 2013). Unless there is an adjustment in the competing 
agricultural policies, the potential financial incentives from REDD+ will have little chance in 
outweighing lucrative forest uses for commercial agriculture.  
 By virtue of the prevailing absence of resolute political support for REDD+ and the 
existence of competing government agenda, the eventual convergence and alignment of 
government agenda and policies seem implausible in Thailand. Unless REDD+ becomes the 
government’s prime agenda, it is foreseeable that the existing or future contradictory policies 
could work against the effort to reduce emissions from forest sector or worse entail forest 
conversion at a scale which would make a difference in national emissions (Karsenty 2012). 
Under such circumstances, the shortfalls embedded in the project-based and nested 
approaches to REDD+ architecture could create negative implication on the emission 
reduction efforts. Depending on national ramification of the project-based and nested 
approaches, REDD+ projects with verified reduced deforestation could potentially be credited 
without taking into account the subsequent total national deforestation level. Such situation 
                                                
22 Canned chicken refers to tinned and fully retorted chicken meat, which has had prolonged exposure to high 
temperature while in its container. 
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may henceforth lead to an overall increase in national, regional or global emissions from 
deforestation due to indirect land-use displacement outside project boundaries. However this 
does not necessarily conclude that REDD+ implementation under project-based approach or 
nested approach in Thailand would have no contribution. Indeed, other co-benefits of REDD+ 
beyond carbon sequestration, namely biodiversity improvement from such project could 
possibly be immense. The latter has greater importance to local communities in form of food 
security and medicine (GoT 2013). 
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CHAPTER 8 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents the major policy implications that were drawn from the study. This 
chapter then concludes the study by summarizing important findings, criticizing major 
limitations of the thesis and proposing several avenues for further research. 
8.1. Policy implications 
The case study of Thailand clearly highlights that clear and secure tenure is necessary as one 
of the enabling conditions for the long-term success of REDD+ for sustainable forest 
management and improved livelihoods. A comprehensive tenure reform to formally recognize 
communal tenure ideally with conditionality of forest conservation performance should be 
considered. The reforms may encompass the re-introduction of the Community Forest draft 
with certain modification on the constraints of local communities’ rights and their potential 
role in forest management or active implementation of the Regulation of the Prime Minister 
Office on the Issuance of Community Title Deed. In parallel, this requires existing legal 
framework with conflicting implications on communal tenure and local livelihoods in State-
owned forestland to be streamlined, the National Park Act, National forest reserve Act, 
Resolution on watershed classification and Land Code and Promulgation Act for instance. 
 However, tenure reforms without effective enforcement could engender risks to the 
success of future REDD+ implementation, while exacerbating current inequality in the tenure 
arrangement as well as future REDD+ benefits. Essentially, the prevailing absence of strong 
political will implies that the legal reform of tenure would likely to be sluggish, expensive and 
might not offer the anticipated outcome on tenure security of local forest-dependent 
communities. In other words, while delivering enforceable tenure to forest-dependent 
communities could be one of the long-term measures, REDD+ also requires immediate 
actions to enable rapid implementation in a short to medium term, as on-going economic 
pressures to convert forest land to other uses namely agricultural production threaten to out-
compete the possible future financial incentives offered by REDD+. Potential short to 
medium term measures include: 
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 Firstly, existing national policies and legal framework as well as government priorities 
could be assessed for their consistency with REDD+ objectives. This encompasses policies 
across sectors with relevance to deforestation, such as agriculture, mining, forestry and 
infrastructure development. Consequently, policies and laws with perverse incentives, legal 
loopholes or conflicting priorities that has implications on deforestation as well as tenure of 
local forest-dependent communities could be identified. Corresponding interim measures to 
halt unsustainable development or temporary tenure arrangements could be provided, while 
the government priorities are re-assessed. Even though comprehensive legal changes and 
tenure reforms are needed in the long-term, the identification of policy inconsistency and 
implementation of interim measures might also reduce deforestation rapidly and facilitate 
REDD+ development within existing legal framework. 
 Secondly, in light of the absence of de jure tenure clarity for local forest-dependent 
communities and carbon ownership clarification, REDD+ pilots could be conducted as PES 
projects in short-term, with the aim to expand into national PES scheme in a long-term. PES 
is believed to be the more preferable apparatus given the current context of Thailand, 
compared to REDD+ for several reasons. Firstly, PES is a result-based scheme that involves 
payments to managers of land or other natural resources for activities conducted. In other 
words, actions anticipated to deliver ecosystem services are used as proxies, e.g. respect of 
contractually agreed land use plans, reforestation activities, restoration of degraded ecosystem 
etc. Rather than using carbon as proxy, high carbon-related costs associated with REDD+ 
regarding carbon measurement, verification, validation and sales (the so-called ‘carbon 
infrastructure’) could be avoided. Secondly, tenure formalization is regarded by NGOs and 
CSOs in Thailand as one of the most important pre-conditions for REDD+, as expressed in 
the 2013 national R-PP public consultation and in-depth interviews (Pornpana Kuaycharoen, 
personal communication, 12 July 2013; Kittisak Rattanakrajangsri, personal communication 1 
August 2013; Somsak Soonthornnawaphat, personal communication, 1 August 2013). Local 
communities with sufficient de facto management and exclusionary rights are deemed 
acceptable to be included and for benefiting from PES, even without formal title document 
both in theory (Wunder 2005) and in the context of Thailand (Pornpana Kuaycharoen, 
personal communication, 12 July 2013; Somsak Soonthornnawaphat, personal 
communication, 1 August 2013). Thirdly, the political support for PES from government 
authorities appears to be clearer, attributable to a clearly defined concept, tangible domestic 
financial sources, success stories in other countries, greater awareness among the relevant 
government authorities and compliance with existing laws (Amphorn Pammongkol, personal 
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communication, 10 August 2012; Charnwit Puangchan, personal communication, 11 August 
2012). Moreover, a number of PES-like activities – such as the private sector-funded 
reforestation and forest maintenance projects inside State-owned forest land with local 
communities as main implementers and beneficiaries via the local authorities – was conducted 
in Thailand in the past. In line with the proposal, one of the key organizations related to 
REDD+ development in Thailand, notably the Lowering Emissions from Asia’s Forest or 
LEAF program, decided to conduct their REDD+ pilot in Thailand in form of PES. In 
agreement with relevant government officials, the principal source of finance would derive 
domestically from national companies’ corporate social responsibility programs (Somsak 
Soonthornnawaphat, personal communication, 1 August 2013). 
 The findings furthermore suggest that the two Northern communities studied appear to 
have de facto management and exclusionary rights and able to complete long-term forest 
protection even without formal tenure recognition aside from GPS maps produced by the 
officials. The communities were found to possess the following attributes: 
• Proven forest conservation capability, e.g. continuous community-initiated/managed 
reforestation or forest conservation activities and evidences of positive forest outcome 
• Strong collective action, e.g. enforcement of community rules governing the 
management of community forest 
• De facto management and exclusionary rights, e.g. autonomy and main responsibility 
in maintaining and managing the community forest, excludability vis-à-vis all 
incompatible land users including the State authorities and GPS map of the settlement 
conducted by the local authorities implying informal tenure recognition 
• Good relationship with authorities, e.g. collaboration and mutual trust between the 
community and local authorities in forest management and enforcement of the laws. 
 Communities possessing the prescribed attributes should not be neglected as potential 
participants to REDD+ scheme, against the backdrop of no upfront tenure clarification. Their 
on-going conservation efforts and practices of sustainable management of forests should be 
encouraged and be eligible as REDD+ activities. For communities without the prescribed 
attributes, engaging them in REDD+ or long-term forest conservation contractual agreement 
prior to the formalization of their customary tenure might have lower chances of success. 
Weak collective action and lack of proven capability of forest conservation of such 
communities cast doubts on whether they would be capable of conserving the forest. Without 
minimum de facto rights to exclude or manage, the permanence of long-term forest protection 
 134 
activities could not be ensured. Having on-going conflicts with the authorities and low mutual 
trust would prevent the communities from entering into any contractual agreement with the 
authorities, particularly the one with the promised rewards after project completion rather 
than upfront.  
 Ideally, the community title document encompassing both community forest area and 
individual agricultural plots of the community members in accordance with Regulation of the 
Prime Minister Office on the Issuances of Community Land Title Deed could be provided as 
REDD+ rewards upon the completion of the project. Such in-kind reward should be provided 
because PES payments alone may not be sufficient to incentivize land use changes (Neef 
2012). The title document providing use and management rights to the community over 
community forest and agricultural land could potentially be revoked if the community forest 
is not well-maintained or if any community member sells the agricultural land to external 
party (Anand Ganjanapan, personal communication, 13 May 2012). In parallel, this implies 
modification of several contradictory laws in order to make such concept feasible. 
 REDD+ activities could then be regarded as reforestation or forest maintenance 
activities and be conducted in collaboration with local authorities, which would transfer the 
payment and implementation responsibilities to the local communities in accordance with the 
NP and NFR Acts. Under existing legal framework, this suggestion is feasible based on the 
similar project of the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) conducted. The project funded 
reforestation activities performed by Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities via local DNP 
authorities. It is important to note that PES or REDD as a financial incentive alone can only 
be a part of the solution to reverse deforestation and forest degradation in a limited timeframe. 
However, if REDD+/PES benefits are entangled with resources to acquire capital needed to 
implement new skills, training, agricultural techniques and market, the effort to reduce 
reliance on forest products as well as incentives for forest conversion is likely to sustain, even 
after the termination of REDD+ compensation. Based on the BCI model, the REDD/PES 
model of Karsenty (2011), FORRU (Stephen Elliot, personal communication, 2 August 2013) 
and the Village Development Partnership of the PDA (Samnan Chaikot, personal 
communication, 8 October 2013), one of the potential models for REDD+ in Thailand prior to 
forest land tenure clarification is illustrated in Figure 43. 
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Figure 43 Proposed REDD+/PES model in Thailand 
 
 Following the REDD+ national and local institutional structures prescribed in 
Thailand R-PP of 2013, the REDD+ Task Force could distribute monetary benefits of 
REDD+ to the participating communities through the REDD+ local offices. The local office 
would also be responsible for carbon monitoring and reporting conservation performance in 
collaboration with the local actors, namely community committee members and youth group, 
on a frequent basis. The payment to the community could be made in sequences throughout 
the project duration through the village revolving fund. The collective payment should be 
conditional to the conservation performance and corrective action of the community, e.g. 
replacement of dead trees with seedlings a few months after reforestation activity. 
 In the case of loan default, no further loan would be issued to other members unless 
the default is corrected. Furthermore, the REDD+ local offices, Task Force and donor should 
contribute to training of skills for income generating activities and enhanced market access in 
correspond with the community members’ interest. Then aside from paying for saving 
interests and shareholder revenue and adding on to the fund, certain percentages of the 
interest gained from the loan could be used for communal activities and improvement such as 
firebreak preparation, education and healthcare. It is noteworthy to mention that each REDD+ 
project should have an MoU with clear deliverables as well as terms and conditions of the 
village revolving fund agreed and signed by both parties. Any breach of the terms agreed 
should only result in termination of the project. This study does not claim however that such 
model is a one-size-fits-all framework for all forest communities in Thailand. Rather, it 
intends to illustrate one of the potential models that is feasible to enable REDD+ 
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implementation within existing legal framework and can generate lessons learned for future 
REDD+ development in the country.    
 Thirdly, in relation to the REDD+ Task Force, as described by the R-PP submitted to 
the FCPF in 2013 appeared to already be multi-ministerial and multi-sectoral, yet several 
improvements could be made. Additional ministerial members with relevance to deforestation 
and hence stakes in REDD+ such as Royal Irrigation Department (dam construction), 
Department of Primary Industries and Mines (mining) and Tourism Authority of Thailand 
(tourism) could be included. Private sector alike, additional leading players in agribusiness in 
food, energy and pulp and paper industry, notably Charoen Pokphand Foods, United Palm 
Oil, Mitr Phol Group, Betagro Group, Univanich, Sritrang Agro Industry, Double A should 
also be incorporated, given that their roles in the REDD+ Task Force are well-defined. Rather 
than being a separate body, the REDD+ Task Force could be part of the National Climate 
Change Committee23 in order to participate in national climate change policy making and 
ensure that the preparation of the policy was conduced in a coherent manner to REDD+. 
Moreover, the Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister, which in turn could provide the 
REDD+ Task Force with robust authority when facing contradictory policy or legal 
framework. Likewise, close coordination between the REDD+ Task Force and the GHG 
inventory unit (TGO) should be secured. To ensure that the GHG inventory would be 
completed within the given timeframe, legal instruments with flexibility such as MoU, 
contracts or formal agreements, could be considered. Ideally, the GHG inventory team for 
agriculture, forestry and other land uses sector should have permanent positions to assure that 
technical skills and institutional memory are not lost and to support the continuity in GHG 
inventory cycles. 
8.2. Conclusion 
This section summarizes important findings and its significance in contributing to the debate 
on tenure and REDD+ relationship. It also revisits the primary research questions and 
hypotheses. It furthermore describes the main limitations of the study and provides direction 
and areas for future research. 
                                                
23 Ideally, Thailand Greenhouse Gas Organization or TGO (GHG inventory unit and Clean Development 
Mechanism Designated National Entity), Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions  (NAMAs) Authorities 
alongside other representatives from relevant ministries should be part of the Committee as well. 
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8.2.1.$Summary$of$findings$
Despite the issue of tenure and REDD+ was raised by a number of scholars, limited filed 
research has been conducted. This study aims to fill some of those gaps through research in 
four local communities in two different location in Thailand, one is where REDD+ pilot 
project was supposedly implemented and another is where REDD+ project is likely to be 
implemented. The findings suggest that in general where forest land tenure remained insecure, 
the effect of the relationship between tenure and REDD+ could potentially be significant. To 
elaborate, the two research questions and hypotheses were revisited.  
 The first research question asks, “Does the present legal framework with non-
recognized customary rights produce similar de facto impacts in all communities at present?” 
and the corresponding hypothesis is “Communities reveal different de facto impacts due to 
different local context.” The findings confirm the hypothesis. Two major findings emerged 
from this study in relation to the first research question. They contribute to the existing 
knowledge of de facto tenure security in a setting, where the statutory and customary tenure 
systems co-exist without any formal linkages in two ways. Firstly, they provide evidences that 
in some communities the legal framework resulted in de facto tenure insecurity of local 
communities and secondly provide alternative evidences that in other communities, the 
similar legal framework implementation in fact resulted in de facto tenure security. 
Additionally, the findings offer insights into potential explanation of the diverse level of de 
facto tenure security among local forest-dependent communities. 
 The first findings are that in the past all of the four communities reported that their de 
facto tenure security was negatively affected by the legal framework particularly the National 
Park Act and the National forest reserve Act. Without any prior public consultation, the 
designation of National Parks and National forest reserves was declared nation-wide as part of 
the government’s effort to conserve the forests. Most of the established national parks and 
national forest reserves nevertheless largely overlapped with existing settlements of many 
local forest-dependent communities. Both Acts prohibited the occupation and use of land 
inside the designation and therefore made the local forest-dependent communities illegal 
settlers. By overlaying formal institutions onto informal arrangements, tenure of those 
communities residing inside the State-owned forest land namely the four communities studied 
was challenged and threats of forced eviction became vocal as a consequence of the legal 
framework. The overlapping claims made by both the State and the local communities led to 
frequent confrontation and bitterness between the two parties as well as violent retaliation by 
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the communities at times in the past. Although the de facto tenure situation evolved over time 
and certain conflict resolution measures were implemented, at present the two communities in 
the Western region generally remained without excludability vis-à-vis the authorities and 
commonly with the fear of forced eviction. Moreover, the local authorities initiated and 
regulated the communities’ ability to access and withdraw forest products from the 
community forest. These findings are found to be in consistent with the literature suggesting 
the negative impacts of legal framework de facto tenure security of the local forest-dependent 
communities in Thailand at present. 
 The second major findings related to the first research question are that currently de 
facto tenure of some local communities has improved, even without significant improvement 
to the legal framework. Even without any legal recognition of their tenure or title document, 
the results show that the two communities in the Northern region felt generally secured. The 
communities understood that they had de facto exclusionary rights against any incompatible 
user, including the State authorities. Furthermore, the members mostly did not fear of forced 
eviction from the settlements. Moreover, the rules governing the access, withdrawal and 
management of community forest were initiated and enforced by the communities, rather than 
being imposed by the authority. These findings henceforth introduce certain nuances into the 
on-going debate about tenure security of local forest-dependent communities in Thailand. At 
the same time, the findings enrich the international discussion on the tenure security of local 
tenure arrangements by providing empirical evidences demonstrating the presence of de facto 
tenure security of local communities even without legal tenure recognition. Furthermore, the 
study proposes that the local context of strong collective action, strategic response to tenure 
insecurity and assistance of local mediators were contributing factors linking local tenure 
arrangements to de facto tenure security, where customary tenure is not legally recognized.  
 The second research question asks “How does REDD+ implementation affect both de 
jure and de facto tenure security of local forest dependent communities?” and the hypothesis 
is that REDD+ project activities positively impact tenure security of local forest communities. 
The findings do not confirm the hypothesis. Two major findings emerged from this study 
related to the second research question. These findings contribute to the discussion of REDD+ 
impacts on tenure of local communities, by providing empirical evidences on the limited 
ability of REDD+ to push forward tenure improvement, as opposed to the expectations 
expressed by certain literature. Additionally, the study pinpoints a more concerning obstacle 
to REDD+, the competing government agendas. 
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 The first major findings related to the second research question are in contrast to a 
growing body of literature that proposes acceleration of tenure reforms as a result of REDD+. 
On the one hand, the findings of the REDD+ pilot in Thailand suggest that REDD+ may not 
be able to provide sufficient incentives to expedite tenure reforms or to improve tenure 
security for local forest-dependent communities. In fact, the findings reveal that de jure 
tenure, the de facto tenure security of the two communities in the Western region that 
participated the BCI was by and large unaffected, despite the request of the participating 
communities for tenure security enhancement through the project. These findings show that 
the Thai government did not embark on tenure clarification in view of REDD+ 
implementation. On the other hand, the findings also disclosed the direct impact of tenure 
insecurity on REDD+. The unresolved forest tenure conflicts and potential exclusion of the 
local communities are embedded with a number of risks, namely reputational risk (being 
perceived as involved in projects with adverse social costs) and non-permanence risk (higher 
emission in the future due to incompatible activities by the actual land users). Consequently, 
investment risks associated with tenure insecurity resulted in withdrawal of REDD+ 
investment and hence prevented the complete implementation of REDD+. In this context, the 
prevailing tenure insecurity in forest land therefore represents an issue that could jeopardize 
the long-term success of REDD+. Returning to the hypothesis posed, these findings do not 
confirm the hypothesis asserting tenure security enhancement as a result of REDD+ scheme. 
 The second major findings related to the second research question are that the 
existence of REDD+ competing agenda might be one of the explanation for the absence of 
strong political will to embark on tenure reform in light of REDD+ and hence influencing the 
long-term success of REDD+. The lack of strong political will and commitment to push 
forward tenure clarification has been observable during the past decades. For the past 
decades, Thai government has been reluctant to give up control of forest area with valuable 
timber resources to the local communities and has limited response to the grassroots 
movement calling for legal recognition of community rights to forest land that was initiated 
since the 1990s. This tends to continue in recent years, even in the view of REDD+. 
Similarly, the efforts to tackle deforestation in light of REDD+ as seen in the rationale for 
pilot site selection, in the case of the BCI and LEAF program for instance, were deemed 
limited. This most likely could be explained by the existence of government competing 
agendas. Amongst a number of government policies and priorities that have been in 
competition with forest conservation in Thailand, the fundamental policies rest within 
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agricultural sector. A number of studies disclose a strong linkage between the promotion of 
cash crop cultivation and deforestation in Thailand for the past decades. Unless these 
competing agendas are revisited, by virtue of the prevailing absence of resolute political 
support for REDD+ and the existence of competing government agenda, the eventual 
convergence and alignment of government agenda and policies seem implausible in Thailand. 
In such case, it is foreseeable that the existing or future contradictory policies could work 
against the effort to reduce emissions from forest sector or worse entail forest conversion at a 
scale, which would make a difference in national emissions under certain REDD+ 
architecture. 
 In relation to policy implication, this study suggests that clear and secure tenure 
through a comprehensive tenure reform is desirable prior to any REDD+ implementation. 
However, it is widely accepted that such national tenure reform a time-consuming process 
that involves a comprehensive reform of policies and laws surrounding land tenure issue. 
Furthermore, it requires strong political will, which the country currently lacks of, to embark 
on such national reform. While delivering enforceable tenure to forest-dependent 
communities could be one of the long-term measures, REDD+ also requires immediate action 
to enable quick implementation in a short to medium term, as on-going economic pressures to 
convert forest land to other uses namely agricultural production threaten to out-compete the 
possible future financial incentives offered by REDD+. Potential short to medium term 
measures include: the assessment of government policies consistency, pilot implementation as 
PES in communities with de facto management and exclusionary rights and improvement of 
REDD+ institutional structure. Firstly, existing national policies and legal frameworks could 
be assessed for their consistency with REDD+ objectives. Policies or government priorities 
that has implications on deforestation as well as tenure of local forest-dependent communities 
could be identified. Corresponding interim measures to halt unsustainable development or 
temporary tenure arrangements could be provided, while the government priorities are re-
assessed. Secondly, REDD+ pilots could be conducted as PES in coherent with existing legal 
framework on communities with sufficient de facto management and exclusionary rights. The 
findings reveal that some forest-dependent communities with specific attributes could 
successfully conserve the forests even without any formal recognition of their tenure. In a 
long-term, such PES implementation of REDD+ could be scale up to the national level. 
Lastly, institutional setting for REDD+ could be improved. Additional stakeholders with high 
relevance to deforestation should be included in the task force. The task force should become 
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part of the national climate change committee to directly participate in climate change policy-
making and obtain robust authority when facing contradictory policy or legal framework. 
 These policy implications nevertheless remain with limitations. Firstly, the tenure 
reform, the reassessment of competing government agendas and policies and the provision of 
enhanced tenure security as rewards all need certain level of political support to become 
feasible. REDD+ funding up to this stage does not appear to be sufficient, as an incentive for 
generating strong political will to enhance tenure security of local forest-dependent 
communities in Thailand. However, it is noteworthy to mention that the previous governing 
political party expressed strong political will and prioritized community title as their flagship 
policy, resulting in the implementation of the Prime Minister Office on Community Title 
Deed followed by the issuance of community title deeds for pilot communities in Thailand. 
This implies that the change in governing political party to the one with tenure reform as one 
of their priorities might be one of the potential factors that could adequately generate strong 
political will to make these policy recommendations feasible. Additionally, public pressure 
pushing for tenure reform could also play role in igniting strong political will of the 
government. The recent public protests against Mae Wong dam construction project in 2013 
with expected large-scale forest and wildlife loss, which resulted in the halt and re-assessment 
of the project’s environmental impacts, serves as a good example. Secondly, the proposed 
conditionality of the community title document, despite the aim to guarantee continuous 
forest conservation performance, could make the communities expose to subjectivity of the 
judgment by the officials. Thirdly, the PES implementation suggestion might have limited 
application ability at present, as only forest-dependent communities with certain de facto 
rights are eligible and such communities may be limited in number at the national scale. 
Lessons learned from the application could nonetheless provide useful insights for further 
REDD+ development. 
    
8.2.2.$Research$limitations$$
As with most survey research, this study is embedded with several noteworthy limitations. 
The limitations include the following: 
 Firstly, due to relatively small sample of case studies in selected regions for assessing 
tenure situation and for assessing REDD+ pilot impacts. A larger sample would have 
provided us with a more powerful test to our hypotheses and lessened the possibility of 
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erroneous results. For this reason, disproportionate stratified sampling technique was used in 
order to increase precision gains and reduce estimation bias of the results. 
 Secondly, any synthesis of an active program is bound to be highly subjective. The 
assessment of REDD+ pilot site is no exception. In combined with limited prior assessment of 
the pilot program, concentrating only on forest tenure impacts could overlook many other 
important aspects of the program. Despite such limitations, however, the study may still be 
useful to the current state of knowledge in this field.  
 Thirdly, the reliance on qualitative data obtained from focus groups, interviews and 
survey questionnaires is embedded with potential sources of bias. The sources perhaps 
include subjective memory and exaggeration to name a few. Moreover, the data on the past 
tenure conflicts and resolution was collected retrospectively. Additionally, the participants 
were recruited on a voluntary basis. They may henceforth have had recent experiences of bias 
or conflicts with the authorities and were looking for a venue to express their frustrations. 
Even so, the nature of qualitative studies is such that the perceptions of individuals who 
voluntarily share such information are represented. Consequently, at times, accuracy of 
responses regarding involvement and positive contribution of the authorities in community 
forest maintenance was under-reported, perhaps blinded by bias. In response, various 
measures were taken in order to crosscheck the information, e.g. interview with local key 
informants and relevant authorities. 
 Fourthly, another limitation is the possibility of response bias in that participants may 
not have felt comfortable expressing their sincere opinions or concerns in a focus group 
setting. However, this limitation is unlikely since the participants usually shared information 
and experiences that were extremely personal and often emotionally charged in most focus 
groups conducted.  
 Lastly, language barrier was found rather problematic with the older female groups of 
the Northern region. Even with facilitation by the local translator, such barrier impeded the 
dynamics of the discussion. Data gathering was completed. The process however consumed 
comparatively more time than the groups without language barrier.  
8.2.3. Suggestions$for$future$research 
Based on the limitations described, the study raised some issues and questions that could be 
considered for future investigations. These suggested research areas could promote the 
improved understanding of the complex relationship between tenure and REDD+.  
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 Firstly, as the findings reveal that de facto tenure security of local communities 
evolved over time and potentially into diverse direction. Further studies encapsulating the 
longitudinal effects of the tenure evolution could provide a more comprehensive development 
of de facto tenure security and the corresponding drivers of change. Moreover, future studies 
should contain a larger sample from State-owned forest area in all regions to demonstrate the 
generalization of this study’s results. By doing so, the broader pattern of de facto tenure 
changes as well as their drivers could be identified.  
 Secondly, the assessment of de jure and de facto tenure impacts from REDD+ pilot 
could be performed in a longer timespan with a larger number of participating communities. 
Ideally the sample could cover communities with various level of de facto tenure security in 
order to compare the REDD+ impacts in different tenure settings. The study could also 
attempt to examine other socio-economic outcomes of REDD+ activities and enrich the 
present understanding of REDD+ impacts on local communities. 
 Lastly, given the issue of government competing agendas, the politics of REDD+ in 
national setting, in other words, the interplay between REDD+ policies and measures and 
other development agendas including the incompatible ones should be considered as an issue 
for future studies. 
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CHAPTER 10 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 List of questions for Mae Sa Mai and Mae Sa Noi communities 
1. Community forest 
1.1 Rights to access and withdraw 
1.1.1 Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption 
without official permission? 
1.1.2 Can the members gather forest products for commercial purpose without official 
permission? 
1.1.3 Can the members hunt animals without official permission? 
1.1.4 Can the members use timber products without official permission? 
1.2 Rights to manage 
1.2.1 Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community 
forest? 
1.2.2 Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management 
of the community forest? 
1.3 Rights to exclude 
1.3.1 Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other 
communities or investors? 
1.3.2 Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 
1.4 Rights to alienate 
1.4.1 Can the members transfer the community forest via inheritance? 
1.4.2 Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 
1.5 Fear of eviction  
1.5.1 Do the members fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 
1.6 Legal recognition 
1.6.1 Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 
2. Pressing concerns 
2.1 Please list your top three concerns at present 
3. Tenure preference 
3.1 Would you like to receive title document to your communal forest land? 
3.2 If yes, what type of tenure would you prefer, i.e. communal or individual? And 
why? 
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Appendix 2 List of questions for Ton Mamuang and Bongti Noi communities 
1. Community forest 
1.1 Rights to access and withdraw 
1.1.1 Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption 
without official authorization? 
1.1.2 Can the members gather forest products for sale without official authorization? 
1.1.3 Can the members hunt animals without official authorization? 
1.1.4 Can the members use timber products without official authorization? 
1.1.5 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
1.2 Rights to manage 
1.2.1 Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community 
forest? 
1.2.2 Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management 
of the community forest? 
1.2.3 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
1.3 Rights to exclude 
1.3.1 Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other 
communities or investors? 
1.3.2 Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 
1.3.3 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
1.4 Rights to alienate 
1.4.1 Can the members transfer the community forest via inheritance? 
1.4.2 Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 
1.4.3 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
1.5 Fear of eviction  
1.5.1 Do the members fear of eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 
1.5.2 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
1.6 Legal recognition 
1.6.1 Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 
1.6.2 Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 
2. Pressing concerns 
2.1 Please list your top three concerns at present? 
3. Tenure preference 
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3.1 Would you like to receive title document to your communal forest land? 
3.2 If yes, what type of tenure would you prefer, i.e. communal or individual? And 
why? 
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Appendix 3 List of questions regarding REDD+ implementation for NGOs, donor 
organizations and government authorities 
1. From your perspective, what is the current situation related to tenure security of forest 
land in Thailand? 
2. Has the tenure security situation in Thailand improved or worsened, in your view? 
3. What have been the major events or influences of tenure security situation in Thailand? 
4. Please describe REDD+ from your understanding. 
• Activities? 
• Project level or national level? 
• Government/Department of National Parks or community as project 
developer? 
• Protected area or community forest? 
• Benefit-sharing structures? 
5. Is Thailand suitable for REDD+ development and vice versa?  
• If not, why and what are the appropriate alternatives for Thailand? PES? 
6. What should be the criteria for choosing REDD+ project site in your opinion? 
• Which level of pressure of deforestation should it have high/low/in between? 
7. In which location or region in your view are suitable for REDD+ development?  
• Why not other location or region? 
8. What are the main driving forces for REDD+ development in Thailand? 
9. What are the main obstacles for REDD+ development in Thailand? 
10. Is Thailand ready for REDD+ development?  
• If yes, why? 
• If not, please list three most urgent issues to be addressed in order to facilitate 
REDD+ development in Thailand. 
11. How do you perceive the relationship between land tenure and REDD+ in Thailand? 
12. How should tenure security/use rights be restructured to facilitate REDD+ development 
in Thailand?  
• Securing individual rights or collective rights? 
• How, e.g. individual land titling, communal land titling, a combination of 
individual and communal land titling, mapping of rights, ad-hoc agreements? 
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Appendix 4 List of questions regarding REDD+ implementation for project developers and 
local key informants 
1. From your perspective, what are the key BCI project’s objectives? 
2. What are the BCI activities implemented? 
3. What are the legal frameworks related to forest tenure that have been implemented in 
the local communities and what are their impacts? 
4. From your perspective, what is the current situation related to tenure security of forest 
land in the local communities? 
5. What are the causes of the tenure conflicts in forest land at present? 
6. What are the impacts of the project on tenure security of the community? 
7. Did the project meet your expectation? If not, why? 
8. What were the main obstacles of the project? 
9. How do you think the project could be improved? 
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Appendix 5 List of interviewees regarding REDD+ implementation 
Number Name Organization Type of organization 
1 Justin Foster World Wildlife Fund International NGO/donor 
2 Kantinan Peawsa-ad Department of National Park, Wildlife and 
Plant Conservation 
Government organization/ 
project developer 
3 Kittisak Rattanakrajangsri Indigenous Peoples’ Foundation for 
Education and Environment 
National NGO 
4 Pornpana Kuaycharoen Thai Climate Justice Group National NGO 
5 Prasert Tubaiyam Bongti Noi community Community committee 
6 Regan Suzuki RECOFTC International NGO 
7 Rungnapar Patanavibool Department of National Park, Wildlife and 
Plant Conservation 
Government organization/ 
project developer 
8 Sakol Kunapitak Suan Phung sub-district Community committee 
9 Somchai Lima Ton Mamuang community Community committee 
10 Somchat Teerasuwanajak Sai Yok district office Local public organization 
11 Somsak 
Soonthornnawaphat 
LEAF/Winrock International International NGO/Donor 
12 Stephen Elliot Forest Restoration Research Unit of 
Chiang Mai University 
International 
NGO/Research institute 
13 Sumit Pokhrel Asian Development Bank Donor/project developer 
14 Yongyuth Surbthayat Hmong Association National NGO 
15 Wirat Polrangsit Border Patrol Police school Local public organization 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6 List of questions regarding tenure-related legal framework implementation for 
local NGOs and local government authorities 
1. What is your role in relation to the local communities? 
2. What are the legal frameworks related to forest tenure that have been implemented in 
the local communities? 
3. What are the impacts of such legal framework implementation on tenure of the local 
communities? 
4. What were the main obstacles to implement the legal framework? 
5. From your perspective, what is the current situation related to tenure security of forest 
land in the local communities? 
6. Has the local tenure security situation improved or worsened, in your view? 
7. What are the causes of the tenure conflicts in forest land at present? 
8. How could tenure conflicts be alleviated?  
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Appendix 7 List of interviewees regarding tenure-related legal framework implementation 
Number Name Organization Type of organization 
1 Amphorn Pammongkol Suthep-Pui National Park Government organization 
2 Anand Ganjanapan Chiang Mai University Research institution 
3 Bunrongsak Sainoi Royal Project Foundation of Mae Sa Mai Local NGO 
4 Chaowit Chomketkaew Department of National Park, Wildlife and 
Plant Conservation Regional Office 16 
Government organization 
5  Charnwit Puangchan Land Office of Chiang Mai province Government organization 
6 Direk Jirachawalwisut Chao Poh Luang 7 school Local public organization 
7 Kaew Mon-ut Pong Yeang sub-district Local organization 
8 Pavinee Kumpetch Queen Sirikit Botanical Garden Local public organization 
9 Phnom Jaikeaw Suthep-Pui National Park Government organization 
10 Samutcha Ratchapukeaw Sai Yok Forest Park Government organization 
11 Taweesak Kornjiratikarn Mae Sa Mai community Community committee 
12 Duangjun Sansuya Pong Yaeng Tambon Administration 
Organization 
Local public organization 
13 Vichai Pusiripattanon Mae Sa Noi community Community committee 
14 Wichian Nantasinghareuk Land Office of Mae Rim district Government organization 
 
Appendix 8 Response of Mae Sa Mai community 
Question Female > 50 years old 
Female  
< 50 years old 
Male  
> 50 years old 
Male  
< 50 years old 
Village head and 
his assistant Total 
 
COMMUNITY FOREST 
Rights to access and to use Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain 
Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 0 
Can the members gather forest products for sale without official authorization? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 
Can the members hunt animals without official authorization? 2 8 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 3 7 0 0 2 0 5 34 0 
Can the members use timber products without official authorization? 8 2 0 9 1 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 36 3 0 
Rights to manage                   Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community forest? 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 0 
Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management of the community forest? 0 10 0 0 3 7 6 2 2 7 3 0 2 0 0 13 18 9 
Rights to exclude                   
Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other community or investors? 9 1 0 8 2 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 36 3 0 
Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 7 3 0 7 3 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 33 6 0 
Rights to alienate                   Can the members transfer the community forest to the next generation? 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 0 
Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 
Fear of eviction                   Do the members fear of forced eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 2 8 0 1 9 0 3 6 0 2 8 0 0 2 0 8 31 0 
Legal recognition                   Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 39 0 
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Appendix 9 Response of Mae Sa Noi community 
 
Question Female > 50 years old 
Female  
< 50 years old 
Male  
> 50 years old 
Male  
< 50 years old 
Village head and 
his assistant Total 
 
COMMUNITY FOREST 
Rights to access and to use Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain 
Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members gather forest products for sale without official authorization? 0 8 2 0 8 2 0 10 0 0 9 1 0 2 0 0 35 5 
Can the members hunt animals without official authorization? 0 10 0 1 9 0 0 10 0 3 7 0 0 2 0 4 36 0 
Can the members use timber products without official authorization? 4 6 0 9 1 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 33 7 0 
Rights to manage                   
Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community forest? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management of the community forest? 0 6 4 0 7 3 5 5 0 2 8 0 2 0 0 7 26 7 
Rights to exclude                   Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other community or investors? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 1 2 0 0 39 0 1 
Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 3 7 0 8 2 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 31 9 0 
Rights to alienate                   Can the members transfer the community forest to the next generation? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Fear of eviction                   Do the members fear of forced eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 4 6 0 0 10 0 1 9 0 2 8 0 0 2 0 7 33 0 
Legal recognition                   
Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
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Appendix 10 Response of Ton Mamuang community 
Question Female > 50 years old 
Female  
< 50 years old 
Male  
> 50 years old 
Male  
< 50 years old 
Village head and 
his assistant Total 
 
COMMUNITY FOREST 
Rights to access and to use Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain 
Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members gather forest products for sale without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members hunt animals without official authorization? 2 8 0 1 9 0 0 10 0 2 8 0 0 2 0 5 35 0 
Can the members use timber products without official authorization? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 2 8 0 0 2 0 2 38 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Rights to manage                   
Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community forest? 4 6 0 2 8 0 8 2 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 24 16 0 
Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management of the community forest? 3 5 2 0 10 0 1 8 1 2 8 0 2 0 0 6 31 3 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10  0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 Rights to exclude                   Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other community or investors? 7 3 0 8 2 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 35 5 0 
Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 0 10 0 2 8 0 1 9 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 3 37 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Rights to alienate                   Can the members transfer the community forest via inheritance? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 - 0 
Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Fear of eviction                   
Do the members fear of forced eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 10 0 0 10 0 0 6 4 0 4 6 0 1 1 0 30 10 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Legal recognition                   Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
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Appendix 11 Response of Bongti Noi community 
Question Female > 50 years old 
Female  
< 50 years old 
Male  
> 50 years old 
Male  
< 50 years old 
Village head and 
his assistant Total 
 
COMMUNITY FOREST 
Rights to access and to use Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain Yes No Uncertain 
Can the members enter and gather forest products for household consumption without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members gather forest products for sale without official authorization? 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 0 
Can the members hunt animals without official authorization? 1 9 0 1 9 0 1 9 0 3 7 0 0 2 0 6 34 0 
Can the members use timber products without official authorization? 2 8 0 1 9 0 0 10 0 3 7 0 0 2 0 6 34 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Rights to manage                   
Is the community responsible for maintaining and managing the community forest? 2 8 0 3 7 0 2 8 0 6 4 0 0 2 0 13 27 0 
Have the RFD/DNP officials been involved in the maintenance and management of the community forest? 7 1 2 8 2 0 9  1 10 0 0 2 0 0 34 3 3 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Rights to exclude                   Can the members exclude competitive land users that are villagers from other community or investors? 0 10 0 3 7 0 1 9 0 4 6 0 0 2 0 8 32 0 
Can the members exclude competitive land users that are RFD/DNP officials? 0 10 0 0 10 0 1 9 0 2 8 0 0 2 0 3 37 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Rights to alienate                   Can the members transfer the community forest via inheritance? 6 3 1 4 4 2 7 1 2 4 6 0 2 0 0 21 14 5 
Can the members sell the community forest to any interested party? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Fear of eviction                   
Do the members fear of forced eviction or withdrawal of rights to community forest? 7 3 0 9 1 0 6 4 0 8 2 0 2 0 0 30 10 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Legal recognition                   Do the members have any formal recognition of their rights to community forest? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
Have there been any changes due to the BCI project implementation? 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 40 0 
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